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PREFACE
In the summer of 1991, I travelled throughout Costa 
Rica for two months with some 20 other graduate students as 
part of a field course, Tropical Managed Ecosystems, 
sponsored by the Organization for Tropical Studies (OTS).
By participating in the course, I hoped to broaden my 
knowledge of the ecological aspects of Central American 
small-farm agriculture. Based on fieldwork I had conducted 
a year earlier in Costa Rica's Valle del General, I had 
intended to write my dissertation on changes in that coffee 
zone emanating from that locality's integration in the 
world economy. I had established many contacts in both San 
Jose and the village of Santa Fe de Pejibaye in the Valle 
General. In short, the next three years of my life were 
"mapped out."
During the OTS field course, however, my attention 
suddenly and unexpectedly turned to another area of Costa 
Rica. One of the research sites was a community called 
Hojancha in the Nicoya Peninsula, where local officials and 
farm families were experimenting with forestry as a means 
of reversing disturbing trends in poverty and land 
degradation. It was obvious from my first view of Hojancha 
that the community was quite different from other recent 
frontier settlement zones.
Santa Fe de Pejibaye provided me the opportunity to 
hone my skills as a field researcher of cultural geography
v
in Costa Rica. But, Hojancha called louder to me, and 
inticed me to go there instead to investigate the "big 
questions" about connectivity between a small farm 
community and the global economy. The present document is 
the result of eight memorable months of fieldwork in 
Hojancha and several additional months of archival and 
library research in San Jose and The United States.
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ABSTRACT
The "new regional geography" is an attempt to fuse 
traditional regional geography's concerns with cultural and 
environmental uniqueness of places, with political 
economy's regard for the nature of global and local 
structures guiding resource allocation. The approach 
infuses chorology with theory, and political economy with 
place-specific empirical research. Most studies 
exemplifying the new approach have been of industrial 
localities of Europe and North America.
This dissertation is a case study of regional 
transformation in a Third World locality, the canton of 
Hojancha, in Costa Rica's Nicoya Peninsula. The approach 
utilized is "critical chorology, 1 a variant of the new 
regional geography that fuses traditional chorology with 
aspects of critical social theory. Critical chorology is 
distinguished by its stronger focus on environmental 
change. The empirical findings of the study suggest that 
Hojancha's contemporary regional economic and environmental 
changes are linked to each other, and to structural changes 
in the world economy.
Hojancha's contemporary transformation has been 
remarkable. Until the 1950s, small farm production of 
basic grains and cattle, both for subsistence and market, 
dominated the locality's economy. The shift in emphasis 
toward market-oriented beef production bonded the region
more tightly with the global economy, but also marginalized 
nearly half the region's peasantry, and accelerated land 
degradation. To combat poverty and environmental 
deterioration, community leaders, led by the local priest, 
successfully lobbied the Costa Rican state and various 
multinational development agencies for assistance in 
constructing housing, improving infrastructure, and 
introducing forestry as a small farm persistence strategy.
A feature of Hojancha's "politics of place" is the 
distinctive connections between community leaders and the 
PLN, or National Liberation Party. Because of these 
connections, forestry, housing and infrastructure projects 
have materialized. Forestry, a centerpiece of the 
contemporary Hojanchan economy, has provided a basis for 
many smallholders to persist. Fluctuations in tree 
seedling markets, however, have reinforced social class 





The countries and subnational regions of the tropics, 
their societies, cultures and environments, are in a state 
of rapid transformation. The days are all but gone when 
significant numbers of indigenous or peasant peoples of the 
tropics lived in isolation from the "modern world." Images 
and reports of tropical indigenes-in-transition are staple 
items in today's documentary cinema, radio, and glossy 
print journalism. It is common knowledge that African 
herders, Pacific Island fisherfolk, and Central American 
farmers wear factory-made clothing, listen to factory-made 
radios, and sport factory-made tools. Sahelian herders are 
wearing "made-in-Mauritius" tee-shirts, Fijian fishermen 
are moving to Jamaican reggae music, and Central American 
farmers are felling forests with chain saws from North 
America.
Today, regions and places that are not plugged into 
the world economic system in multiple and cross-cutting 
ways are the exception. Similarities in clothing worn, 
culture consumed, or crops produced may give the illusion 
of an increasing homogenization of traditional peoples' 
lifestyles and livelihood patterns throughout the tropics. 
In part, this is true. But, at perhaps a more profound 
level, millions of villages, localities, and larger 
subnational regions of the Third World are each
1
experiencing participation in the world system in different 
and particular ways.
Geographers who study such particularities are once 
again finding themselves at the forefront of social science 
research. Traditional regional geography, or chorology, 
which provided the main focus for the discipline from the 
1920s until the 1950s, came under attack for being overly 
concerned with anomalies and description while ignoring 
underlying general laws and theory {Guelke 1977).
Adherents of the "new regional geography," however, argue 
that with the global economy's constant reshaping, to 
understand that system, the structures underlying it, and 
the regional reorderings it brings about all over the 
world, one must study how particular places adapt to and 
are changed by it (Sayer 1989).
Since the early 1980s, many geographers, particularly 
those disillusioned with positivist approaches, have been 
calling for such a "reconstructed regional geography" to 
integrate ethnography and political economy (Sayer 1989). 
This trend is borne out of a dissatisfaction not only with 
traditional chorology's idiographic emphases, but also with 
the overly-generalizing (or non-empirically substantiated) 
theories of political economy and logical positivism. 
"Theoretically informed empirical research" is a phrase 
Sayer (1989: 253) uses to describe the new approach. It is 
concerned with discovering the differences from place to
3
place of the effects and workings of larger scale (i.e., 
global and national) economic and social processes (Pudup 
1988: 379-81). One of its major premises is that social 
structures and spatial systems are created and recreated by 
people in specific places, an idea which political economic 
approaches too often ignore (Gilbert 1988: 208).
Objectives
This dissertation has interrelated theoretical and 
empirical objectives. It is an attempt to apply the new 
regional geography approach to the small region of 
Hojancha, a community in the central mountainous zone of 
Costa Rica's Nicoya Peninsula (Fig. 1-1). My goal in 
studying Hojancha has been to understand how the global 
political economy and local efforts have shaped the recent 
and dramatic changes in the community's economy, 
environment and society. The analysis is centered on the 
emergence of forestry as a strategy that offers many 
smallholders a means of subsistence and persistence. To 
accomplish my goal, I worked as a human geographer, at 
times viewing the people and place as a journalist might, 
to reveal Hojancha's story as revealed to me by Hojanchans. 
Through eight months of field research, I was able to 
recover the story behind Hojancha's regional formation 
through the efforts of its people to adjust to changing 
political and economic forces at different scales, and to 
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Like the studies categorized as traditional chorology, 
this study involved a holistic accounting of the many 
geographic facets of the region: its physical environment,
population characteristics, settlement history, economic 
activities, social structure and politics. But this 
dissertation goes beyond traditional chorology. I felt it 
necessary to understand more fully the crises the region 
has been forced to face and overcome throughout the 
twentieth century, and to understand the nature of 
Hojancha's connections with other regions of Costa Rica and 
beyond. I took a critical theoretical posture, and sought 
to uncover the "hidden” social phenomena imposing 
constraints and providing opportunities for the people of 
Hojancha in the living of their daily lives.
I call this blending of chorology and critical social 
theory "critical chorology." The prime advantage of 
critical chorology, as I will argue, is its ability to 
blend empiricism with those aspects of contemporary social 
theory concerning human uses of space (or the "social 
construction of space"), the meanings of place, attachments 
to place, and the political particularities of place. It 
treats the "locale," or region, as the "meeting ground," or 
the physical setting, of local actions of individuals and 
larger scale structural forces. Critical chorology also 
incorporates the physical and biotic aspects of environment 
which condition local action and structure alike.
6
Hojancha lends itself well to a regional study of this 
type. The story of the canton, or county, of Hojancha is 
unique by the standards of Guanacaste, the province within 
which it is located. The canton's settlement history was 
dramatically different from that of other parts of the 
province, in part due to its environmental characteristics. 
The community is culturally and ethnically different from 
neighboring cantones. Even the patterns of political 
affiliation are different from the rest of the province.
The case of Hojancha challenges much of the 
conventional wisdom concerning small rural regions located 
within the periphery of Central American countries.
Relative to most Central American localities, the community 
only recently began participating in the global economy, 
and hence, the process of capital formation. These 
activities, combined with the canton's infertile soils and 
steep slopes, have produced environmental degradation and 
poverty, a pattern typical of Central America. In recent 
years, however, Hojancha has departed from the typical 
Central American scenario. The region has in many ways 
surpassed neighboring communities of Guanacaste in terms of 
peasant persistence. For example, the small-farm forestry 
which today is in part a response to the community's recent 
crises, has enabled many small family farm units to survive 
intact. As a result, it has served to put Hojancha "on the 
map," to strengthen its linkages with other regions of
7
Costa Rica and beyond. Hojancha has become a center of 
innovation and diffusion of small-scale forestry 
technology. I will argue that these recent and dramatic 
changes are the "essence” of the region and regionalization 
of Hojancha.
The essence of the region of Hojancha, the meaning of 
that place to Hojanchans and others, and the various 
economic and political activities underlying the region are 
the outcomes of a series of "conjunctures" emanating from 
different places and operating at different scales. A 
series of historically-contingent events and actions have 
coalesced, forming and reforming the region. These 
conjunctures include changing social, economic, political, 
and environmental conditions, and other phenomena embedded 
in the local history, shaped by and shaping local 
biographies. When combined in place and time, these 
conditions have generated new outcomes, actions, and 
circumstances, subsequently leading to reconstitutions of 
the region. As Pred (1984:279) suggested, regions such as 
Hojancha can be viewed as "historically contingent 
processes" in which places "constantly become human 
products." I will argue throughout this work that 
Hojancha, the region, represents in effect a process of 
local people, or "agents," continually competing with those 
of other regions for scarce resources in an effort to 
achieve improvements in their way of life. Of course,
8
competition in the realms of production, markets, and power 
occurs within the region as well. Thus, structures exist 
at the local scale as well as at national and larger 
scales. The territory corresponding to this intra-regional 
competition coincides with the territory corresponding to 
the alliances formed out of common purposes. Both of these 
occur within the political boundary of the canton. The 
study area was, therefore, easily delineated, and the 
processes which comprise the field of inquiry of the 
approach of critical chorology were easily identified in 
the study area.
Methodology
Thrift {1983: 39) provides one possible methodological
outline for the new regional geography, and one that is
appropriate to critical chorology:
No doubt, any reconstituted regional geography can 
start conventionally enough with a compositional 
account of "the regional setting." This involves, 
first of all, all those geographical determinations 
that can be grouped under the general heading of 
topography; such things as geology, hydrology, and 
climatic conditions which have likely been changed 
already by the impacts of the societies over the 
years. An account of the organization of production 
in a region is then needed, which involves ascertain­
ing the level of the productive forces and the form 
of the productive relations, concentrating on the 
labour process. This emphasis leads, under capital­
ism in particular, to an outline of the class 
structure of a region. . .Finally, the local form 
of the state must be taken into account.
In following this approach, I have identified several
"constituent components" of the structures of the study
region's social relations. These include the " . . .
9
regionalization of the political and ideological processes 
of domination used to maintain the social relations of 
production" (Gilbert 1988: 209). That is, I found it 
necessary to identify and understand the way the region's 
identity has been constructed through day-to-day politics, 
and the day-to-day workings of the locality's economy. It 
was obvious to me upon my first visit to Hojancha that such 
processes lie at the heart of the region's uniqueness. In 
addition to the strong political component of Hojancha's 
regional identity, there exists an economic component. 
Markets for forestry and agricultural products are 
particularly influential in the formation and maintenance 
of the region's class dynamics, and by extension, the 
region's identity.
To identify and understand the nature of these 
structural properties and the actions on the part of local 
"agents" to adapt to, or even to alter, these structures, I 
carried out eight months of intensive field research in 
Hojancha. This research involved traveling the study 
area's remote and accessible roads on an enduro motorcycle. 
I conducted interviews of members of 88 families that 
operate farms, and 31 families earning their livelihood 
primarily through wage labor. I observed farm activities 
and related transportation and marketing activities on my 
numerous motorcycle "outings" throughout the study region.
I observed a variety of material indicators of living
10
standards, such as housing, modes of transportation, and 
farm equipment. I observed the condition of the landscape, 
which ranged from deliberate land improvements to 
unintentional land degradation.
I questioned farmers about their crop and livestock 
choices, and the reasons for them. I paid particular 
attention to diversity of activities with respect to farm 
size, land quality, and labor utilization. To aid in 
developing a typology of farm types, I asked each of the 
farm operators about their employment of labor and their 
own choices to hire themselves (or other family members) 
out as laborers on other farms. I interviewed wage 
laborers about their different activities and their success 
in finding work in each season. I found the ability of the 
region's economy to absorb its labor force to be seasonally 
variable. Appendix I is an explanation of the sampling 
technique I utilized to select these interviewees. 
Additionally, I found informal conversations with one or 
more Hojanchans at a time in such places as shops, bars, 
and restaurants to be quite illuminating. Such 
conversations typically revealed the nature of social and 
political structures in the community and what people think 
about them.
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter Two provides the theoretical underpinnings of 
critical chorology, an approach derived from the "new
11
regional geography." A review of the relevant literature 
will trace the origins of the new regional geography, and 
discuss its place not only within the discipline of 
geography but within the social sciences and social theory 
in general. It is shown to be a fusion of traditional 
chorology, a branch of geography often thought to be 
excessively idiographic and void of analytical content, 
with political economy, currently understood as a radical, 
usually Marxian, critique of capitalism often regarded as 
deterministic, overly explanatory and general, and lacking 
in empirical detail.
Adherents, including this author, believe the new 
approach is a synergistic improvement over those two ways 
of studying human interactions in places. It recognizes 
that capitalism operates at many scales, from the global to 
the local {Johnston 1987: 209-210; Soja 1985: 178}. The 
key to this synergy lies in critical chorology's inclusion 
of structuration theory, which posits that individuals are 
more than just passive recipients of the workings of the 
global economy. Instead, they are "agents" whose actions 
are not only successful in dampening the negative effects 
of the global economy, but can alter the structures of that 
economy to suit them (Johnston 1987: 217-218). Because 
capitalism operates at all scales, its structures, 
according to structuration theory, are essentially 
summations of all the local-level "agency." The locale, or
12
small regional setting, provides a window for viewing 
larger processes. Justification of the delineation of the 
study area is provided, based on the notion of scale 
posited in structuration theory.
The chapter also includes a review of theoretical 
literature addressing issues falling under the headings 
"peasant economy1 and "peasant persistence." Such issues 
include markets of peasant-produced commodities, the 
relative importance of production and consumption within 
the peasant economy, class structure in peasant societies, 
the linkage of poverty and environmental degradation, and 
other conjunctural factors relevant to Hojancha's regional 
identity. While various Marxian and Chayanovian theories 
of the peasant economy and peasant persistence provide 
useful insight into the relevance of production and 
consumption, most fail to account adequately for the role 
of non-labor commodity markets in patterns of dominance and 
subordination (Brass 1991; Bharadwaj 1985). This chapter 
provides a theoretical basis for reinserting markets into 
the analysis.
Also addressed in the chapter is a theory of the state 
and the crisis of legitimation it constantly faces. The 
theory, described by R. J. Johnston (1984), views the state 
as a mediator between different competing interests, 
switching sides as often as is necessary to maintain the 
dominant (e.g., capitalist) mode of production. I argue
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that such maneuvering by numerous government entities at 
various levels, is an integral part of Hojancha's regional 
processes.
Chapter Three provides a detailed description of the 
study area, the physical and historical setting where 
strucure and agency interact to create the unique place, 
Hojancha. Included are descriptions of the physical 
landscape, climate, terrain, soils, water resources, and 
recent transformations of the landscape, including changes 
in vegetation cover and economic land uses. The chapter 
includes a review of the literature of the legacy of the 
Chorotega, the pre-Columbian people of the mountainous 
central portion of the Nicoya Peninsula. Their mode of 
agriculture, and their trade with other Amerind groups are 
described.
The chapter also addresses early Spanish settlement 
and the subsequent transformations of the central Nicoyan 
mountainous zone from 1520 to the end of the nineteenth 
century. Among the key events described are the social and 
environmental impacts of the "conquest," including the 
plunder of the indigenous economy, the introduction of 
slavery, and the imposition of the encomienda system. In 
addition, the chapter discusses Nicoya's re-entering of the 
agricultural export economy through mule production and 
trade in the eighteenth century. Finally, the chapter 
addresses the effects on the Amerind economy of the
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privatization of property, the Costa Rican livestock boom 
of the nineteenth century, changes in the system of 
tribute, and the forced entry of Amerinds into the money 
economy.
The focus of Chapter Four is frontier settlement of 
Nicoya's central mountainous zone in the first half of the 
twentieth century. An important aspect of this historical 
period is the ethnicity change in frontier settlement, from 
"misplaced" Guanacasteco-mestizos to "Cartagos," or Whites 
from the Valle Central, the country's heavily populated 
coffee region. The dominant settlement form in this period 
was the small farm producing food crops for subsistence.
In the chapter, a number of conjunctures are discussed 
which underlie a series of transformations in land use, 
economy, society, and environment. These include.the 
deepening of market linkages for food crops and land, and 
the closing of the frontier in the 1930s. The latter 
created shortened fallow periods, accelerated 
deforestation, and increased land concentration. As a 
result, many unsuccessful smallholders were forced to work 
off-farm. Finally, the chapter includes an analysis of the 
region's locational competitive disadvantage in national 
basic grains markets, the subsequent decline of market- 
oriented production of basic grains, and the emergence of 
the Guanacastecan cattle boom in Hojancha. The cattle boom 
was solidified by increased global and national demands for
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beef, the comparative advantage of the region at small- 
scale cattle production, and the subsequent need for 
increased stocking rates.
Chapter Five examines the strengthened linkages 
between Hojancha and the global economy between 1960 and 
1980. The chapter describes the connections between 
Hojancha's changing society and landscape on the one hand, 
and the global and national economic and political forces 
underlying the canton's economic activities on the other 
hand. These macro- and meso-level forces became 
increasingly influential as capital accumulation expanded 
in the study area. During the period, the cattle crisis 
deepened, paving the way for a dramatic regional decline 
marked by dependency, depopulation, deforestation and 
poverty. Increased landlessness resulted in the dual 
processes of emigration and proletarianization of much of 
the peasantry. The lack of alternative cash-generating farm 
activities for many Hojanchans, combined with a declining 
compatibility of small-scale farms and cattle production, 
proved devastating to the Hojanchan economy. Increased 
stocking rates of livestock, and expanded grazing hectarage 
resulted in soil erosion and deforestation.
The Costa Rican state, in its efforts to maximize 
foreign exchange, has responded in multiple ways to global 
market trends in beef, coffee, and basic grains, the three 
main Hojanchan product categories in the 1960-80 period.
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Though not a labor-intensive activity, beef production has 
received the bulk of state agricultural credit, even in 
years when global demand for Latin American beef was less 
favorable. Consequently, marketing is well-developed at 
the national and provincial levels, and even at the local 
(study region) level. The dependency of Hojancha on 
international and domestic beef markets has remained to the 
present.
Basic grains, the traditional mainstay of the 
Hojanchan campesino economy through the 1950s, have not 
received the attention by the state that export-oriented 
crops have enjoyed. The primary reason for this neglect is 
the incapability of these crops to generate the foreign 
exchange earnings upon which Costa Rican development as a 
whole has become dependent. The chapter illustrates how 
international development agencies and other creditors of 
the state continue to dictate austerity measures 
disfavoring the basic grains sector, despite the fact that 
most Costa Rican campesinos are involved in producing the 
crops.
Coffee production, like beef, has become an important 
basis for Hojancha's connections with the global economy. 
The chapter provides a description of political and 
economic characteristics of coffee production and marketing 
at the international and national levels. The Costa Rican 
state's involvement in the coffee sector is described,
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particularly its development and support of the smallholder 
cooperative sector. Hojancha's relative success with 
coffee has come about through the establishment of a 
producer cooperative and the generally-favorable trends in 
international prices.
Chapter Six addresses the emerging small-farm forestry 
of the 1980s and 1990s, and discusses the conjunture of 
events and conditions underlying the shift toward forestry. 
These include outmigration, unemployment and 
underemployment, threats of further landlessness and 
environmental degradation from years of over-emphasis on 
cattle production, and emerging markets for forest 
products. The political economy of forestry involves more 
than simply the presence or absence of markets for forest 
products. The state and various multi-national financial 
institutions have created economic incentives for 
reforestation. As a result, the locality has become a 
center for forestry-related activities and their diffusion 
to other communities of the country. The changes in the 
Hojanchan landscape, society, and typology of farm 
production units resulting from forestry are discussed. 
These changes have occurred in conjunction with 
differential access to markets and resources among small, 
medium, and large producers. Hojanchan development 
involving forestry is characterized by uneven development,
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due especially to inadequate planning in the tree seedling 
market sector.
Chapter Seven discusses contemporary variations in 
land use in the study region. Forestry, to the extent that 
it has been adopted by Hojancha's campesinos, is seldom the 
only activity of a given farm unit. Land-use decisions are 
shown to be a function of several factors, including 
location with respect to roads, altitude, soil and slope 
conditions at the farm level, and farm size. Like land use 
decisions, development in general exhibits spatial 
variability throughout the study region. Variability in 
human geography between each of the study region's lowland 
and highland zones is discussed. Finally, the temporal and 
spatial geography of labor is discussed.
Chapter Eight examines the regional reconfiguration of 
Hojancha from 1955 to the present, with the aim of 
illustrating the applicability of the critical chorology 
approach to that small region. The chapter's main focus is 
Hojancha's politics of place, which involves forestry, 
small farm persistence, and the political distinctiveness 
of the locality within the Nicoya Peninsula and within 
Costa Rica. The study area's distinctiveness is considered 
within the longstanding ideology of Costa Rican 
exceptionalism. Structure, agency, and political 
connections between Hojancha and the Costa Rican state are 
highlighted. These factors underlie Hojancha's development
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as a core for the diffusion of small farm forestry and its 
associated technologies to other Costa Rican regions of 
reforestation. Through its political connections, the 
region has become a visible recipient of development 
subsidies in forestry, housing, and other economic sectors. 
Chapter Nine provides a summary and conclusions.
Conclusions
I argue throughout this work that a critical approach, 
which goes beyond description, is necessary to understand 
the dramatic changes that have occurred in that part of the 
Nicoya Peninsula since Wagner's (1958) classic study of the 
peninsula in the 1950s. He witnessed the beginning stages 
of the region's participation in the national and global 
economies. Many of the small-farm persistence mechanisms 
he observed have subsequently broken down. Only by viewing 
Hojancha as "a window onto wider processes" (Lovering 1989: 
10) of social and geographical relations can we understand 
the forces underlying the dramatic changes that have 
occurred there since the 1950s. Likewise, to understand 
the larger processes requires an examination of the actions 
of local people in a region such as Hojancha, as they 
continually react to, and attempt to influence, those 
structures.
CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE OF CRITICAL CHOROLOGY
While contemporary social theory has emphasized 
the historical specificity of social life, it 
has generally failed to acknowledge a similar 
specifficity in spatial terms. Traditional chor­
ology exhibited a studied preoccupation with the 
site-specific nature of places but proved in­
capable of integrating notions of regional 
structure within any wider conception of 
historical process. Refusing to appropriate for 
itself this necessary conceptual foundation, it 
became largely reduced to inductive description 
void of substantive analytical content (Warf 
1988: 341) .
Introduction
The approach known as "the new regional geography" is 
an attempt to address the contrasting weaknesses of 
traditional regional geography and political economy, and 
through combined reconstruction, create new ways of doing 
both. In turn, by merging the two, the discipline of 
geography can better position itself to meet the challenges 
of a changing world, and make original contributions to 
social theory. While Marxian political economy can make 
valid claims that it has surpassed previous or competing 
schools of thought in uncovering the inner workings of 
capitalism (Peet 1985), and other modes of production for 
that matter, it has not provided a sufficiently complete 
framework for understanding or explaining contemporary 
global social processes (Soja 1985, 1989; Lovering 1989). 
The economic restructuring which resulted from, and helped 
to create, the breakdown of Fordist-style industrial
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capitalism and the shift to a service economy in the 
economically advanced countries is regional in nature, a 
patchwork of tendencies and countertendencies across space 
and time (N. Smith 1987:60). Attention is turning now 
toward specific localities and the local ramifications of, 
and contributions to, these global developments. The new 
place-based approach challenges the widespread assumption 
of "modernist" social science that global development and 
its related technological advancements in communications 
are gradually eroding the differences between places (Agnew 
1987: ix; Entrikin 1989: 31).
Studies exemplifying the new regional geography have 
predominantly been of urban and/or industrial regions of 
the developed world, and particularly Great Britain.
Perhaps the best known example is the CURS project (the 
program of Changing Urban and Regional Studies), initiated 
by the Economic and Social Research Council of England, to 
study changes in that nation's economic geography emanating 
from Thatcher's neo-conservative regime (N. Smith 1987: 60; 
Cooke 1987). Works integrating place-specific empiricism 
and social theory in Third World rural areas, or peripheral 
areas within industrialized countries occupied by 
marginalized cultures, are few in number.1 This study, by 
using the "critical chorology" approach, a derivative of 
the new regional geography, is an attempt to provide a 
framework for understanding the multi-layered processes
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underlying regional change in the community of Hojancha, 
Costa Rica. This exercise is also designed to add to the 
body of literature of recent attempts to apply the new 
regional geography to a Third World peasant region, in this 
case within Central America.
The 1 Place” of the New Regional Geography 
in Geographic Thought 
A concern for the uniqueness of place, a prominent 
characteristic of the new regional geography, is not new to 
the discipline. Descriptive travel writings dating back to 
classical antiquity represent among the earliest 
foundations of geography {Livingstone 1992). Twentieth 
century attempts to define human geography in terms of 
place uniqueness can be separated into two main schools of 
thought, associated with Richard Hartshorne and Carl Sauer, 
respectively. These two versions of traditional 
"chorology" have tended to emphasize, to varying degrees, 
human-nature relationships such as agriculture. They 
exhibit aspects of science and art, of explanation and 
description (Entrikin 1991:15).
Hartshorne, (1939) following Hettner's prescriptions 
for geography, offered direction for the discipline during 
the mid-decades of this century. His approach focused on 
areal differentiation from place to place of interrelated 
phenomena (Guelke 1977: 2-3). Each region was itself a 
place of homogeneity with respect to the chosen
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characteristics, but was different from other regions 
(Johnston 1987: 39). Following from this philosophy was 
his insistence that the study of aggregated individual 
cases was necessary to elucidate generalizations, yet he 
doubted that a geography concerned with the idiographic, 
the unique, could ever practically become primarily a law- 
seeking science (Guelke 1977: 2-3).
Instead of areal differentiation as the focal point of 
study, the landscape was the primary topic of the "Berkeley 
School" of geography, founded by Sauer. Sauer and his 
followers have studied cultural features in the landscape 
as a means to understand cultural processes, to uncover 
what the landscape reveals about the people who have 
occupied and created it. Sauer's version of cultural 
geography begins with the earliest human occupation of a 
given place, considers the processes behind the landscape 
changes all the way to the present, and is, therefore, more 
deeply historical than Hartshorne's version (Johnston 1987: 
41-42).
Both the Hartshornean and Berkeley approaches have 
relevance for critical chorology. The Hartshornean concern 
for synthesizing the peculiar combinations of 
characteristics underlying regional uniqueness forms a 
partial basis for critical chorology's focus on the 
variability at the regional level of the workings of the 
global economy. As Johnston (1987: 42) suggests, the
Berkeley School's regard for diversity in landscapes and 
cultures, and its simultaneous recognition that the past 
conditions the present without strictly bounding 
contemporary human action, has parallels to "structuration 
theory," a useful concept to critical chorology described 
below. By failing to concern themselves with the inner 
workings of capitalism, however, geographers following 
these approaches have been ill-equipped to address 
landscape change and regional differentiation as they 
relate to social, economic, and political processes 
operating at multiple scales (Soja 1989: 36-37).
Traditional chorology has been widely criticized as 
academically isolated within the social sciences, and 
devoid of theory (Sayer 1989: 253-254; Archer 1993: 499). 
Post World War II geographers seeking to transform the 
discipline into spatial science attacked chorology as the 
mere description of places, an encyclopedic collection of 
facts (Pudup 1988: 369-70; Soja 1989: 38). Guelke (1977) 
has argued that Hartshorne's approach in particular is to 
blame for the decline of regional geography in the wake of 
the quantitative revolution, because of its emphasis on 
functional, as opposed to causal, relationships underlying 
spatial correlations. Furthermore, the Hartshornean 
emphasis on the spatial correlations of phenomena, rather 
than with the phenomena themselves (or even the causes of 
relationships) left chorology vulnerable to dismissal. In
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a similar vein, Duncan {1993: 518) argues that by placing 
culture at the center of analysis, rather than individuals 
and their social and political systems, Sauer failed to 
address adequately "the complexity of social structure."
In tracing the evolution of positivism within
geography, Warf {1988: 341) asserts that it was not without
faults of its own:
Regionalism was certainly not to be resurrected 
by the frozen geometries of positivism, in which 
a geography of "regions without theories" quickly 
became one of "theories without regions." The 
possibility of local uniqueness was abandoned in 
the search for "general laws" of explanation, 
whose function it was to show particular events 
to be the outcomes of more abstract forces.
Positivism's pursuit of general laws, then, did not
adequately accommodate the particular as anything but an
unexplainable anomaly or deviation.
The emergence of radical geography in the 1960s and 
1970s is in large part due to quantitative geography's 
continuation of the emphasis on functional spatial 
relationships and simple correlations, without addressing 
underlying causes of the relationships (Guelke 1977: 2-4).
A concern for the global problems of the day, such as 
overpopulation, poverty, and the threat of nuclear war, 
accompanied the assertion by Marxist social scientists that 
". . .science is (not) independent of its enveloping 
material conditions, . . .(but) in fact it is very much 
geared to its containing and constraining society. . ." 
(Johnston 1987: 194). That is, it plays an active role in
society and social process. Marxist geographers saw 
geography as a discipline particularly well equipped to 
address fundamentally the workings of capitalism, which 
they viewed as the very basis of the global problems.
These geographers rejected those paradigms of the 
discipline, such as positivism, which they saw as co-opted 
by bourgeois interests. By infusing Marxian theory into 
geographic study, they hoped to provide the powerless with 
a new set of tools to understand the nature of domination 
and subordination, and patterns of spatially uneven 
development that characterize the geography of capitalism 
(Soja 1989: 73-74).
Structural Marxism, like positivism, was largely 
concerned with universal laws, and as has been suggested, 
equally detached from "questions of everyday life" (Warf 
1988: 341). Cooke (1987: 71) argues that it ". . .offered 
deterministic, thus preordained, explanation, one result of 
which was to make research results unsurprising and thus 
uninteresting." Geographically uneven development is 
viewed as the shaping of places by the workings of global 
capitalism (Entrikin 1989: 32-33). Neo-Marxist and post­
structuralist radical geographers increasingly are 
recognizing the differences from region to region of the 
workings of global capitalism. They increasingly realize 
that social structures and spatial systems are created and 
played out in specific ways in specific places. These
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realizations provide the basis for a reconstructed regional 
geography (Gilbert 1988: 208, 214-15; Cooke 1987: 70-71). 
"Theoretically informed empirical research" is a phrase 
Sayer (1989: 253) uses to describe the new approach, which 
integrates ethnography and political economy to support the 
latter with empiricism.
Warf (1988: 342) is careful to point out that a "sound 
theoretical basis" remains important to the new regional 
geography, ". . .to avoid a collapse into a confusing 
welter of empirical data." By building upon theory, the 
new regional geography can respond to the realities of 
capitalism, whose inner laws involve the production of 
uneven development as a means of reproducing its social 
relations (Entrikin 1991: 21). To account for the 
processes through which economic and social relations are 
played out in regions, the traditional human-nature concern 
of chorology has been broadened to include society. In the 
new approach, ". . .the triangular relations between 
people, society, and nature. . ." are seen as the basis of 
region formation (Gilbert 1988: 210). The characteristics 
of places that typically are "listed" in traditional 
chorologic studies are placed in their social context in 
the new approach (Agnew 1989: 9) .
The Reinsertion Of Regions in Social Science
Four interrelated concerns of the new regional 
geography, or "contexts of reinterpretation of the regional
question" (Soja 1985: 176) can be identified. The first 
considers regions and their place within the geographically 
uneven development of capitalism (Soja 1985: 176). The 
persistence and intensification of spatially uneven 
development under capitalism, and the related 
transformations of regions, have prompted a reassessment 
within social science of the role of regional differences 
in portraying contemporary social, economic, and political 
processes (Murphy 1991). Spatial disparities, both medium 
and outcome of capitalist development, are produced at 
multiple scales. As Soja (1985: 178) asserts, this spatial 
character of capitalism should no longer be treated within 
social theory solely as a separate outcome of capitalism; 
therefore, encyclopedic descriptions of such patterns are 
insufficient. The regional phenomenon should be treated as 
integral to capitalist origins, development, and survival.
The second context considers regions within the 
geography of the changing spatial division of labor. It 
includes the complex mosaic of national and subnational 
regional differences which the changing spatial division of 
labor creates (Soja 1985: 175-6). Regions are portrayed ".
. .as the products of local actors situated within a wider 
division of labor" (Warf 1988: 342). The CURS project and 
its empirical studies of multiple localities in Britain has 
sought to identify and analyze the effects in those
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localities of global economic restructuring and its shifts 
in the spatial division of labor (Pudup 1988: 381).
The deepening of capitalism's global division of labor 
is increasingly seen as the basis for increased attachments 
to locality and even nationalistic sentiments throughout 
the world (Murphy 1991). As Warf (1988: 342) states,
1 (i)ndividual regions play different "roles" (that is, 
enjoy different comparative advantages) within the national 
and international division of labor." Just as workers' 
tasks are specialized in order to enhance productivity and 
corporate profits, regions have assumed increasingly 
specialized roles in the global production and reproduction 
of capital. And just as workers compete for recognition, 
salary increases, and even job security, regions must 
increasingly compete with one another for markets, 
political clout, state and private investment, and 
infrastructural development.
A third related context of regions in the new regional 
geography, and one that has particularly strong relevance 
in the case of Hojanchan development, is what Zimmerer 
(1991: 444) refers to as the "politics of place." This 
relates to the interactions of elites and subordinate 
groups, such as the rural peasantry in the Third World, and 
the spatially variable character of these interactions. 
Local politics is an essential feature of the spatial 
economic restructuring occurring in the world today
(Johnston 1987: 211). Indeed, Agnew (1987) has argued that 
political behavior at the level of multiple localities 
constitutes the national political systems that define the 
way global restructuring will occur in a given country. 
Furthermore, locality studies contribute to an 
understanding of the empowerment and/or disempowerment of 
economically marginalized groups. For example, much of the 
impetus of the CURS initiative had to do with the political 
(as well as economic) marginalization of some regions in 
Thatcher's Britain (Howitt 1992: 73). In his case study of 
highland Peru, Zimmerer (1991: 444) shows how the peasants 
in one locality historically resisted domination by estate 
owners, permitting them to successfully utilize the 
political arena to mobilize and pressure the state for 
needed subsidies for developing their montane wetland 
agriculture.
The fourth context within which regions are considered 
involves ". . .the retheorization of space in social theory 
and philosophy" (Soja 1985: 176). Patterns of spatially 
uneven development, an increasingly complex spatial 
division of labor, growing regional sentiments or 
attachments to place, and the formation of regions around 
some common political cause or action are among the events 
which many theorists view as "the social production of 
space" (Soja 1985: 176). The social production of space
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provides a place for regions and regional processes within 
social theory.
Soja {1985: 177-78) identifies five key premises of 
the contemporary retheorization of space, all of which have 
particular relevance to critical chorology. First is the 
"existential link between spatiality and human agency," or 
more simply, the fact that existence, action, and thought 
occur in space and are conditioned by space; they do not 
occur on the "head of a pin." Secondly, parallel to the 
Marxian notion that humans make their own history but not 
under conditons of their own choosing, the reinsertion of 
space in social theory implies that humans create their own 
geographies, but these are conditioned by prior geographies 
and histories. Thirdly, space is seen as both a medium and 
an outcome of social practices. Soja refers to this 
combining of social and spatial relations as the "socio- 
spatial dialectic." The fourth premise is related to the 
third: social relations are spatially concrete. Fifth, the 
social construction of space is characterized by conflict 
and contradiction, and therefore, is filled with ideology 
and politics.
Perhaps the work most commonly associated with the 
reinsertion of space and place in social theory is that of 
Anthony Giddens (1984), and his theory of structuration. 
Unlike the structural Marxism of Althusser (1982), 
structuration theory places the individual at the center of
analysis. Individuals and their behaviors constitute 
action, or "agency," but the capabilities of agents to act 
is always constrained in some way by institutional 
contexts, or societal structures. Despite this boundedness 
of action, agents are knowledgeable and aware of their 
capabilities to maneuver within the institutional 
(structural) contexts. These structures are themselves not 
only constraining, but enabling with respect to human 
action. ■ Thus, structure and agency are dialectically 
intertwined; that is, they constitute a mutually- 
reinforcing duality. Even the most seemingly powerless 
members of society are able to achieve at least some degree 
of control over conditions of their social existence 
(Giddens 1982: 29-32).
Structuration theory is not a negation of structural 
Marxism, but rather builds upon it by adding human action 
to society's materialist base. What it rejects are 
structural Marxism's reification of economic structures, 
the treatment of individuals as passive recipients of the 
economic whole, and the treatment of economic processes as 
the cause of human behavior (Johnston 1987: 217-18).
Within structuration theory, regions are viewed as the 
contexts, or settings, for the various social, political, 
and economic processes; the playing fields of the various 
structure-agency interactions (Pudup 1988: 383).
Individual thoughts and actions are located within specific
historical and regional contexts. For example, through 
learning in particular places, people develop their 
interpretations of the social structure of each place, and 
their position within that structure (Johnston 1987: 210) . 
Regional geographers are, therefore, able to recognize the 
differing ways the people of different places interpret 
their conditions, and transform their resources and value 
systems in response (Warf 1988; Zimmerer 1991).
Giddens (1984: 118) defines a "locale" as the use of 
space as a setting of interaction. It is more than just 
the combination of physical geographic features and human 
artifacts in a particular location, but is also the context 
of social interactions, and as such, is a human construct. 
Locales express the spatial (as well as temporal) 
structures of peoples' lives (Thrift 1983: 40). A region, 
too, is more than just a spatially-defined localization, 
but is defined by some specified sets of "routinized social 
practices" occurring in space (Giddens 1984: 119). When 
enough of these intersect spatially, with a common node or 
focal point, a region, a "structure of interaction," 
comprised of different but connected settings for 
interactions, exists (Thrift 1983: 40). Pred (1984: 279) 
takes the idea a step further, and describes the region as 
". . .a process whereby the reproduction of social and 
cultural forms, the formation of biographies, and the 
transformation of nature ceaselessly become one another."
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The way in which the region-as-process originates and 
develops, varies with historical circumstances, and is, 
therefore, not subject to universal laws.
The functioning of agency in altering political 
economic structures that affect Third World or other 
peripheral regions of the world, has been described in a 
small number of recent studies. Warf (1988) applies 
structuration theory to describing regional change in the 
Pacific Northwest timber region. His analysis portrays 
timber and sawmill workers and their acts of protest as 
playing a definitive role in the shaping of economic and 
social conditions in the region. Zimmerer (1991) similarly 
applies the theory in his portrayal of peasants of the 
Colquepata district of highland Peru, and their effective 
lobbying of the social democratic government for subsidies 
to develop agricultural infrastructure. In a contrary way, 
however, Howitt (1992) effectively shows how Australian 
Aboriginies in places such as Alice Springs and Tanami, are 
effectively blocked from exerting more than minimal 
influence over the conditions of their lives, because of 
state policy. He argues that, for the most marginalized 
groups of the world, there are limits to the power of 
agency; structure, in effect, has the final word.
In sum, regions, comprised of the networks of locales 
elaborated in structuration theory, are relevant to social 
theory, and of fundamental import to critical chorology,
because social interaction occurs in specific ways in 
specific regional settings. For example, uneven 
development and the global division of labor which 
characterize capitalism translate to regional differences. 
The way capitalist structures are played out differently in 
different places has a lot to do with the "meaning of 
place" in each location, the different forms of attachment 
to place, and how individuals interpret structures 
differently and act (and react) as agents in different ways 
(Entrikin 1991: 21-22). Also underlying regional 
differences are the different power struggles occurring at 
different scales. Inter- and intra-regional power 
struggles, which arise out of the unique networks of social 
interaction, are both the medium and outcome of regional 
differentiation (Gilbert 1988: 213). Likewise, the 
physical and bio-geographies of a region, such as Hojancha, 
condition and are conditioned by social, economic, and 
political processes occurring at the scale of the region, 
as well as at larger (i.e., national, global) scales.
Stated somewhat differently, the relevance of regions 
to social theory is that they can function as a window for 
viewing wider social, economic, and political processes.
As Lovering (1989: 9) notes, these systems ". . .do not 
exist without people, (who). . .engage with each other, in 
their different contexts and roles, in such a way that 
these relationships constitute macro-social institututions.
36
. . .The economy is, after all, made up of people." In 
short, people are active participants in transforming or 
maintaining the structural conditions of their livelihood.
A number of small-scale locality studies will not 
simply represent a number of separate idiographic studies, 
completely dependent upon context, but in fact can inform 
general theory by broadening the vocabulary with which we 
analyze macro-level or meso-level systems. To do this, 
however, requires the recognition that capital formation is 
not a process disengaged from local context, but originates 
and is actualized in particular places (Sayer 1989: 260- 
61). The specific ways in which the commodity-producing 
system affects and is affected by local areas are neither 
predetermined nor predictable, because they involve the 
day-to-day perceptions and actions of ordinary people (Warf 
1988: 342). Likewise, regional change does not occur in 
isolation, and should, therefore, be considered in its 
larger interregional context. Regional change and regional 
identity simultaneously shape and are shaped by mutually 
influencing local- and wider-scale spatial processes.
Defining a Region's Extent:
Hoiancha's "Regional Character”
Whether place refers to a village or a metropolis, 
an agricultural area or an urban-industrial complex, 
it always represents a human product. Place, in 
other words, always involves an appropriation and 
transformation of space and nature that is insep­
arable from the reproduction and transformation of 
society in time and space (Pred 1984: 279).
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As I discussed in the previous section, a region is 
the "playing field" where social structures and individual 
actions interrelate. The social structures are comprised 
of mutually influencing social, economic, and political 
processes occurring at different scales, and played out 
spatially in regions of different scales. These processes 
and the individuals in a region are mutually influential; 
the processes arise in regions, and reflect back on 
regions. Regional differences represent the different 
interpretations, experiences and actions individuals in 
different locations have with respect to the processes. 
Regional changes are the outcomes of shifts in the balance 
of interactions between region and structure, and between 
region and region, at multiple scales.
A region, then, is more than just a spatially-
delineated location but is defined by some specific set of
social practices characteristic of the location (Giddens
1984: 119). In the new regional geography, a region is
. . .the spatial organization of the social pro­
cesses associated with the mode of production: the 
regionalization of the social division of labor; 
the regionalization of the process of capital 
accumulation, organized as a net of interwoven 
partial accumulation processes that have defined 
territorial bases; the regionalization of the 
reproduction of the labour force, whose logic 
relates the region of labour markets to the 
spatial organization of population; and the 
regionalization of the political and ideological 
processes of domination used to maintain the 
social relations of production (Gilbert 1988: 209).
Often, the different networks comprising the 
particular, localized social structures will overlap 
territorially to a significant degree, but rarely exactly.
A shared local interest, however, emerges, providing a 
basis for regional identity (Cox and Mair 1989: 128-29) . 
Examples include overlapping market and information 
networks associated with dominant sectors of the economy of 
a given area, such as agriculture, or a real estate 
development/banking .economic complex. By carefully 
defining and studying the dominant sectors of a given 
locality, a region can be delineated that is not arbitrary 
(Cox and Mair 1989: 129).
As long as a group within an area is influential 
enough to develop regional norms, the region becomes 
sharply defined and differentiated from others. If no such 
social structure exists, the area will be absorbed by 
another region with a dominant group that has created its 
own regional unity (Gilbert 1988: 217). The implication of 
this idea is that "the politics of place" are especially 
important in region formation and regional identity. 
Critical chorology must, therefore, be attuned to the role 
of local political action in economic restructuring as it 
affects (and originates in) particular regions (Cox and 
Mair 1989: 129).
Obviously, the more complex the institutional 
framework is, and the more extensive the web of social
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interaction characterizing a given location, the larger the 
region is (Murphy 1991: 24; Giddens 1984: 122). Also, 
depending on what the dominant economic and/or political 
forces of an area are, the size of the region will vary; 
some activities encompass more territory than others.
Likewise, as the nature of the activities and their
social institutional contexts varies, so too do the extent
of "core" and "periphery" dichotomies within and between
regions. Core-periphery relationships exist at many
scales, the largest of which is the "World System,"
comprised of core states and peripheral areas (Wallerstein
1976). Within a given country, such as Costa Rica,
spatially-fixed "establishments" exist, which ". . .lie at
the core of the structuration of dominant classes" (Giddens
1984: 131-32). Core-periphery dichotomies also exist all
the way down to intraregional scales, such as within
provinces, counties, towns, or even within smaller locales.
But, the boundaries between core and periphery are often
blurred in much the same way as the boundaries between
social classes. As Soja (1985: 181) argues,
. . .there is no necessity that core and periphery 
be rigidly bounded or permanently fixed. Individuals 
in their lifetime can move from one class to another 
and back again, without destroying the antagonistic 
class structure of capitalist society. So too can 
areas and regions shift over time from core to 
periphery--and back again--without destroying the 
structural meaning of core-periphery relations in 
capitalist spatiality.
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Just as there are middle classes, so too are there semi- 
peripheries (Wallerstein 1976: 231-33).
In many ways, Hojancha's "structuration of peasant 
persistence" has created a place for this study area within 
the semi-periphery of Costa Rica. This was not always the 
case. Until the region became a canton {county) of 
Guanacaste Province, it was firmly within the periphery of 
Costa Rica and the World System. As I argue in Chapters 
Six and Eight, the efforts of local agents have resulted in 
the establishment of Hojancha as a core region for the 
diffusion of small-farm forestry products and technology. 
This in turn has led in many (but by no means all) cases to 
upward social mobility. It is worth noting that if recent 
trends in the marketing of tree seedlings continue (Chapter 
Six), Hojancha could once again occupy a place wholly 
within the Costa Rican periphery.
The study area of this work, where I conducted the 
fieldwork and interviews, corresponds roughly to the 
northern half of the canton, or the portion containing some 
four-fifths of the canton's population. It is easily 
defined as a region, by virtue of its "web of social 
relations," a number of social, economic and political 
occurrences which roughly coincide spatially (See Fig. 3- 
2). The southern portion of the canton lies outside of 
this web. Other than by cantonal boundary, it is not 
linked to the northern portion in any significant way. The
41
southern portion has developed a separate regional 
identity, based on the coastal resort of Puerto Carrillo 
and a 3,OOO-plus-hectare, foreign-owned teak plantation.
Its inclusion in the study area would, therefore, not be 
appropriate.
As explained in Chapter Three, the study area's unique 
(by Nicoyan standards) physical geography, characterized by 
small, steep mountains and intermontane valleys, forms a 
partial basis for regionalization. So too do that area's 
unique colonial and post-independence settlement histories. 
The devastation of so many of the study area's small- and 
medium-sized farms from the "cattle boom" of the 1960s and 
1970s, was unique not only by Nicoyan and Guanacastecan, 
but also Costa Rican standards. Individuals in the region 
recognized a common purpose, and so created a political 
region (a canton) in 1972 to enhance political lobbying 
efforts as a means of overcoming these cattle-related 
problems. Contemporary regional identity is based on, and 
reinforced by, small farm forestry and the political 
mobilization resulting in the development of that and 
related activities. The "politics of place," then, is 
perhaps the most important context for interpreting the 
regionalization of the Hojanchan study area.
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Conjunctures and Critical Chorolocrv:
A Reinterpretation of the New Regional Geography 
for Third World Rural Localities 
To apply the "new regional geography" to a Latin 
American peasant-dominated locality, it was necessary to 
incorporate the historical and ecological dimensions of 
Hojancha's regional formation to perhaps a greater extent 
than is normally the case with that approach. The 
advantages of traditional chrorology, especially its 
holistic description of place, are especially evident in a 
region such as the Hojanchan study area. The inclusion of 
pre-colonial indigenous settlement and land use is 
essential to this study, because it formed the foundations 
for settlement and land use in all subsequent periods of 
the region's history, including the present. The relation 
between humans and landscape for the nearly two millennia 
of human occupation of Hojancha is best described as close 
or "intimate," and as such, requires the inclusion of a 
description of the region's topography and soils.
The dramatic changes throughout the region's 
historical geography of settlement and land use are the 
results of "conjunctures" of social, political, economic, 
and ecological events. Regions, such as Hojancha, are not 
formed out of a sequence of independent events in a 
specific portion of the earth's surface. Instead, they are 
formed out of a historically determined sequence of
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connected events that nowadays involve the workings of 
capitalism at various scales (Gilbert 1988: 216; Watts 
1987: 292-98). The conjuncture, as a "constellation" of 
global, national, and subnational forces, arising out of 
crises and forming new ones, often involves environmental 
change (Watts 1987).
In studying marginalized rural localities of the 
world, it is necessary to examine the underlying diverse 
"mechanisms of marginalization,1 and the "linkages to wider 
social processes" (Howitt 1992: 77). The conjuncture is a 
crucial feature of critical chorology, because it links a 
traditional rural locality and its specific, localized 
activities with the global political economy. Furthermore, 
the elusive duality of "tendencies and counter-tendencies," 
and the "contradiction between equalization and 
differentiation" that characterize geographically uneven 
development, are conjunctural; that is, they are specific 
to time and place (Soja 1985: 179). The understanding of 
conjunctures makes possible the understanding of Hojancha's 
unique movement from periphery to semi-periphery; the 
upward social mobility of many of Hojancha's peasants in an 
age of increasing marginalization of the Costa Rican 
peasantry in general.
Critical Chorolocry and the Environmental Dimension
The linkage of environment and peasant well-being in 
Third World locales is an increasingly important element of
conjunctures. This linkage, therefore, is essential to 
critical chorology. The theoretical literature on Third 
World rural development is recognizing more and more the 
fundamental importance of linking environment and 
socioeconomic conditions (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987,* de 
Janvry and Garcia 1988; Gradwohl and Greenberg 1988; Hecht 
and Cockburn 1989; Mellor 1988; Oram 1988; Parsons 1976; 
Yapa 1979, 1982, 1990). According to Mellor (1988: 8), 
"(i)n developing countries, environmental problems and 
poverty are inseparable." Traditional farming is generally 
more sustainable ecologically than are modern-day peasant 
farming systems, because it includes a rationality of 
sustainability. Once peasants produce primarily for 
exchange and cease production strictly to meet family 
needs, their production is no longer diverse, and 
sustainable practices are abandoned (Toledo 1990: 53).
Because of land scarcity, due in large part to market- 
driven land tenure inequities, Latin American peasants 
increasingly are forced to make their livings on fragile, 
marginal lands appropriate only for trees and grasses. De 
Janvry and Garcia (1988) argue that land concentration 
creates the need for landless or land-poor peasants to work 
for wages on other farms, a process they call "semi- 
proletarianization,1 and a process which ultimately reduces 
the incentive to use land in a sustainable way or to adopt
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sustainable practices. This problem is particularly acute 
in the hilliest, most rugged areas of Latin America.
Parsons (1976: 121-23) described the transition from 
forest to pioneer small farms to pasture that has degraded 
much of the Central American landscape. Unsustainable, 
wasteful subsistence farming practices in recent decades 
have led to decreased soil fertility, and peasants reacted 
in one of two ways: they expanded farming onto still more
marginal lands, or they sold their land to cattle ranchers. 
Both resulted in further land degradation and a 
strengthened cycle of poverty.
Further threats to sustainable peasant economies and 
land uses result from various complications in the 
production process and in the market place. Painter (1987: 
165-82) found that impoverishment and environmental 
destruction in the eastern Bolivian lowlands are linked. 
Both are ". . .the products of relations of unequal 
exchange that are established between a settlement area and 
the larger society." Peasants often are faced with credit 
discrimination, unreliable availability of inputs, and 
unequal access to markets, technical assistance and 
technological innovations (Soto 1990; Alfaro 1990; Painter 
1987). Price fluctuations and programs of economic 
structural adjustment, which normally call for price 
ceilings on grain crops, further reduce peasant incentives 
to adopt sustainable practices, and instead promote
expansion of market-oriented crop production onto marginal, 
ill-suited lands. As a result, poor agricultural practices 
and their low yields translate to low income.
These problems are illuminating for Hojancha, because 
sustainable forestry and agriculture can only work on the 
fragile lands there if they meet the economic and social 
needs of the small-scale producers (Yapa 1979, 1990).
In short, peasant farming strategies are formulated 
and carried out not only within the framework of 
overarching economic, social and political forces, but 
occur within varying (and often dynamic) environmental 
settings. Peasants attempt to simultaneously achieve 
upward social mobility and long-term security (Popkin 1979; 
Barlett 1982; Reinhardt 1988; Llainbi 1988) . Success 
depends upon the maintenance of productive resources (i.e., 
soils.) The latter, in turn, depends upon the peasant's 
ability to "make ends meet," to avoid a situation in which 
declining terms of trade outstrip the ability to increase 
yields in a sustainable fashion.
Peasant Persistence. Peasant Markets and 
the Political Economy of Hoiancha 
An important area in which Marxian and Chayanovian 
theories of peasant societies and economies differ is the 
question of social class formation. To Marxists, social 
class differentiation occurs within the peasant category. 
Some peasants exhibit upward mobility and become small-
scale capitalist fanners, while others "disappear" as farm 
operators and become wage labor. Marxists view classes 
first in productive terms (i.e., the relationship of a 
given class to the means of production) and later in terms 
of their revolutionary potential. Theoretical descendents 
of the Russian agricultural economist, Alexander Chayanov, 
view peasants as individuals, emphasizing persistence and 
consumption at the family level. They have little regard 
for social differentiation within the peasantry, but a 
strong regard for subordination of the peasantry to other 
sectors of society. Individual peasant families initiate 
changes only to meet their consumption requirements, or to 
simply persist (Brass 1991).
Peasant persistence, or the maintenance of the 
smallholder productive farm unit in the face of increasing 
penetration of capitalist development, is a topic of 
considerable debate among Chayanovian and Marxian social 
scientists. Chayanovian scholars argue that persistence is 
commonplace, given the nature of peasant production. Most 
Marxists argue that peasant disappearance is the more 
likely outcome (Reinhardt 1988: 17-18; Llambi 1988: 351) .
According to the Chayanovian position, the peasant 
family unit is simultaneously a unit of production and 
consumption, whose main objective is to meet its 
consumption needs and its outside obligations, such as 
taxes and rent. As such, it constitutes a separate "mode
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of production" that functions in much the same way under 
capitalism, feudalism, or socialism. It, therefore, can 
maintain itself within a broad range of social contexts, 
regardless of the dominant mode of production {Shanin 1973: 
67, 78; Brass 1991: 175). Because family members provide a 
major portion, if not all, of the peasant farm unit's 
labor, wage obligations are less of a problem to the 
peasant unit than to a capitalist farm unit. If prices 
received for crops are lower due to competition, the family 
members have only to work harder to increase output to make 
up for the loss in revenue (Lehmann 1986: 603). Peasants 
persist, then, because they ultimately can produce 
agricultural commodities more cheaply than capitalist farm 
units, which face wage obligations. Various levelling 
mechanisms, such as the partitioning of landholdings 
through inheritance, adverse weather conditions, and 
control by outsiders over markets and credit, serve to keep 
the peasant family unit from achieving upward social 
mobility or accumulating capital (Shanin 1973: 71).
According to the classical Marxian position, such as 
that elaborated by de Janvry (1981: 106-109, 121, 172-173), 
the smallest family farm productive unit cannot effectively 
compete with capitalist farms, because the latter possess 
the economies of scale to drive per-unit production costs 
down. Accordingly, this forces the smallest peasant 
productive units out of business. Furthermore, the larger,
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more successful peasant enterprises will benefit at the 
expense of their less fortunate neighbors, and will 
themselves become small-scale capitalist farms. In short, 
the peasant eventually becomes either laborer or 
capitalist.
Empirical evidence suggests that both the persistence 
and non-persistence points of view have applicability to 
the Hojancha case. As explained in subsequent chapters, 
much of the peasantry was unable to persist once cattle 
production became the dominant economic activity by the 
1960s. Many families lost their land and were forced to 
emigrate from the region or work as wage labor. Other 
peasant farm units have persisted through coffee production 
and forestry. Still others have achieved upward mobility, 
becoming small-scale capitalist, through coffee or tree 
seedling production. Ironically, tree seedling production 
has not worked to the benefit of all Hojanchan peasants 
participating in that activity. Instability in seedling 
markets has forced some smallholders to abandon the 
activity, and revert to earning off-farm wages for their 
livelihood.
Within political economy studies, the role of markets 
of peasant products is a topic of great debate. Typically, 
markets and marketing are not the central themes in Marxian 
or Chayanovian analyses of the peasant economy (Ellis 1983: 
214). Within Chayanovian approaches, markets are
50
subordinate to consumption behaviors on the part of 
peasants. In Marxian works, the category "production" 
generally subsumes market relations involving non-labor 
commodities. Orthodox Marxists have criticized adherents 
of Dependency Theory and other neo-Marxists who emphasize 
circulation (market and exchange relations) over productive 
relations. Such an emphasis, argue the classical Marxists, 
over-emphasizes external factors, thereby obscuring 
internal class configurations (Kay 1989).
In a singular neo-Marxian analysis of agricultural 
exchange relations, Bharadwaj (1985) points out that market 
relations have had differing impacts upon different strata 
within the social hierarchy of Third World farm families. 
Prices, and non-price factors such as personal dominance 
and power, permit exchange relations to enhance the 
positions of some families while pauperizing others. In 
such markets ". . .there are dominant parties. . .who set 
the pattern as well as the terms and conditions of 
exchange" (Bharadwaj 1985: 11) . Tax obligation and 
commoditization of land reinforce these patterns by binding 
peasants to market-oriented production.
In his study of campesino (peasant) settlement toward 
the western end of the Valle Central of Costa Rica and 
beyond, from the latter nineteenth to mid-twentieth 
centuries, Samper (1990) demonstrates how market, exchange, 
and credit relations were of paramount importance in the
formation and maintenance of an "historically specific 
concept of agrarian capitalism." Merchant elites 
controlled the credit and processing ends of the coffee 
industry, but promoted a continuation of campesino control 
of land and of the production of the coffee bean itself. 
This latter strategy enabled elites to dominate marketing 
and credit without having to compete with a landed, coffee- 
growing elite for control of these functions. Thus, within 
this specific Costa Rican process of agrarian capitalism 
was a particular set of social relations based on elites' 
marketing of campesino-produced commodities and control 
over the credit peasants relied on.
Similar to Samper, Carol Smith (1977) takes a neo- 
Marxian stance on the importance of markets to 
socioeconomic structures affecting peasants. Not only have 
peasants been drawn into the global capitalist economy, but 
they are dependent upon it. Market mechanisms affect 
peasants differently; some benefit, while other lose ground 
(literally and figuratively.) It is the type of markets, 
rather than the degree of market integration, that explains 
differences in peasants' economic experiences and their 
economic behavior: a well articulated market with multiple 
outlets for peasant-produced commodities will result in 
greater ability to overcome terms of trade problems, which 
typically disfavor peasants.
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Smith {1977: 144) further argues against the orthodox 
Marxian over-emphasis on productive relations and de­
emphasis of markets:
Marketing systems are more than reflections 
of the organization of production; they also 
constrain the organization of production by 
promoting differences in the way that commod­
ities and factors of production are priced 
and allocated.
By factors of production, she means land, labor and
capital. Thus, commodity markets are an important
component of the social relations of production. In any
market, ". . .the terms of trade will always favor the one
who can wait or find other exchange parties. . ." (C. Smith
1977: 118). Those with such options are the ones who
determine market price. A peasant producing a perishable
commodity in place of subsistence products realizes no
value from the product of his labor until he rids himself
of it in the marketplace (Gudeman 1978: 121-22). In
effect, the peasant producing for market has lost most of
his control over the productive means.
Gudeman (1978: 28) further argues that the unequal 
terms of trade which peasants inevitably face means that 
prices for goods they purchase (many of which they formerly 
produced on the farm before participating so heavily in the 
market) increase faster than prices for the goods they 
produce for sale. Painter (1987: 165-66, 174, 178-82) 
links such flaws in market mechanisms to the peasant's need 
for expansion of crop production onto fragile lands, and
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hence to land degradation. These phenomena place exchange 
relations squarely within the structure. Gudeman 
reiterates, however, that the initial distribution of the 
factors of production condition exchange relations; he does 
not argue for the primacy of exchange relations.
In the critical chorology of the Hojanchan study area, 
an explicit focus on markets arguably stands to enhance 
both Marxian and neo-Chayanovian analyses, since market 
relations are an important mechanism by which the region's 
social relations of production are reinforced (a Marxian 
concept), and the means by which the contemporary campesino 
family maintains its consumption behavior {a Chayanovian 
concept). By focusing on markets in subsequent chapters, I 
place my analysis squarely between the two approaches. For 
example, the marketing of tree seedlings, characterized by 
falling prices and market saturation, underlies Hojancha's 
contemporary social class formation. At the same time, such 
markets influence the prospects for campesino persistence 
in the region.
Critical Chorolocrv and the Role of the State 
At the heart of the contemporary socioeconomic trends 
which befall the campesinos of Costa Rica are the economic 
policies of the state. The state carries out a range of 
taxation, pricing, investment, credit, and other fiscal 
policies which, in addition to market forces, influence the 
production decisions of campesinos. The state's
development policies from the late 1940s through the 1960s 
exhibited the typical Latin American pattern of reliance on 
exports of primary goods to finance imported technology and 
capital goods for urban industrialization (del Aguila 1982: 
370). Import substitution policies involving high tariffs 
on imported consumer goods intensified in the 1960s, and 
have largely been maintained to the present (Rottenberg 
1993: 134-136). Subsequently, exports of coffee and 
bananas have been a cornerstone of Costa Rica's neo-liberal 
development strategies (Gayle 1986: 87-91; IDB 1988: 388). 
Another cornerstone has been the Programa de Ajuste 
Estructural (PAE), or structural adjustment, a strategy 
designed to control inflation and reduce the cost of labor, 
to make the export sector more competitive in the world 
market (Alfaro 1990: 97-100; Soto 1990: 235). The 
continuation, albeit in modified form, of import 
substitution strategies along with the strengthened neo­
liberal posture of the state (Gayle 1986: 81-85), is an 
ironic feature of Costa Rican development policy, and one 
which exemplifies the country's contemporary 
exceptionalism.
The neo-Marxian theory of the state described by R. J. 
Johnston (1984) is appropriate for critical chorology, 
because it is framed within the perpective of modes of 
production in capitalist societies. Johnston (1984: 480- 
482) argues that "(t)he state exists because such an
institution is necessary for the continued existence of the 
mode of production.1 The state both legitimates and 
promotes capital accumulation. It must be separated from 
the capitalist mode of production, yet allied to it in its 
role of regulator. Faced with constant crises of 
legitimation, the state may favor the interests of one 
sector (such as the urban-industrial or agro-export sector) 
over another (such as the domestic peasant food crop 
sector), "because it has to reconcile different 
interpretations of how the economic system should be 
structured" (Johnston 1984: 482).
In its execution of the PAE, the Costa Rican state is 
the mediator of a tension between the interests of 
agricultural producers and those of labor (Soto 1990: 235). 
By allocating public resources among the different social 
groups, the state practices regional planning as these 
allocations take on a spatial (regional) component.
Pricing, fiscal, and finance policies are selectively 
implemented, creating a hierarchy of "winners and losers" 
(Alfaro 1990: 97-99). Traditionally, this favoritism has 
been directed at export agriculture rather than domestic 
food crops (Gayle 1986: 81). For example, PAE has called 
for elimination of price supports for basic grains, and 
reductions in state-sponsored technical assistance to small 
farmers (Alfaro 1990: 100-101). These trends have made the 
competition for scarce state resources among subnational
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campesino-dominated regions all the more acute. Such 
competition is an important component of the politics of 
place of Hojancha and other such regions.
Summary: Critical Chorolocrv and Hoiancha
The approach of critical chorology combines a regard 
for uniqueness of place, a trait of the traditional 
chorology associated with Hartshorne (1939), Sauer (1925, 
1941), and many of their academic descendents, with a 
regard for the workings of the global economy and its 
inherent social and power structures. In its approach, 
critical chorology goes beyond most studies exemplifying 
the new regional geography by including more fully the 
ecological aspects and culture history of a given region. 
Because it is more deeply concerned with human-environment 
interactions, such as agricultural activities, than most 
studies using the new regional geography approach, critical 
chorology is arguably a better- suited approach to studies 
of rural Third World region formation, regional identity 
and regional processes in general.
Likewise, critical chorology advocates a more explicit 
focus on the "politics of place," that is, the arena of 
intra- and inter-regional political competition which 
underlies region formation and regional identity, than do 
most examples of political ecology. The latter in most 
cases provide impressive insight into the 
interrelationships between, on the one hand, human-
environment interactions, and, on the other hand, the 
forces and structures associated with the global political 
economy. With few exceptions, however, political ecology 
tends not to include regional theory itself, that is, 
epistemological concerns for the processes of region 
formation, regional identity, and the spatial delineations 
corresponding to political economy/ecology interrelations.2 
In short, while political ecology is concerned with process 
and interrelationships, critical chorology shares these 
concerns, but especially as they affect, and originate out 
of, differentiated regions.
Hojancha is particularly well suited to a study using 
the critical chorology approach as elaborated in this 
work. It is a region well defined by virtue of the 
structure-agency interactions which are key to its regional 
identity. The changing characteristics of Hojanchan 
peasant farming and the changing landscape are embedded in 
a historically contingent multi-layered matrix of changing 
market conditions for peasant products and labor, political 
policies and actions at different scales, and 
reconfigurations in the capital accumulation process.
Local agency adapts to and modifies these structures. 
The economically and ecologically turbulent recent past has 
been reversed in part by a strong community spirit 
dedicated to preserving the small family farm. The basis 
of this reversal of fortunes is the foresight and actions
of such agents as agricultural and forestry extension 
personnel and the skillful political maneuverings of the 
Catholic priest. The political arena within which 
structure and agency come together in Hojancha holds a 
commanding place in the study area's regional character. 
Hojancha's political party affiliation, atypical by 
Guanacastecan and Costa Rican standards, and its 
functioning within the region, is elaborated in Chapter 
Eight.
Thus, Hojancha's chorologic construction is clear in 
two basic ways. First, Hojancha is a distinct region 
dominated by campesino producers and other small farmers of 
predominantly European ancestry, as opposed to the mestizo 
ethnicity dominant elsewhere in Guanacaste. They actively 
seek to maintain their independent productive relations, 
free of the proletarianization and land concentration so 
historically typical of Guanacaste's livestock-dominated 
economic geography. Second, Hojancha is a campesino 
stronghold community actively pursuing forestry as a means 
of counteracting the degradation of its landscapes, which 
has accompanied the region's historically specific process 
of agrarian capitalism in the twentieth century. In both 
cases, agency and structure, occurring at multiple scales, 
are dialectically intertwined to give rise to a unique 
place which plays its distinct part in the global division 
of labor.
Finally, the Hojanchan study region has a strong sense 
of community that is common in local discourse. It clearly 
functions as a region in the minds of its inhabitants, and 
other Costa Ricans familiar with it. The region and its 
particular set of ecological opportunities and constraints 
and particular historically contingent political economic 
and social processes at work, is further delineated as a 
distinct region by virtue of its people and their 
particular individual and group actions in responding to 
the challenges they face.
Notes
1 Examples include Jarosz (1993); Wilson Salinas (1983) ; 
Barkin (1983); Howitt (1992); Samper (1990); and Zimmerer 
(1991). The latter two are not explicitly presented as 
"the new regional geography," but share many of it 
preoccupations and assumptions.
2 Exceptions include Sheridan's (1988) study of the 
political ecology of a Sonoran peasant community, and 
Zimmerer's (1991) study of the political ecology of a 
highland Peruvian peasant community.
CHAPTER THREE
THE STUDY AREA: PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT AND
HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY TO 1900
In one of the key Berkeley School studies of a region 
in the developing world, Wagner (1958) effectively 
illustrated how the Nicoya Peninsula was then 
distinguishable in many ways from the rest of Costa Rica. 
First, the biophysical environment is distinctive. For 
example, geologically, the region is older than the rest of 
Costa Rica. But it is in its human population that this 
quality is most notable. It was the first area of Costa 
Rica to be settled by the Spaniards, and had the largest 
concentration of Amerinds of any region of Costa Rica at 
the time of conquest. Whereas people of Spanish descent 
are culturally dominant in Costa Rica as a whole, Nicoyans 
are by and large mestizos, or a mixture of indigenous and 
European ancestry. To a lesser but noteworthy extent, many 
can be identified as fitting the categories of mulato or 
1 zambo.1 reflecting African influences. Despite its long 
settlement history, the Nicoya Peninsula, and especially 
the mountainous central region where Hojancha is located, 
remained largely isolated from more "developed” parts of 
Costa Rica until the 1960s, a decade after Wagner completed 
his study. At the time of Wagner's study, the cattle 
industry dominated Nicoya's economy, as it had much of 
northwestern Costa Rica since colonial times. This was in
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marked contrast to the rest of the country. Since then, 
cattle raising has come to represent a much larger focus of 
Costa Rica's economic concerns. Nicoya, like many 
currently peripheral regions in Latin American countries, 
exhibits an historical trajectory that combines episodes of 
precocity with longer lapses into marginality.
The unique features of the Hojanchan and Nicoyan 
physical geography, indigenous history, and European-based 
settlement and economic histories form the foundations for 
the most recent regional processes and the regional 
identity that are central to this dissertation. This 
chapter provides an overview of the human-environmental 
"structuration," or mutual influences, underlying 
Hojancha's contemporary chorologic construction. In this 
and subsequent chapters, I will argue that these unique 
historical and physical facets of the region strongly 
condition the nature of the choices to be made by 
Hojanchans as they respond to and attempt to influence the 
structures of their social existence; these facets pose 
obstacles to overcome and opportunities to pursue.
The Physical Geography. Climate. Flora, and Fauna 
of the Nicova Peninsula 
The Nicoya Peninsula is bounded on the west and south 
by the Pacific Ocean, on the east by the Gulf of Nicoya, 
and on the north and northeast by the Tempisque River and 
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NICOYA PENINSULA
composed of Costa Rica's oldest geologic materials (Hall 
1985: 3), and forms part of Costa Rica's old External Arc,
or Nicoya Complex (Brown 1992: 1; Ribier, et.al. 1986: 9-
10). Its old granitic rocks have been separated from the
rest of the Costa Rican mainland by a fault system, 
trending northwest-to-southeast (West 1964: 80). The 
peninsula's exposed igneous intrusions and marine sediments 
suggest that it was once part of a chain of volcanic 
islands lying close to the Pacific coast of mainland Costa 
Rica. It was originally formed beneath the sea during the
upper Cretaceous. Sedimentation subsequently contributed 
additional mass to the volcanic rocks (Hall 1985: 3), and 
the peninsula was formed out of a (still ongoing) process 
of uplifting (Stone 1977: 12; Urena 1965: 64). Today, the 
peninsula's west side is slowly rising relative to its east 
side. The Gulf of Nicoya is a tectonic depression whose 
northern portion has been filled in by sedimentation, now 
occupied by the Tempisque River Valley, the northern and 
northeastern boundary of the peninsula (Wagner 1958: iii; 
Urena 1965: 64).
The peninsula, roughly 110 kms. long by 15-40 kms. 
wide, contains great physical diversity in a small area. 
Wide, flat plains flank the gulf and Tempisque Valley 
sides. Folding has produced a rugged, hilly central 
portion of the peninsula (Sandner 1962: 121). Coastal 
plains along the Pacific side are narrow-to-nonexistent.
Even the peninsula's climate is marked by variability. 
Towards the northern end, the typical Guanacastecan dry 
conditions prevail. Rainfall increases markedly from north 
to south, from some 2,000 millimeters annually in the north 
to 3,000 at the southern tip (Sandner 1962: 122).
Vegetation ranges from almost purely deciduous in the north 
to almost purely evergreen toward the south (Wagner 1958: 
203) .
The Nicoya Peninsula can be subdivided into three 
physical geographic regions (Wagner 1958: 196-7). First, 
the broad coastal plain of the Gulf of Nicoya and the plain 
of the Tempisque Valley are composed of limestone and 
quaternary sedimentary deposits. This broad region 
encompasses approximately one-third of the Nicoya 
Peninsula. Quaternary sands, marine alluvium and gravels 
are the dominant materials (West 1964: 39). The landscape 
is dotted with occasional limestone hills, many of which 
are isolated, conspicuously rising out of otherwise level 
plains. These hills are generally elongated and trend 
northwest-to-southeast (Sandner 1959: 30). The immediate 
gulf coast is marked by river and stream deltas, marshes, 
and mangrove swamps. A second region is that of the 
Pacific coastal littoral of the southern and western sides 
of the peninsula. It is composed primarily of sedimentary 
features. Sandy beaches are narrow, and are flanked by 
steep bluffs in many parts. Estuaries are formed where
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streams enter the Pacific (Wagner 1958: 196-7). Steep, 
rugged, but low hills extend close to these shoreline 
features.
The third physical geographic region is characterized 
by igneous and metamorphic materials (schists, gneiss, 
granites), most of which have been folded, faulted and 
eroded (West 1964: 39; Wagner 1958: 196-7; Hall 1985: 10-
11). The Hojancha study area is located in this hilly and 
mountainous central region, which rises abruptly out of the 
flat lands to the north (Sandner 1962: 121). The region 
comprises about half of the peninsula. Though reaching 
1,000 meters in only one point (Cerro Azul, 1,018 meters), 
these small mountains are steep, and separated in many 
cases by narrow, deep gullies and numerous stream valleys. 
In these northwest-to-southeast-trending ranges are found 
remnants of old "altiplanos," or high mountain plains, in 
the 300-350 meter and 500-600 meter elevation ranges.
These indicate occurrences of different phases of 
geomorphologic development (Sandner 1959: 30).
Four of the dominant ranges of the Nicoya Peninsula's 
mountainous spine converge within, or in the immediate 
vicinity of, the canton of Hojancha. These include the 
Cerros de San Bias, Cerros de Dulce Nombre, Cerros de 
Nosara, and Cerros de las Huacas. The latter three are 
eastward and southeastward branches of the San Bias; the 
latter two are separated from the first two by the Rio
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Nosara, the dominant river of the peninsula's interior 
(Secretaria de Gobernacidn 1924: 50, 95). All these 
mountains can be best described as "rough," or "wild like" 
(Wagner 1958: 197-9). Human settlement, therefore, tends 
to be most heavily concentrated in the altiplanos and 
stream valleys.
The climate of the peninsula exhibits a noteworthy 
transition from north to south. The average annual 
temperature in the drier plains of the northern portion of 
the peninsula is 28 degrees (centigrade), compared to 23 
degrees in the higher peaks farther south. The smaller 
rainfall amount in the northern plains and northern portion 
of the mountainous zone coincides with the longer dry 
season, late November to early May (Sandner 1962: 122).
The southern and southwestern coast receive some 50 percent 
more rain annually than the dry northern plains, and the 
dry season is reduced to three or four months (Wagner 1964: 
246) .
The first weeks of the dry season, mid-November 
through December, represent the coolest time of year, due 
to strong north winds and clear nights. The end of the dry 
season is the hottest time of year, with average 
temperatures 5 or 6 degrees centigrade above those of late 
November. By May, the highly variable rainy season begins. 
A short dry spell, or "veranillo," can last two weeks or 
more, usually starting sometime in July. In August, the
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rains return and fall nearly every day. Everywhere on the 
peninsula, the month of October is the wettest, usually 
with more than twice the precipitation of the entire dry 
season (Sandner 1962: 122; Wagner 1964: 246).
The rainy season provides an important source of water 
for the peninsula's streams and rivers. Compared to the 
rest of Guanacaste, however, the peninsula's streams 
generally contain more water year-round, and are more 
numerous on a per-square-kilometer basis (Secretaria de 
Gobernaci6n 1924: 95). The Rio Nosara, the widest and most 
voluminous of the interior peninsular rivers, originates 
within the Hojancha study area, in the Cerros de las 
Huacas, and provides Hojancha's farmers and other residents 
a year-round water resource. The Rios Perros and Zapotal, 
tributaries of the peninsula's second major river, the Rio 
Ora, also provide Hojancha with water resources, especially 
irrigation for crops.
Natural vegetation is varied throughout the peninsula. 
Toward the north, where conditions are flatter and hotter, 
and the dry season is longer, low (i.e., 20 meters or less) 
deciduous trees in "scrubby assortments" are dominant 
(Wagner 1964: 246). These include guanacaste 
(Enterolobium), pochote (Bombacopsis), Guazuma. Cordia, 
tropical cedar (Cedrela), and other species of the tropical 
dry forest category. The central mountainous zone, 
including Hojancha, contains premontane humid forest above
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500 meters, and tropical humid forest below 500 meters and 
near the coast (Campos, Rodriguez, Ugalde 1993: 6; Stone 
1977: 13-14). In this zone, both deciduous and evergreen 
trees can be found (Stone 1977: 13-14).
In addition to guanacaste and pochote, the dominant 
upper story tree species are cedar (Meliaceae), narzareno 
(Peltoovne), Chrvsophvllum. Terminalia. Chloronhora. and 
Cedrela. The lower story contains such species as guava 
(Psidium), custard-apple (Annona). and Acacia (Wagner 1964: 
246). The upper of the two tree stories reaches some 20 
meters in height. Southwestward from the central 
mountains, the forests are less deciduous, and closer in 
character to tropical rainforest. That is, they are 
seasonal evergreen forests, and contain three stories, the 
highest of which is closed canopy and reaches 30 meters. 
Dominant species include mahogany (Swietenia), tropical 
cedar, pochote, sapote (Pachira), and laurels (Cordia and 
Nectandra). Epiphytes are more common in this zone of 
Nicoya with higher rainfall than the other zones (Wagner 
1964: 246). In the plains and central mountains, stream 
beds contain the evergreen forest type with epiphytes 
characteristic of the south and southwest coastal portions 
of the peninsula (Sandner 1962: 122).
It is worth noting that much of the Nicoyan landscape, 
and especially the flatter areas, have been cleared of 
natural forest cover. Natural, undisturbed forest tends to
be isolated to slopes and stream beds. Hillslopes, many of 
which exceed 30 percent, are by no means uniformly zones of 
non-disturbance (Ribier, et.al. 1986: 9-10). The numerous 
abandoned fields and pastures of the peninsula contain 
secondary regrowth, ranging from weeds and brush to clumps 
of single species trees with brush and weeds, to forests 
which are almost developed to original multi-layered 
conditions (Wagner 1958: 203-4). Species with fire- 
resistant seeds, or easily-dispersed seeds, prevail, such 
as guanacaste, pochote, and tropical cedar, indicating fire 
has had a lasting impact on Nicoya's vegetation. Wagner 
(1964: 246-7) speculates that such human disturbance may 
have had an even greater impact in colonial times than in 
the twentieth century.
As is the case with Nicoya's flora, its fauna portrays 
the region's place in the "landbridge" between North and 
South America. Just as Nicoya's flora originated from both 
continents, so too have the region's animal species (Janzen 
1983). Rodents, bats, monkeys and marsupials related to 
South American species are dominant. At the same time, the 
Nicoya Peninsula represents the southward limit of such 
northern animals as shrews and coyotes (Wagner 1958: 204). 
White-faced monkeys, howler monkeys, tapirs, white-tailed 
deer, iguanas, green parakeets, macaws, and parrots, all of 
South American origin, coexist in the peninsula with wild 
turkeys, quail, and dove from the north (Stone 1977: 14).
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THE HOJANCHA STUDY REGION AND ITS 
VARIABLE PHYSICAL CHARACTER 
The study region corresponds roughly to the northern 
half of the canton of Hojancha, the smallest of provincial 
Guanacaste's 11 cantones, and contains an estimated 80 
percent of the canton's population of nearly 6,000 
{Comunidades 1990: 3). The study region's longest east- 
west dimension is approximately 16 kms., and its longest 
north-south dimension is approximately 13 kms., producing a 
territory of approximately 132 square kms. (Fig. 3-2). The 
261.4 square-km. canton is delineated by a number of 
physical features. The Blanco, Perros, and Ora rivers form 
most of the canton's long eastern and southeastern 
boundary. The Pacific coast serves as the canton's short 
southern boundary. The long western boundary is formed by 
the highest points of a series of ridges of the Cerros de 
Tabaco and San Juan Bosco of the San Bias system, and, 
therefore, coincides with a natural watershed boundary.
The northern cantonal boundary is the Rio Momollejo. Thus, 
the political boundaries of the canton coincide as much 
with physical features as with the spatial extent of 
historical settlement.
The study region is delineated culturally as well as 
physically. Its population is much more of Valle Central 
origins than surrounding regions of the Nicoya Peninsula, 
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Nandayure Canton to the east. The study region's northern, 
eastern and western boundaries are the same as those of the 
canton. The boundary zone which separates the study 
region, the more heavily populated northern half of the 
canton, from the rest of the canton is a series of steep 
hills and small mountains, rugged and only sparsely 
settled, that trend from just south of San Rafael roughly 
eastward to just south of Monte Romo. Southward of this 
boundary is a peripheral, largely empty zone with only a 
small number of sparsely populated mestizo settlements on 
or near the coast. These are more economically and 
culturally tied to Puerto Carrillo than to the study 
region. Farmers and laborers of the northern half of the 
canton have surprisingly few economic connections with 
Puerto Carrillo.
Despite its small size, the study region is marked by 
diversity in its physical, ethnic, and economic landscapes. 
The largely mountainous and hilly region contains four 
altiplanos that are important in its settlement geography. 
The dominant plain is that surrounding the region's largest 
town, Hojancha. The "Plain of Hojancha" is a crescent­
shaped meseta. or mesa, extending from the cantonal 
boundary due west of the town of Hojancha, to east of the 
town, and southeastward to the small community of 
Pilangosta. Steep mountains with peaks of over 500 to 
nearly 900 meters surround the plain to the south and
southeast. Among the hamlets in the plain are Libertad,
San Gerardo, Cuesta Blanca, and Arena. The Rio Nosara and 
numerous small tributaries flow through this plain, lying 
between 300 and 350 meters in elevation. Throughout most 
of the twentieth century, pastures have been the dominant 
landscape feature of the plain, though in recent years, 
nurseries producing tree seedlings have sprung up 
throughout. As Sandner (1959: 38) noted, the predominance 
of cattle culture and lack of intensive food crop or coffee 
production has translated historically to fewer isolated 
farmsteads than in other frontier localities of Costa Rica 
settled by Whites.
The north side of the Plain of Hojancha is separated 
by a mountain range, 500 to 580 meters high, from the plain 
of Matambu, 300 to 350 meters in elevation. This plain is 
the site of Guanacaste's only indigenous reserve. Though 
these "Indians" are for the most part mestizos, they have 
conserved many of their traditional customs, such as the 
maintenance of household gardens producing a variety of 
fruits, vegetables, and tuber crops. Matambu was made into 
a reserve to halt the process of "Cartagos" (persons of 
European ancestry from the Valle Central) from acquiring 
Indian lands through questionable business dealings 
(Comunidades 1990: 13). Matambfi contains the most heavily 
populated farming settlement in the study region. Tiny 
farms, or minifundias. too small to sustain a family on a
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full-time basis, predominate. Even in the 1950s, Sandner 
{1959: 39) noted a high incidence of migration of youth to 
the banana and other zones of Costa Rica to earn wages, a 
pattern which continues today. Matambu is an obvious 
peripheral locality within the study region.
At San Rafael, in the southwestern portion of the 
study region, is a small altiplano of some 400-450 meters, 
surrounded by steep mountains of 600-800 meters. Cattle 
culture dominates the San Rafael plain, though small- and 
medium-sized dispersed farms growing food crops in addition 
to cattle are found in greater proportions than in the 
Plain of Hojancha. A fourth altiplano is occupied by 
Huacas, a community of mostly small farms and intensive 
agriculture. This plain is at sufficient altitude, 500-600 
meters, for intensive coffee production. The slightly 
higher elevation of this plain and its cooler climate have 
made it a preferred settlement locality, first by Amerinds, 
who left burial sites there, and later by some of the 
earliest of the pioneers from the Valle Central wishing to 
transplant their coffee culture to the Nicoyan frontier. 
After several successful decades of living and working in 
that relatively remote altiplano, the people of Huacas, now 
numbering some 525 (Comunidades 1990: 17), have developed a 
strong sense of community.
Within the study region, there are three communities 
located in more mountainous, rugged terrains rather than
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altiplanos. These are Pita Rayada (550 meters), Maravilla 
(620 meters), and Monte Romo (700 meters). In all three, 
small-farm coffee culture is dominant, followed by 
commercial production of vegetables and subsistence 
production of grains. Cattle grazing is less intensive 
than in the altiplanos of the study region, since most 
pastures occupy steep slopes.
Overall, the landscapes of the Hojancha study region, 
altiplanos and mountain slopes alike, are largely 
deforested and contain poorly developed soils. Soils are 
largely shallow and clayey (Ribier, et.al. 1986), and 
classified as brown and red Ustic Dystropeth latosols. 
Because of severe slope, some 35 percent of the region's 
soils are appropriate only for forest and unsuitable even 
for livestock (Campos, Rodriguez, Ugalde 1993: 5). The 
recent efforts at reforestation, though impressive, have 
not yet begun to rival pasture as a land use.
Reforestation is more common on lower, flatter lands of the 
region, due primarily to the agroecologic character of the 
tree species planted there. Seedling production is limited 
to flat lands below 500 meters, and is, therefore, found 
for the most part in the Hojancha Plain and to a lesser 
extent in other lower altiplanos. As farmer confidence in 
forestry increases, that activity is slowly diffusing from 
the Hojancha Plain to the rest of the study area. Though 
forestry is a major component of Hojancha's contemporary
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regionalization, it is not the only one. Subsequent 
sections of this study will outline the various historical 
and contemporary processes underlying Hojanchan regional 
structuration, linking such diverse localities as 
impoverished Matambu and "middle class" Huacas in a common 
effort of regional upward social mobility.
The Pre-Columbian History of the Nicova Peninsula
The Nicoya Peninsula represents the southernmost 
region occupied by Mesoamerican High Cultures at the time 
of the Spanish Conquest (Wagner 1958: 205; MacLeod 1973). 
The Chorotega were the peoples the Spaniards encountered 
when they explored the region. These were the most 
advanced of the indigenous groups of Costa Rica (Urefia 
1965: 64). The Chorotega were relatively recent arrivals 
to Nicoya. The' peninsula had been occupied and visited by 
peoples as far back as several millennia. The burial site 
at Huacas, excavated at the turn of the twentieth century, 
contained arrowheads and other artifacts stylistically 
similar to those dating back to 9250 B.C. in North America, 
suggesting passage of pre-Columbian humans from North to 
South America (Stone 1977: 26-29).
In numerous parts of the peninsula, archeologists have 
encountered pottery types commonly found in Chiapas, 
Guatemala, Ecuador, and even Guyana dating as far back as 
1500 B.C., suggesting to Stone (1977: 29-43) that there was 
significant contact between Nicoyans and peoples of distant
regions, such as the Mayas and merchants of Mexico's and 
South America's west coasts. Lange, et.al. (1992: xviii, 
275-276), however, doubt that trade between Nicoya and 
these areas was heavy. They suggest instead that pottery 
ideas, as opposed to the pottery itself, diffused from 
Mayan and South American source regions to Nicoya, and that 
the Nicoyans themselves manufactured the pottery of these 
types.
The pre-Chorotegan Amerinds of Nicoya relied heavily 
on fishing, the gathering of nuts, seeds and fruits, and 
the hunting of fowl, rodents, deer and monkeys.
Agriculture was not yet extensive, but included tuber crops 
such as yams tDioscorea sp.), yuca (Manihot sp.) and 
ticfuisoue (Xanthosoma violaceum) ,• all of which were well 
adapted to the region's distinct wet and dry seasons 
(Wagner 1958). Housing was constructed of perishable 
materials, including vines, cane and palm leaves. In the 
period 300 B.C. to 300 A.D., Nicoyans used stone tools and 
jade pendants, of both northern and southern origins.
Their stratified society was ruled by chieftains 
(Stanislawski 1983: 3; Stone 1977: 29-43). Trade networks 
included the use of rafts with triangular-shaped sails, and 
possibly canoes holding up to 60 people, travelling between 
the Ecuadorean and southwest Mexican Pacific coasts (West 
1961). The natural protection which the Gulf of Nicoya 
offered sea-bound traders is believed to be a major reason
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for the involvement of Nicoyans in the wide-spanning trade 
network (Stone 1977: 29-43).
After 300 A.D., a time when the Nicoyan population 
increased, trade with the Maya became more pronounced. 
Classic Maya jade pendants of the period 300-800 A.D. have 
been found at Huacas. Other items found in Nicoya 
suggesting a strong Maya trade connection in the period 
include ceremonial pottery of "Nahuatized Maya theology, 1 
suggesting the adoption in Nicoya of Maya religious 
concepts (Stone 1977: 58-60).
The Chorotegas settled the Nicoya Peninsula in the 
period 1200-1500 A.D. (Stone 1977: 78-79). Originally from 
Chiapas (Secretaria de Gobernacion 1924: 220), but not of 
Nahuat origins, they succeeded in driving the Corobici, an 
egalitarian peoples of South American origins, out of 
Nicoya (Stone 1977: 78-79, 92). The Chorotegan territory 
extended northward from their Nicoyan hearth to the Lago de 
Nicaragua. With the possible exception of Huacas, very few 
people lived in the peninsula's southern or central 
mountainous zones (Comunidades 1990: 4; Secretaria de 
Gobernaci6n 1924: 224; Wagner 1962: 123). Their numbers 
had probably reached 65,000 or more by the time of the 
first Spanish exploration of the peninsula, 1522-23 (Newson 
1987: 336).1 The Chorotegas, the most advanced indigenous 
group in all of Costa Rica, faced fewer natural obstacles 
to trade than peoples elsewhere in Costa Rica. They had
created roads or trails for use in trade and as war paths 
(Nunley 1960: 10-11/ Mora, et.al. 1986: 9-10). Their 
capital city, which they called Nicoya, and which is east 
of the present-day city of Nicoya, was the largest of eight 
or nine villages in which most Chorotegas lived (Nunley 
1960: 10; Secretaria de Gobernacidn 1924: 224-225). This 
largest Chorotegan settlement of the peninsula likely 
exceeded a population of 20,000 (Sibaja 1982: 24).
In addition to hunting, gathering and fishing, the 
Chorotegas practiced rather intensive agriculture in some 
areas. They produced maize, beans, and squash in a system 
based on forest regeneration (Mora et.al. 1986: 9). They 
grew a surplus of maize for trade. Adjacent to the larger 
settlements, maize was irrigated and weeded. Tortillas 
were important in the Chorotegan diet. They produced 
cotton and cloth for trade, and cacao for money and for a 
beverage. They raised the stingless bee for honey, and this 
was traded as well (Stone 1977: 85-86). The zapote and 
nispero (medlar) were two fruits important in trade 
(Secretaria de Gobernacidn 1924: 107). Chorotegan crops 
used locally included tobacco and such fruits as papayas, 
plums, and avocados. They chewed coca leaves to alleviate 
pain and thirst (Stanislawski 1983: 4-5; Stone 1977: 85- 
86). Yuca, beans, turkeys, and dogs rounded out the diet. 
Agricultural technology included slashing, burning, the 
digging stick, and tools made of stone and shell (Wagner
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1958: 205; Secretaria de Gobernacidn 1924: 223; Mora, 
et.al. 1986 : 10-17) .
According to Mora, et.al. (1986: 10-15), the swidden 
agricultural system of the Chorotega included a long 
rotation cycle of approximately 40 years per plot of land, 
or two years of crop production and the remaining years in 
fallow. They favored vegetative reproduction of maize, and 
used the stalk to support squash plants. The broad leaves 
of the squash plants served to preserve the moisture in the 
soil. The least advantageous aspect of this sustainable 
system was the use of fire, which tended to impoverish the 
soil by destroying grasses and weeds. Stone axes and hoes 
enabled the Chorotega to fell trees and work the soil with 
relative ease. In addition to the rotating fields, 
permanent household gardens produced yuca, plantains, chili 
peppers, and numerous other fruits and vegetables.
Non-agricultural Chorotegan technologies were highly 
developed. Their villages each had markets and temples 
(Nunley I960: 10). These dwellings and the houses were 
constructed of wood and thatch. Primitive looms enabled 
them to fashion cotton cloth for trade. They had stone 
tools, made clay pottery, did woodworking, and used plant 
dyes (Wagner 1958: 205) . The Spaniards encountered their 
small boats in the Gulf of Nicoya (Nunley 1960: 11). They 
had made scientific discoveries in astronomy, and had
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developed a calendar (Secretaria de Gobernacidn 1924: 221). 
They used gold primarily in jewelry (Stone 1977: 94).
The Chorotegan division of labor was well defined 
along gender lines. Women tended the markets (which used 
cacao beans for money), homes and gardens. Men worked the 
fields, hunted, and waged war (Wagner 1958: 205).
Chorotegan society was stratified, and included nobles, 
commoners, slaves and prisoners of war. Agricultural 
surpluses had to support two non-farming groups: nobles and 
a large military. The latter enforced systems of tribute 
in the feudal society (Mora, et.al. 1986: 16-17). The 
chief, located in Nicoya, ruled over the entire Chorotegan 
territory. While commoners' houses were built at ground 
level, the rulers' dwellings, or palaces, were constructed 
on mounds of approximately a meter high. While nobility 
was buried in tombs, commoners were cremated (Stone 1977: 
90-93).
The Chorotega held festivals for maize, cacao, cotton, 
and beans. During these festivals, prisoners of war were 
sacrificed and eaten, a practice which appalled the 
Spaniards, and, along with the gold, enticed them to 
conquer the region (Stone 1977: 90-94; Secretaria de 
Gobernacidn 1924: 221-223).
The Spanish Conquest and Colonial Nicovan Economy
It is no accident that the Nicoya Peninsula was the 
first region of Costa Rica to be conquered by the Spaniards
(Trejos 1937: 334). At least half of the Amerinds of 
Guanacaste lived on the peninsula. There was, therefore, a 
concentration of Indians to Christianize. The intensive 
production of cotton and other crops, and the use of gold 
by the Chorotega led the Spaniards to believe that Nicoya 
could produce wealth for the Crown (Nunley 1960: 11). The 
environment was more accommodating for exploration and 
penetration than other, wetter, parts of Costa Rica 
(Secretaria de Gobernaci6n 1924: 107). The Gulf of Nicoya 
offered several natural harbors. The rest of Costa Rica 
had little to offer in comparison (Augelli 1987: 2) .
The Spaniards first explored the Gulf of Nicoya and 
the peninsula's gulf coast in 1519, and first explored the 
peninsula on foot in 1522 (Sibaja and Zelaya 1985: 9-11; 
Nunley 1960: 11-13) . Their excursion took them through the 
Chorotegan town of Nicoya, where the cacique Nambi and his 
followers, a total of 10,862 Chorotegas, were baptized by 
don Diego de Aguero. In 1524, the Chorotegas were assigned 
to encomiendas. in which the rights to control Indians and 
their territories were granted by the Crown to the 
principal conquistadores (Secretaria de Gobernaci6n 1924:
11, 225). The encomienda and its abusive system of forced 
labor was ineffective in Nicoya. In an effort to restore 
the Indian population, it was soon replaced by the hacienda 
system, based on quasi-feudal relations (i.e., peonage) and 
livestock production (Hall 1985: 41, 98). Many of the
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Indians were shipped as slaves from the region to Panama 
and Peru.
Along with this forced emigration, diseases introduced 
by the Spaniards, and the overworking of the Chorotegas all 
contributed to a dramatic decline in the indigenous 
population of the Nicoya Peninsula. For example, by 1569, 
the Nicoyan Indian population had diminished to an 
estimated 3,000, about five percent of the level at the 
time of initial Spanish contact (Hall 1985: 41; Sandner 
1962: 123). Some of the reported abuses under the 
encomienda system included the overworking of Indian 
children, and the renting of Indians to third parties, who 
forced them to carry cargo, and to fell and saw trees in 
forests for unreasonable lengths of time: The extraction
of tribute from the Chorotegas began in 1544, officially 
marking the end of the slavery of the encomiendas and the 
beginning of the quasi-feudalism of the haciendas (Mora, 
et.al. 1986: 26-27).
The Spaniards brought Old World plants and animals to 
Nicoya, including sugar, citrus, rice, cattle, and horses, 
not to mention the plow. The old Chorotegan economy was 
quickly phased out and replaced by a Spanish one, involving 
cattle raised for hides and fat, horses, mules, pearls, 
indigo, and commercially produced rope, twine and cotton 
cloth. Thus, northwestern Costa Rica, with its cattle- 
based economy which subjugated the native peoples, had a
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separate development from the Valle Central (Hall 1985: 92- 
95). Spanish replaced the Mangue language of the 
Chorotegas and Catholicism became their new religion 
(Wagner 1958: 206-207).
The colonial venture in the region involved the 
forceful establishment of mechanisms to guarantee a 
favorable return on capital invested. In addition to 
labor, the region supplied the conquerors with food 
surpluses and wood supplies. The food surpluses, many of 
which were exported to Panama, were needed to sustain the 
exportation of livestock-related goods and Indian slaves to 
other colonies (Mora, et.al. 1986: 25-27, 32; Secretaria de 
Gobernacidn 1924: 114-115). In addition to the surpluses 
produced for the Spanish-controlled trade, the Indians 
continued, albeit in modified form, their traditional 
subsistence practices of food production under the hacienda 
system of tribute (Sandner 1962: 123). They were forced to 
use Spanish agricultural technologies, and were 
concentrated by the Spaniards into hacienda settlements, 
where tribute could be easily collected, and their work 
could be overseen (Mora, et.al. 1986: 31-32).
By 1550, the trade of Chorotegan slaves had 
diminished, due to decreased demand by Panama and Peru, and 
the diminished local supply of Indians. The Spaniards of 
Nicoya were forced to turn their attention to the 
production of mules, a product exported for use in the
Panamanian trade routes, and, after 1560, cattle for 
market-bound hides and tallow. The delay in cattle 
production in Nicoya coincided with a lack of capital 
before 1560. Indian laborers slaughtered the cattle. The
fat was extracted and sold for the making of candles and 
the protection of wood on boats. Interestingly, because of 
the great distance to markets, the meat was too perishable 
to become an export product from Nicoya in the sixteenth 
century (Secretaria de Gobernacidn 1924: 115). The 
proliferation of the Nicoyan livestock economy was made 
possible not only by capital, which increased in 
availability after 1560, but also by the privatization of 
land which commenced once the hacienda system legally 
replaced the encomienda in 1542 (Mora, et.al. 1986: 29-32).
Mora, et.al. (1986: 31-38) provide a detailed 
description of the relationship between the early colonial 
economy and its land tenure arrangements on the one hand, 
and environmental degradation on the other hand. Almost 
immediately after their arrival in Nicoya, the Spaniards 
began felling trees and grazing livestock in the flatter 
areas of the east side of the peninsula. As their 
mercantile economic activities developed, they required a 
sedentary indigenous population. The Indian communities, 
lands designated for Indian settlement and production, had 
been established by the seventeenth century in six 
localities of the peninsula, including Nandayure in the
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central mountainous zone. The communities contained 
communal forest lands for swidden production of crops for 
tribute, individual titled minifundias for subsistence food 
crop production for each Indian family, and communal 
grazing lands, once the cattle culture was fully developed 
in the region.
The closer proximity of these Indians to one another 
immediately caused a reduction in the forest regeneration 
fallow time associated with their food crop production, and 
consequently, a reduction in soil fertility. Forest land 
was continually reduced as pasturage increased in area. 
Indian swidden subsistence crop production expanded out of 
necessity to forested lands of marginal quality. The 
destroyed Indian subsistence agricultural economy was not 
only unable to assimilate the Spanish-imposed factors of 
production, but was further marginalized by the competition 
for land, which favored Spanish mercantile livestock 
grazing.
By the early seventeenth century, Nicoya began to 
experience diminished trade with the markets of Panama and 
the Costa Rican Valle Central. The latter began producing 
much of its own crop and livestock needs, and supplying 
Panama with these goods more effectively than the more 
remote Nicoya Peninsula (Mora, et.al. 1986: 32; Secretaria 
de Gobernacidn 1924: 114-115). The northwestern Costa 
Rican participation in the livestock trade that did
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survive, due to the opening of the road to Panama early in 
the 1600s, was more a phenomenon of northern Guanacaste, 
rather than remote Nicoya, which had sent livestock to 
Panama mostly by ship (Mora, et.al. 1986: 39).
By the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, Nicoyan livestock production had diminished even 
further, due to several factors. Significant land 
degradation resulted from nearly two centuries of poor 
management of grazing lands and a reduced carrying capacity 
of these lands. Prices of livestock products, including 
dried meat, fell. The cattle slaughter season occurred in 
August, the same time as the harvest of food crops; fewer 
hands were available to work in the livestock operations. 
Competition with other livestock-producing zones in the New 
World, such as Peru, served to marginalize Nicoyan 
production. Pirating on the Gulf of Nicoya affected the 
peninsula's exports of livestock products. Despite these 
setbacks, Nicoyan cattle production did not disappear 
entirely, because new markets opened up in the emerging 
indigo-producing regions northward, such as El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua (Mora, et.al. 1986: 40-42). 
Increased contact between Nicoya and regions to the north 
opened up markets for live cattle to be driven to Nicaragua 
for later shipment to Guatemala (Hall 1985: 98).
The demographic changes in the Nicoya Peninsula in the 
colonial period were dramatic (Table 3-1). From the
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earliest stages of Spanish occupation, whites married 
Indians, producing a mestizo segment of the population.
The decline in the Indian population provided the impetus 
on the part of the Spaniards to relocate African slaves to 
Nicoya from the Caribbean coast of Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, beginning late in the seventeenth century 
(Secretarla de Gobernacidn 1924: 231-232; Sandner 1962:
123). The Spaniards brought Africans to Costa Rica's
TABLE 3-1
COLONIAL NICOYA PENINSULA POPULATION ESTIMATES
Negros,
Mulatos 1YEAR Indians Mestizos Zambos Whites Total
1521 63,000 63,000
1529 12,000 10 (?) 12,010(?)
1569 2,650 200 20 2,870
1613 2,000 200 50 2, 250
1700 718 10 833 9 1, 570
1801 650 ? ? ?
Sources: Newson 1987; Secretarfa de Gobernacidn 1924; 
Nunley 1960; Hall 1985.
Atlantic coast originally as labor for the burgeoning cacao 
plantations (MacLeod 1973: 333-334; Gudmundson 1986: 2). 
Once in Nicoya and elsewhere in Guanacaste, Black, mulatto 
and zambo (Black and Indian mix) immigrants worked on 
cattle haciendas. In the eighteenth century, many of these 
laborers of African (and mixed) descent began migrating 
from crowded cattle haciendas of northern Guanacaste to
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lowland zones of the Nicoya Peninsula. This migration had 
the effect of driving some Indians and mestizos out of the 
Nicoyan lowlands and into the peninsula's mountains, where 
land was more productive and plentiful (Sandner 1962: 123-
124) .
These movements of marginalized Nicoyans were but two 
examples of peasant farmers of Colonial Nicoya. A small 
number of mostly mestizo, and in some cases Spanish, 
pioneers legally obtained land in the Central Nicoyan 
mountains by squatting peacefully and continuously 
occupying small parcels for at least ten years. After that 
time, they could petition the Spanish Crown for legal 
ownership after paying a fixed sum (Augelli 1987: 4). 
Because of the lack of labor and the resulting high wages 
beyond what hacendados (hacienda owners) could afford, a 
number of small- and medium-scale beef producers emerged in 
eighteenth century Nicoya. These were potential laborers, 
mostly mestizos, who chose to establish their own farms. 
This boom in smaller farms was made possible in part by a 
new market for land which accompanied the eighteenth 
century cattle boom. Many of these smallholders initially 
rented the land from hacendados. To pay for the land, the 
smallholders also produced sugar cane, basic grains, and 
other cash crops. Hacendados and cattle dealers frequently 
offered the smallholders credit to build up their small but 
intensively-raised herds (Mora, et.al. 1986: 42-52).
Indian peasants, still dependent on haciendas, became 
more deeply incorporated into the European-controlled 
capitalist economy in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. As hacendados found it increasingly difficult to 
penetrate Panamanian markets, they became less interested 
in crop tributes from peasants, and more interested in 
monetary tributes. Indian peasants, therefore, had to sell 
crops for cash, which they produced on the ejidos, the 
communal lands on the Indian communities. They maintained 
communal herds of cattle, which enabled them to enter 
livestock product markets, and earn a reliable source of 
tribute in some cases. In many other cases, however, the 
stiff tribute requirements could not be met, and many 
Indians lost their land, cattle, or both (Mora et.al.,
1986: 52-55). Though equally tied into the regional and 
international capitalist economy, hacendados and Indians of 
the late colonial period in the Nicoya Peninsula 
experienced quite different economic and social outcomes. 
The migration of landless Indian and mestizo peasants to 
the mountains and other frontier zones of the peninsula, 
which began late in the colonial period, accelerated after 
independence.
Costa Rican Independence and Changes in 
the Nicovan Economy and Society 
Though independence came to Costa Rica September 15, 
1821, it was not until 1824 that the country annexed Nicoya
from Nicaragua (Sibaja and Zelaya 1985: 5). A plebiscite 
that year affirmed the intention of the people of present- 
day Guanacaste and a part of southern Nicaragua to be part 
of Costa Rica. The annexation was officially ratified by 
both countries in 1888, thirty years after an agreement was 
reached between the two countries that designated the lands 
of southern Nicaragua to that country (Hall 1985: 56-58). 
Shortly after the 1824 annexation, the territory was 
divided up into cantones and districts. At that time, the 
Hojancha study region was a portion of the First District, 
the Villa de Nicoya, of the canton of Nicoya, established 
in 1837 (Secretaria de Gobernacion 1924: 214).
For the Indians of the Nicoya Peninsula, independence 
from Spain brought an end to the tribute. Almost 
immediately, the indigenous population began to increase. 
The demographic and land tenure changes brought about by 
the end of the tribute were accompanied by a tighter 
linkage of the Indian communities to markets, and the 
introduction on these lands of new cash-earning 
agricultural activities, including rice, coffee, sugar 
cane, and hogs (Mora et.al. 1986: 57-58). With these 
market linkages, landlessness and peasant migration to 
frontier zones of the peninsula accelerated.
The number of small farms in the peninsula increased 
rapidly throughout the nineteenth century, due in part to 
frontier pioneer settlement and in part to the selling of
divided Indian lands (Sandner 1962: 124-125). The cattle 
industry became increasingly lucrative, especially the 
fattening of Nicaraguan cattle on Nicoyan pastures for 
eventual driving to the Valle Central (Secretaria de 
Gobernacion 1924: 118). Hacendados participating in this 
market began evicting peasants from haciendas as they 
enlarged herds, improved pastures and intensified 
production. In many cases, land used for peasant 
subsistence crop production disappeared from haciendas, 
driving many to search for new places to settle (Gudmundson 
1983: 147). In some cases these peasant lands associated 
with the haciendas were sold or rented, as cattlemen sought 
new sources of capital. The latter was becoming 
increasingly scarce, because it was tied up in the emerging 
coffee boom in the Valle Central (Mora, et.al. 1986: 57).
Gudmundson (1983: 145-147) identifies two main peasant 
types in northwestern Costa Rica, including the Nicoya 
Peninsula, in the nineteenth century. The majority through 
most of the century were of the first type, the remnants of 
the pre-capitalist peasantry associated with the cattle 
haciendas. Several decades after independence, most of 
these Indian and mestizo peasants remained concentrated on 
and near the cattle estates located around such towns as 
Nicoya, Liberia and Santa Cruz, and on a few isolated 
haciendas in the mountainous and lowland peripheries. The 
second peasant type established small, independent
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farmsteads, dispersed throughout the frontier highlands of 
Guanacaste, including the Nicoyan mountains. These 
peasants, mostly of European ancestry, were displaced by 
crowded conditions in the Valle Central coffee zone. Some, 
however, were mestizos, mulatos and Indians displaced from 
their traditional hacienda settlements of Guanacaste.
It is this second peasantry type that eventually 
became the most important in Hojancha's twentieth century 
historical geography. Fleeing economic insecurity, they 
migrated and established isolated farmsteads at the 
frontier. Gudmundson (1983: 146-147) argues these 
peasants, because of their economic misfortunes and their 
initiatives to move, were willing to struggle, to effect 
change, such as acquiring lands through squatting or 
agrarian reform. The peasants associated with haciendas, 
on the other hand, were conservative, because they had 
relatively steady access to land, albeit under harsh social 
conditions. They desired to maintain the status quo, and 
often resisted not only the selling of hacienda lands by 
hacendados, but even agrarian reform efforts that would 
have put the land in their own hands. As argued in 
subsequent chapters, the independent migratory peasants 
that settled present-day Hojancha helped pave the way for 
the study region to develop its regional identity and 
small-farm mercantile spirit, unusual by Nicoyan standards.
The highland Nicoyan pioneer settlers were isolated 
through much of the nineteenth century from the booming 
markets of the Valle Central coffee region. Independence 
from Spain gave the smallholders of the Valle Central the 
opportunity to participate in a lucrative global market, 
and to transform their subsistence economy into a 
mercantile one. It was not until transportation 
improvements, related to coffee, came to the Gulf of 
Nicoya, and to the peninsula itself, that the Nicoyan 
highlanders could produce more than a trivial quantity of 
food crops for the Valle Central market (Nunley 1960: 14- 
22). In fact, the transportation limitations kept highland 
Nicoyan settlement at a slow rate until the twentieth 
century (Augelli 1987: 10; Seligson 1980: 29). As a 
result, pioneers were of the opinion that land was abundant 
in the forested central Nicoyan mountains. Their farming 
practices were wasteful and destructive, because they were 
based on the belief that where trees were abundant, crops 
would flourish (Augelli 1987: 9-10).
Slowly, these Nicoyan highlanders began 'to sell their 
crop surpluses to merchants who shipped them through the 
coffee port of Puntarenas, on the mainland side of the Gulf 
of Nicoya. A road linking the Valle Central to Puntarenas 
was completed in 1846 to facilitate coffee exports 
(Seligson 1980: 17; Nunley 1960: 20-22). In 1865, steam- 
powered boats began commercially shipping agricultural
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products from the Nicoya Peninsula across the gulf to 
Puntarenas (Sandner 1962: 125). Small ports were located 
at Nicoyan gulf coastal settlements and along the Rio 
Tempisque in the Guanacaste cattle zone. The economic 
development of Puntarenas had clear repurcussions for the 
Nicoya Peninsula, including its highland zone, which had 
previously been forced to rely on a crude road leading from 
Liberia to the town of Nicoya (Nunley I960: 20-24).
The presence of maritime shipping routes undoubtedly 
stimulated the Nicoyan timber export industry during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Initially, 
commercial timber extraction occurred near the peninsula's 
coasts following the abolition in 1853 of a law prohibiting 
the felling of trees within one mile of the coast (Sandner 
1962: 125). Eventually, timber extraction expanded into 
the peninsula's mountains, making Nicoya the country's most 
important region of tropical hardwood production for 
export. Between 1867 and 1895, timber exports from the 
region increased seven-fold (Secretaria de Gobernacidn 
1924: 125, 127).
Conclusions
Although the Nicoya Peninsula, and especially the 
immediate vicinity of the town of Nicoya, was the first and 
longest-lasting area of Spanish settlement of the present- 
day territory of Costa Rica, its population in the colonial 
and early independence periods grew slowly. This is
especially true of the peninsula's mountainous zone, where 
the Hojancha study area is located. By the latter sixteenth 
century, the native population had been all but eliminated 
by disease, overworking, and forced emigration. In 1844, 
only a generation after Costa Rican independence, the 
population of the entire canton of Nicoya, which included 
highlands, lowlands, and the main town alike, was only 
2,250 persons, about 27 percent of the Guanacastecan total 
(Nunley 1960: 50). By 1892, the entire canton's total was 
only up to 4,577, some 23 percent of Guanacaste's total 
(Nunley 1960: 55). It was at that time, however, that the 
next great phase of Nicoyan development began: the large- 
scale arrival of "Cartagos" displaced from the crowded 
Valle Central coffee region (Sandner 1962: 125). As the 
following and subsequent chapters of this dissertation 
illustrate, the immigration to the Nicoyan mountains of 
these people of European ancestry was accompanied by 
similar immigration of "Guanacastecos,1 or mestizos 
displaced from Guanacaste's faltering cattle hacienda 
economy. The articulation, or cohabitation, of these two 
groups produced in the zone a dynamic human geography, one 
that has played a fundamental role in Hojanchan region 
formation in the twentieth century.
Notes:
1 Population estimates for the Nicoya Peninsula and Costa 
Rica on the eve of Spanish contact vary significantly. 
Nunley (1960: 10) estimates that half of the population of 
all of Costa Rica occupied the peninsula in 1522. He 
places the Nicoyan population at 13,200. At the other 
extreme, Denevan (1976: 291) estimates a population of 
400,000 for all of Costa Rica on the eve of contact. 
Newson's (1987) intermediate estimates of 125,000 for 
Guanacaste and 63,000 for Nicoya are likely the most 
realistic.
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY SETTLEMENT HISTORY 
OF THE HOJANCHA STUDY REGION 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Nicoyan 
population remained relatively small compared to the more 
crowded Valle Central. By the turn of the century, 
however, new settlement patterns emerged on the peninsula, 
due in part to population increases there and in the Valle 
Central, and in part to economic, political and social 
changes in both places. Migration occurred from east to 
west on the peninsula. Displaced mestizo peasants of the 
eastern Nicoyan lowlands began moving westward into the 
highlands, steadily but not in dramatically high numbers, 
toward the end of the nineteenth century. Shortly 
thereafter, a stream of displaced "Cartagos" left the Valle 
Central and followed the Guanacastecos up into the hills. 
During the first sixty years of the twentieth century, 
dramatic changes occurred in Hojancha's cultural, social, 
economic and agroecologic landscapes. These 
transformations set the stage for subsequent economic and 
social disaster, and regional restructuring.
Migration of Guanacasteco Peasants to Hoiancha 
The population of mestizos and Indians in lowland 
Nicoya had increased by the end of the nineteenth century, 
following the disappearance of the hacienda tribute system, 
and the "stabilization of the peasant economy" (Mora et.al.
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1986: 59). Conditions became crowded and land scarce 
around the estates, displacing many peasants. The 
indigenous settlement of the plain of Matambu likewise 
became crowded, stimulating migration further into the 
highlands. The lands of the altiplanos of Hojancha and 
Huacas were ideal for the reproduction of the mostly 
subsistent, but increasingly market-oriented Guanacasteco- 
peasant economy.
Settlers gained ownership of these prime lands simply 
by occupying and farming them continuously (Mora, et.al. 
1986: 59-60). Households were usually located adjacent to 
streams or springs, to provide each with its own source of 
water. They were dispersed or scattered to accommodate 
shifting cultivation and, in a few cases, the grazing of a 
few head of cattle (Mena 1993). The settlers constructed 
traditional "ranchos," houses with straw roofs and cane 
walls, and round mud ovens located outside (Sandner 1962: 
126) .
The Guanacasteco-peasant economy was based primarily 
on hunting and swidden agriculture. Animals, birds, and 
fish were abundant early in the twentieth century, 
providing these pioneers a relatively healthy diet. They 
began to fell trees in the region's virgin forests, and to 
plant maize, rice, beans, plantains, yuca, and vegetables 
in small, rotating parcels of 1 to 3 has., cultivated for 
two years at a time (Mora, et.al. 1986: 61-63). Don Mateo
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Mena, Hojancha's oldest living resident, explained that 
when his family arrived from the Valle Central in 1912, 
there were only some two dozen Guanacasteco families 
scattered about the Hojancha Plain. Although their 
productive parcels at any given time were small, fallow 
land between households was set aside for the rotation of 
parcels. As conditions became more crowded in the 1920s 
and 1930s, the rotation cycle was reduced to ten years or 
less.
Guanacastecos frequently kept pigs or cattle, which 
could forage on fallow land and on recently harvested 
cropland. These animals supplemented the peasant diet and 
provided them a marketable commodity, albeit on a small 
scale. They were compatible with the rugged trails and 
proved to be advantageous, considering the difficult access 
to the region. The predominantly subsistence Hojanchan 
economy of 1900-1920 was supplemented by market-oriented 
activities, especially production of basic grains, to a 
large enough degree that wage labor had begun to replace 
the traditional system of reciprocal labor exchange (Mora, 
et.al. 1986 : 61-65) .
Migration of Cartaaos to Hoiancha
The Guanacasteco economy of Hojancha was further 
altered once Cartagos began settling the region in the 
1910s and later. For example, they began to buy land, 
thereby implementing its commoditization. Hojanchan
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involvement in national crop markets deepened. Agriculture 
became less diverse and involved a greater, though still 
limited, use of technical inputs.
The settling of Hojancha and neighboring highland 
communities of the Nicoya Peninsula was part of a 
nationwide process of outmigration from the increasingly 
crowded Valle Central coffee region, where social 
conditions were deteriorating for many campesinos (Parsons 
1963: 451-453; Seligson 1980: xxvi; Augelli 1987: 7; MAG 
1986: 88). This outmigration was significant, driving the 
Valle Central's portion of Costa Rica's population down 
from 85 percent in 1864 to 52 percent in 1950, despite 
growth in absolute population and urban-industrialization 
there in the twentieth century (Sandner 1970: 535-538). 
Lands in the Valle Central became increasingly concentrated 
in the hands of a few powerful coffee-producing families, 
creating a movement toward a two-class society of 
propertied employers and propertyless laborers. In many 
cases, largeholder coffee producers obtained land from 
smallholder coffee producers. The latter were unable to 
maintain their farms intact, due to inheritance-based land 
division, or debt-driven loss of land (Gudmundson 1989: 
223-230, 237-251).
Out-migration from the Valle Central involved more 
than push factors. It was not simply, as Gudmundson (1986: 
125-131) argues, an escape of agrarian capitalism and its
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requisite social divisions. Ironically, an important pull 
factor was the desire to participate in agrarian capitalism 
at the frontier, hopefully as a means of achieving upward 
economic mobility. Gudmundson {1986: 134-135) discovered 
through primary research that peasants migrating to 
highland regions of Guanacaste and other Costa Rican 
frontier settlement zones during the early twentieth 
century were "aggressively mercantile," and frequently 
successful at building political allegiances to the state. 
This is a theme integral to Hojancha's regional 
structuration later in the century, and an important topic 
in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
Migrants from the Valle Central to Hojancha exhibited 
many of these mercantilist characteristics. The vast 
majority migrated from the western end of the Valle 
Central, especially from the communities of Palmares, San 
Ramon, and Naranjo. The Western Valle Central was itself a 
destination in the late nineteenth century for peasants of 
the central portion of the valley seeking new lands and a 
better way of life. Colonists from that region are 
regarded as among the most successful and industrious 
farmers of all Costa Rica (Sandner 1970: 540). These 
Cartagos brought improved farming techniques and 
technologies with them, including the use of fertilizers 
and plows, permitting a shortened fallow period and market- 
oriented crop production in addition to subsistence
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(Campos, Rodriguez and Ugalde 1993: 8). Don Mateo Mena 
claims the greatest concern of the early arrivals was to 
improve transportation resources, to transform the 
primitive foot paths linking Hojancha and Nicoya into roads 
that could accommodate oxcarts and facilitate market- 
oriented crop production.
Among the conditions spurring the first wave of 
emigration from the western Valle Central were land 
concentration, land scarcity, land division from 
inheritance, and declining terms of trade with respect to 
agricultural inputs and consumer goods (Samper 1990; 
Gudmundson 1989: 227-230, 237-251). Additional factors 
amplifying the migration in the 193 0s were continued 
population pressures, proletarianization, and severely 
lowered coffee prices related to The Depression of the 
1930s (Samper 1990: 168; MAG 1986: 88; Seligson 1980: 27). 
Even as early as 1921 or 1922, the place name "Hojancha" 
became known in the Valle Central for its good soils, 
favorable climate, and clean water (Mena 1993).
Given that Guanacasteco settlers had already occupied 
the flatter, better quality lands, Cartago settlers had to 
choose between settling unoccupied lands, or "tierras 
libres," in the hillier, sloped portions of the region, and 
buying more favorable farmland from Guanacastecos (Wagner 
1958: 212). Tierras libres, also known as "tierras 
baldios," were unclaimed lands which settlers could claim
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under homesteading laws, by occupying and farming them 
continuously. These lands were quickly spoken for by the 
end of the 1930s in the study region (Mora, et.al. 1986:
60). In the 1920s, a market for land was established. Don 
Mateo remarked that Cartagos were able to buy lands on the 
cheap from Guanacastecos, who were much less experienced 
than their Valle Central counterparts in business dealings. 
He relayed a story of a Cartago who traded an oxcart to a 
Guanacasteco for a farm.
Many Guanacastecos who sold their farms, and others 
who lost them through misfortunes associated with crop 
markets, migrated southward and southwestward to the lower 
hills toward the Pacific coast. There they took advantage 
of homesteading laws, claimed new lands, and attempted to 
recreate their traditional subsistence agriculture. Recent 
arrivals to Hojancha who possessed capital could easily 
take advantage of the temporary hard times and debts of 
many of these pioneer smallholders, and purchase their 
farms at low prices. As long as tierras libres were 
available toward the coast, land prices in the emerging 
Hojanchan land market did not rise rapidly, despite the 
scarcity of unoccupied lands there. For example, in the 
1930s, a farmer could buy a farm of 7 ha. for 300 Colones, 
the same amount he could get at market for selling the 
maize produced in a year on 3.5 ha. (Mora, et.al. 1986: 65- 
67). The relatively low land prices, coupled with emerging
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labor markets, enabled some Guanacasteco laborers to save 
enough money to buy small farms in the altiplanos or 
mountains of Hojancha, and avoid having to seek out new 
lands toward the coast. The settlement pattern which 
emerged seventy years ago can still be observed in the 
canton today: relatively densely populated highlands 
dominated by people of predominantly European ancestry, and 
sparsely populated lowlands dominated by mestizos (Urena 
1965: 69) .
The Highland Hojanchan Economy. 1920-1950 
The Cartagos practiced a modified version of the 
traditional swidden system of the Guanacastecos. The 
primary differences were shortened fallow periods, more 
production for market, and much less reliance on household 
gardens for subsistence. Typically, January through April 
was the season of slashing and burning forest. Planting of 
maize, beans and rice occurred at the onset of the rainy 
season. These basic grains were cultivated together in 
rows for two years, and less demanding tuber crops, such as 
yuca or tiquisque were cultivated the third, and sometimes 
fourth, years. After that, the parcel lay in fallow up to 
five years. Yields were high, as were labor requirements: 
rarely did a family cultivate more than about 3.5 ha. at a 
time. In addition to the food crops, many families 
produced a small amount of sugar cane and coffee (at 
appropriate elevations), partly for subsistence and partly
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for market {Mora, et.al. 1986: 60-62; Sandner 1962: 128). 
Some kept a few head of cattle. Through the 1940s, 
however, basic grains continued to dominate the land use 
and economy of Hojancha (Leon 1948). In fact, according to 
Mena (1993), some farmers who could overcome transportation 
limitations and produce sufficient quantities of grains for 
market, took advantage of this "bonanza" by producing all 
they could for profit, then abandoned their farms and moved 
on once soil fertility was lost.
With land, labor, and consumer goods markets more 
deeply penetrating their economy, Hojanchans had a greater 
need to produce surpluses of food crops, and in some cases, 
non-food cash crops, cattle, and timber for local and 
national markets. The ecological effects of increased 
market-oriented production included shortened fallow 
periods, deforestation, transformation of two-year-old 
cropland into pasture, and resulting declines in soil 
fertility (Mora, et.al. 1986: 63; Campos, Rodriguez and 
Ugalde 1993 : 8) .
Social effects of increased market-oriented production 
were noteworthy. Devoting more time, effort and investment 
to producing crops and livestock for local and national 
markets meant that there was less time and fewer resources 
available for producing the items for livelihood which 
peasants previously produced on the farm. Increasingly, 
campesinos had to buy these products from markets.
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Declining terms of trade of agricultural products with 
respect to clothing and purchased food items meant that 
each year, more agricultural products had to be produced to 
meet family needs. This placed strains not only on family 
economics but on land quality (Wagner 1958: 207, 212).
Once cattle production, financed by profits generated 
from crop surpluses, became more lucrative in the 1940s, 
much of Hojancha's cropland disappeared as it was converted 
to permanent pasture (Barrantes 1993; Campos, Rodriguez and 
Ugalde 1993: 8), reinforcing smallholders' dependency upon 
market-oriented production of cattle. Unemployment and 
landlessness resulted from increased pasturage, and 
decreased economic yields per hectare of cropland (Mora, 
et.al. 1986: 65-66) .
An important factor in the land use decisions of 
Hojanchans in the first half of the twentieth century was 
poor transportation infrastructure. According to Regulo 
Barrantes, one of the earliest settlers of Hojancha, market 
linkages remained weak even into the 1940s. Each month, a 
small number of oxcarts carried the region's production of 
basic grains to the towns of Mansion or Nicoya, or to 
coastal Nicoyan ports, for eventual shipment to Puntarenas 
by boat. Oxcarts were introduced into the Hojancha 
highlands by Cartagos, but not until the primitive 
footpaths and rugged trails linking the region to the 
Nicoyan lowlands were widened and smoothed to accommodate
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them. These improvements were made by Hojanchans, by 
neighbors working together with pick axes, shovels and 
machetes. The result of these efforts was a road, that 
eventually became the present-day highway, linking Hojancha 
and Matambti with Mansifin. No longer did Hojanchans have to 
transport surplus maize, rice or beans on horseback to 
market at Mansion and Nicoya (Mena 1990). Oxcart caravans 
facilitated shipments of grains to these markets and to 
Puerto Jesus and Puerto Thiel for shipment to Puntarenas 
(Wagner 1958: 210; Mena 1993). The Cartagos who introduced 
and operated the oxcarts were, in effect, middlemen who 
appropriated surplus value from other campesinos dependent 
upon them for trade (Mora, et.al. 1986: 69).
The Changing Hoianchan Economy in the 1950s 
In 1950, when Hojancha's pioneer era already had 
passed, basic grains accounted for only ten percent of all 
Costa Rican agricultural production, and this percentage 
continued to drop in subsequent decades (Salas, et.al.
1983: 68-69). The decline in importance of basic grains to 
Costa Rican agricultural production was the logical result 
of state policies during the previous 50 years, which 
wavered between a regard for peasant well-being, and an 
even stronger regard for the success of the agroexport 
sector. Subsidies and other protectionist measures aided 
coffee and banana producers and exporters, while basic 
grains were left to the graces of laissez-faire non-
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intervention, to the laws of supply and demand (Barahona 
1980: 221-223) .
By 1950, maize, beans and rice were no longer the 
profitable crops they had been in Hojancha for nearly 50 
years. Much of the region's soils already were exhausted 
from decades of market-oriented crop production that 
necessitated reduced fallow time, and from poor management 
of ever-expanding grazing lands. Plagues afflicted the 
maize crop in particular, and campesinos, suffering from 
continually decreasing terms of trade, lacked the capital 
to combat them with agrochemicals. State-backed 
assistance, such as credit, the establishement in Hojancha 
of an agricultural extension service or an agency to buy 
crops, was nowhere to be found (Mena 1993). Hojancha's 
locational and transportation disadvantages, compared to 
other basic grains-producing regions of Costa Rica, became 
acute (Campos, Rodriguez and Ugalde 1993: 8). In the late 
1940s, middlemen from outside the region began to 
monopolize the trade in Hojanchan basic grains. Their cut 
of the profits worked to the disadvantage of Hojancha's 
campesinos (Barrantes 1993).
In the 1950s, the cultivation of basic grains began to 
take a back seat to the production of cattle, which was 
better suited to the degraded landscapes and lengthy dry 
season of Hojancha. The forest ecosystem which had fostered 
subsistence agriculture in the region for many decades was
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displaced by a pastoral ecosystem, as iaracrua (Hvpharhenia 
rufa) and other grasses invaded fallow crop fields (Mora, 
et.al. 1986: 70, 76).
Besides environment, other factors contributed to the 
rise of cattle culture in Hojancha. In the 1950s, the 
global beef market expanded dramatically, due in large part 
to increased demand for cheap beef in the United States 
(Chant 1991: 55), and the increased demand for beef in the 
Valle Central that accompanied increases in population and 
industrialization there. In fact, because of the American 
fast food industry's growing requirements, the United 
States began opening its internal markets to Central 
American producers (West 1976: 392; Mora, et.al. 1986: 77). 
State economic development strategies during the decade, 
already favoring agroexport subsidies, were broadened to 
include the beef export sector. The national banking system 
identified beef production as a viable alternative economic 
activity for the country's development strategies, and 
began to subsidize credit to the beef producers, 
processors, and exporters (Campos, Rodriguez and Ugalde 
1993: 1). As a result of these actions, Costa Rican beef 
production tripled in the 1950s, and its proportion of 
total Costa Rican agricultural production increased from 
4.5% in 1950 to 10.1% in 1960 (Salas, et.al. 1983: 69-70).
The Inter-American Highway, completed in the 1950s, 
facilitated the transport of cattle and processed beef out
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of Guanacaste, thereby opening up the province (including 
indirectly the Nicoya Peninsula) to new trade networks 
(Mora, et.al. 1986: 77), In Hojancha, cattle production, 
in number of heads, increased 800% between 1935 and 1963, 
with most of that growth occurring after 1950 (Campos, 
Rodriguez and Ugalde 1993: 1).
Cattle represented an attractive activity to many of 
Hojancha's operators of small and medium farms in the 
1950s. The terms of trade of basic grains with respect to 
land, wages, consumer goods, and agricultural inputs had 
fallen steadily since the 193 0s. From the point of view of 
farm owners, Hojancha had a comparative advantage at cattle 
production, and a comparative disadvantage at basic grains 
compared with other regions producing food crops, such as 
the Valle General, that enjoyed more favorable market 
access and conditions facilitating mechanization. Those 
Hojanchans possessing capital set the transformation to 
cattle production in motion by investing this capital in 
herds and expanding their land holdings. In many cases 
this capital had been brought to Hojancha in previous 
decades by settlers from the Valle Cantral, who reinvested 
it in market-oriented basic grains production, thereby 
realizing modest but sufficient profits to finance the 
subsequent livestock-based commercial venture. Because 
land prices, were significantly cheaper earlier on, the 
earliest arrivals could buy more land, and were the ones
112
most responsible for the subsequent transformation to 
cattle {Mora, et.al. 1986: 74, 77).
As new capital was generated from cattle production, 
farmers began hiring laborers to cut down forests and 
actively plant jaragua, rather than allow it to simply 
invade fallow crop fields. Mountain slopes became 
pastures. Investments were made in improved cattle 
varieties, such as Zebu and Brahman, and in barbed wire 
fencing to separate pasture sections. The expansion of 
grazing land came not only at the expense of forest, but 
also cropland. By turning fallow cropland into pasture, 
fallow periods and soil fertility were reduced. From 1960 
onward, Hojanchans produced basic grains almost entirely 
for subsistence (Mora, et.al. 1986: 76). Clearly, cattle 
production perpetuated itself: it contributed to land 
degradation, and the degraded lands could profitably 
produce only cattle.
The social impact of Hojancha's transformation to 
cattle production was considerable. The smallest farms, 
which had fared well during Hojancha's basic grains 
bonanza, could not profitably be converted to land- 
extensive cattle grazing. Many smallholders, therefore, 
sold their farms in the 1950s and later. Beginning in the 
1950s, the farmers enjoying success from cattle were able 
to buy out those farms that suffered from the decline in
113
profitability of basic grains, and those farms that were 
too small to profitably graze cattle (Mena 1993).
Because cattle production is not labor intensive, 
requiring only an average of 6 worker-days, or "jornales" 
per hectare per year, compared to 34 jornales for beans and 
38 for maize (Chant 1991: 55), there was less work 
available to landless or land-poor Hojanchans. Permanent 
emigration had begun from Hojancha to such regions as the 
country's banana zone around Golfito (Wagner 1958: 215; 
Sandner 1962: 130). Some campesinos without sufficient 
land who chose not to emigrate permanently from the 
peninsula moved to the remote lowland hills near the coast, 
in an attempt to engage in traditional subsistence 
agriculture. Others migrated seasonally to the Valle 
Central to earn wages from the coffee harvest (Mora, et.al. 
1986: 79).
Conclusions
By the end of the 1950s, Hojancha's transformation to 
a predominantly cattle region had begun, and a new social 
landscape was .taking shape. Sandner (1959: 38) noted that 
the town of Hojancha, which in 1959 had a number of shops 
and services, and 38 households, more than double that of 
1945, was a town populated by recent arrivals. Only two of 
the families had lived there several decades. He noted the 
preponderance of speculators and "comerciantes," or 
businessmen, living in the town. Surrounding the town, a
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process of cattle-based land concentration was occurring 
alongside "minifundizacion,1 the division of farms into 
small units with limited economic potential. By then, most 
of the cultivators lived in the nearby highlands and other 
altiplanos of the region.
A process of social class formation in Hojancha was 
fully underway. Those settlers who had brought some 
capital with them, typically generated from the sale of 
their farm units in the western Valle Central, were able to 
diversify their activities, concentrate on the more 
profitable ones and avoid less profitable ones, thereby 
reinforcing their favorable socioeconomic position. They 
built up herds, generated more capital, and purchased 
additional farmland from less fortunate neighbors. The 
conjuncture of forces underlying regional transformation in 
the 1950s and later also included environmental 
deterioration, shifts in state policies, and changes in 
prices of crops and farming inputs. With an absence of 
state-sponsored price supports, campesinos earned less for 
basic grains with respect to rising costs of land, 
fertilizers, labor, and transportation. Cattle generated 
more income, especially per unit of labor, in part because 
of increased global demand for cheap beef, and in part 
because of subsidized credit. The expansion of beef 
production was directly linked to a reduction of fallow 
cropland, and increasingly exhausted soils.
By the end of the decade, cattle was the only viable 
economic activity for most petty-capitalist farmers 
occupying the altiplanos and sloped landscapes of the 
Hojancha study region. Commercial production of basic 
grains was all but gone. With the exception of the 
communities located above 500 meters, where coffee 
cultivation was possible, Hojancha had developed a 
dependency upon cattle production which, in the 1960s and 
1970s, would prove disastrous for many of the region's 
smallholders. This deterioration in Hojancha's social 
landscape, and the local responses to it, would become key 
features of contemporary Hojanchan regional restructuring.
CHAPTER FIVE
HOJANCHA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1960-1980:
THE BASIS FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
The shift toward market-oriented cattle production in 
Hojancha in the 1950s set the stage for a major 
transformation of Hojanchan society and landscape in the 
1960s and 1970s. During those decades, economic and land 
use changes were even more dramatic than those of the 
1950s, when farm operators responded to a conjuncture of 
emerging conditions: changes in international beef markets, 
land degradation, deepening land markets, and a 
deterioration in the terms of trade of basic grains. By 
the mid-1960s, however, these conditions had deteriorated 
to the point of creating a "beef trap." With the exception 
of many smallholders located in the canton's highland 
coffee zones, Hojanchans became dangerously dependent, both 
environmentally and economically, upon cattle production. 
The region would experience denuded landscapes, damaged 
water resources, landlessness, unemployment, land 
concentration and emigration at a pace almost unknown in 
Costa Rica since independence.
From the 1960s onward, Hojancha's linkage to the 
global political economy became locked into place. The 
purpose of this chapter is to identify the economic trends 
and political actions occurring at multiple scales that 
played a role in the structuring and restructuring of this 
small rural region in the 1960s and 1970s. As this chapter
116
117
will argue, decisions as distant as those made by European 
and North American consumers and corporate interests were 
as important as policies enacted in Washington, D.C. and 
San Jos£, Costa Rica, and actions taken by Hojanchans, in 
defining the opportunities and constraints that 
characterized economic and social change in the study 
region during that time period. These descriptions of the 
political economy of Hojanchan smallholder change are 
categorized according to the canton's three pertinent 
activities of the time: beef cattle, which experienced a
productive boom and bust; basic grains, the traditional 
mainstay of the Hojanchan economy that ceased to be an 
important market crop; and coffee, an export cash crop that 
became an important persistence strategy of many Hojanchan 
campesinos.
Each of these products has been subjected to changes 
in consumer demand, and changes in prices, both 
internationally and domestically. Each has been affected 
as well by fluctuations in production in Costa Rica and 
beyond. Hojanchan production of these three products has 
not been strictly market-driven. Given the Costa Rican 
state's activist policies since the 1940s, each of these 
products has been affected by such policies to varying 
degrees. Collectively, near and distant market conditions 
and state involvement (or neglect) have contributed to
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changes in local farmers' decisions, and ultimately to a 
transformation of Hojanchan regional identity.
Perhaps the most direct influences underlying these 
land use and regional shifts since the 1940s have been 
Costa Rican state policies toward the agricultural sector. 
These have largely favored cash crops for export, such as 
coffee and bananas. Despite growing balance of payments 
deficits in the 1950s, resulting from deteriorating terms 
of trade for these traditional exports, the state 
reinforced its posture toward the export sector, in an 
effort to enhance foreign exchange earnings. By 1960, beef 
had become a major component of this policy. It was 
considered a viable part of a strategy to diversify exports 
and reduce dependency on traditional agroexports. At 
various times since 1960, the state hoped to stimulate 
domestic production of, and self-sufficiency in, basic 
grains and other foodstuffs. The desired results, however, 
have not always materialized. For example, during the 
1960s cattle boom, when state credit policies favored beef 
production, and when farms in Hojancha and elsewhere in 
Costa Rica increasingly turned to that activity, coffee and 
bananas still accounted for more than 80 percent of the 
country's agricultural exports (Salas 1983: 159-161).
Costa Rican state agricultural policies are direct 
responses to both fiscal concerns which the state faces, 
and trends in global and national markets for given
products. As noted, credit to cattle producers followed 
favorable beef markets. The state has supported coffee 
production when production had contracted in other coffee 
producing countries or when pricing and consumer demand 
trends warranted greater Costa Rican participation in the 
global coffee market. Basic grains have experienced a wide 
array of state action and neglect, depending upon the 
particular crop and upon a host of other national, regional 
and global production, market and pricing issues. During 
the past two decades, the widespread Latin American 
economic crises of debt {Bianchi 1987) and inflation 
(Prebisch 1987), have largely defined the framework of 
these Costa Rican policies. These events have affected 
Hojanchan productive decisions and environment alike.
The Political Economy of Beef Cattle 
Cattle production, as a primary economic activity, is 
relatively new to Hojancha. This short history contrasts 
sharply with that of the balance of northwest Costa Rica, 
where cattle ranching emerged as an important activity in 
the sixteenth century, and'has remained so to the present. 
Moreover, Hojancha's dependence upon cattle production is 
remarkable, given that the average farm size is smaller 
than elsewhere in Costa Rica's northwest livestock region, 
and the large land area that profitable cattle farming 
requires. Edelman (1985: 156) and Solis (1981: 145-146) 
estimate that small cattle farms in Guanacaste, under 100
hectares (75 head) in size, are unable to produce 
sufficient income to sustain an average family of six 
members. As in the 1970s, more than three out of four 
Hojanchan families today that rely most heavily on cattle 
for income, have fewer than 100 hectares of pasture. In 
1984, only 34 Hojanchan farms had more than 100 head, and 
only 87 had more than 50 head (DGEC 1987). The land- 
extensive nature of cattle production was a key feature of 
Hojancha's’economic and environmental degradation in the 
1960s and 1970s. Despite the seeming incompatibility of 
cattle production and Hojancha's small-farm-dominated 
landscape, the region was drawn deeply into the global beef 
market, because of increased demand for beef in the United 
States, and the respective roles of the Costa Rican state 
and international lending institutions and development 
agencies (Edelman 1985: 169).
Production and Marketing Characteristics 
Cattle culture is entirely of Old World origin. The 
Spaniards introduced cattle into the Western Hemisphere 
during the first two decades of their exploration and 
settlement of the Caribbean and the American mainlands.
The "Criollo" (Bos taurus) cattle that represented the sole 
cattle type of the Western Hemisphere until early in the 
nineteenth century, traces its ancestry to a few hundred 
cattle transported to the Greater Antilles from the dry 
grass rangelands and marshlands of the Andalusian region of
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southern Spain, by way of the Canary Islands (Rouse 1977: 
viii, 3, 11; Butzer 1988; Jordan 1993: 67). The Spaniards 
introduced Criollo cattle into Panama in 1520, primarily 
from Jamaica. By 1524, offspring of these were driven on 
land through Costa Rica to the Pacific lowlands of 
Nicaragua. In 1561, Criollo cattle produced by these 
Nicaraguan herds were brought to Guanacaste for 
establishment of herds (Rouse 1977: 36-49).
The Criollo proved through the centuries to be 
vulnerable to the tropical heat and diseases. In the 
1920s, Costa Rican cattlemen introduced Zebu cattle (Bos 
indicus). of Indian origin, to the country (Hall 1985:
185). Most beef cattle produced in Costa Rica today are 
these hybrid varieties. An example is the Brahman, which 
is a cross of zebu and one or more European breeds. The 
most common pasture grass is iaraaua (Hyparrhenia rufa) of 
African origin that easily takes over the fallow fields and 
establishes itself quickly (Shane 1986: 16).
Cattle are attractive to smallholders in Central 
America, and elsewhere in Latin America, because they 
represent a way of reducing risk. Theoretically they can 
be kept until prices are favorable or quickly converted to 
cash during times of emergency (Hecht and Cockburn 1989:
151). In Hojancha, this strategy can be risky, given the 
region's lengthy dry season in some years. Nevertheless, 
land exhausted by crop production can earn income for a few
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additional years from cattle. Complicating the picture, it 
takes, on average, five years to raise an animal to 
slaughter weight (Place 1985: 294).
Costa Rica has become Central America's second largest 
beef exporter after Guatemala (Shane 1986: 69). Production 
has expanded from the traditional northwest Costa Rican 
flat cattle region to lowlands of the central and southwest 
Pacific and Caribbean regions, as well as to the country's 
Valle Central and Valle General highland zones (Hall 1985: 
87, 183-185).
Between 1960 and 1975, the number of cattle in Costa 
Rica doubled and pasture land increased more than 60 
percent (Parsons 1976: 124). Beef as a portion of Costa 
Rican export earnings increased from zero to ten percent 
between 1950 and 1969. As a portion of the value of total 
Costa Rican agricultural production, cattle increased from 
14 percent in 1950 to 25 percent by the mid-1960s. By 
1970, already more than 70 percent of Costa Rica's farmland 
was in pasture (Spielman 1972: 33, 35). Among the results 
of this dramatic expansion are a steady reduction in land 
devoted to basic grains, and increasingly eroded and 
leached soils, especially on grazed slopes (Hall 1985: 87) . 
Guanacaste has seen the greatest expansion of the activity. 
The province contains nearly 40 percent of the country's 
pasturage and cattle, has received more than half the 
credit earmarked for the cattle sector, and has produced
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more than half of the country's beef exports {Solis 1983: 
14-20) .
Cattle marketing in Guanacaste is well-developed.
Most Hojanchan cattle producers sell their product, whether 
calves for further fattening, or already-fattened animals, 
to intermediaries. or middlemen. A minority of producers 
sell directly to "la subasta," or auction house. 
Intermediaries, in turn, sell calves either directly to 
other farmers for fattening or the auction house, where 
other intermediaries or cattle farmers buy them for 
fattening. These auction houses are scattered throughout 
Costa Rica. The closest to Hojancha is at Santa Cruz, some 
40 kilometers away. The country also has a small number of 
much larger auction houses. The closest of these to 
Hojancha, known as "la plaza," is located in the Valle 
Central. In some cases, cattle are sold directly to 
slaughter houses (or export houses) by intermediaries, 
bypassing auction houses. "Empacadores," or slaughter 
houses, sell either processed beef to domestic supermarkets 
or butcher shops, or they export frozen beef (Morales and 
Villalobos 1985: 333-337).
Since Costa Rica began exporting beef in the 1950s, 
only a minority has been produced for domestic markets.
This beef export boom is part of the second of two "long 
waves" which Hubbard (1986: 15-24) identified as 
characterizing the history of the global beef trade. The
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first wave began in 1880, peaked in 1919, and declined in 
the late 1940s. Britain and other rapidly-urbanizing and 
industrializing countries imported refrigerated beef first 
from the United States first, and later from Argentina.
The second wave began in the 1950s, climbed throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, and levelled off in the early 1980s. This 
wave was dominated by imports into the United States of 
"manufacturing" beef, or lower-quality frozen beef destined 
for hamburger and the fast food industry, from Australia, 
New Zealand, and Central America.
Although exports of manufacturing beef from Costa Rica 
and other Central American countries have not affected the 
volume of world beef exports greatly, it has been extremely 
important within the political economy of these small 
countries (Hubbard 1986: 18). Thus, while most increases 
in beef consumption in the United States during the second 
wave were met by domestic production, there have been 
opportunities in many years for Central American countries 
to supply that market. Of course, when the global market 
experiences a glut, the major beef countries, themselves 
producers, restrict imports and dump their own surpluses on 
the world market to protect domestic prices. Costa Rica 
and other Third World beef exporters dependent upon these 
markets, experience worsened price conditions.
The dramatic, nine-fold increase in Costa Rican beef 
exports between 1960 and 1979 was not accompanied by a
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similar increase in production for domestic consumption 
(only a 60 percent increase throughout the two decades.) 
This phenomenon can be explained in part by the greater 
rise in prices of export beef (510 %) than domestically- 
consumed beef (385%), as the latter is subject to state 
price ceilings (Aguilar and Solis 1988: 21-22). The 
increases in production of beef for exports, and to a 
lesser extent domestically consumed beef, resulted in a 39% 
increase in pasture area in Costa Rica in the 1970s, mostly 
at the expense of forest, and secondarily at the expense of 
foodcrop land (Aguilar and Solis 1988: 4-5; Shane 1986:
31) .
In any given year, some 85-95 percent of Costa Rica's 
beef exports are shipped to the United States (Simpson and 
Farris 1982; El Ganadero 1993a: 32, 35). State policy and 
consumer habits in the United States, therefore, are 
important to Costa Rica's beef export sector. Sanitation 
regulations, a major non-tariff barrier to imports of beef 
into the United States, has created a distinct advantage in 
many years for Central American countries. South American 
beef exporters had been barred access to the United States 
market because of Aftosa, or hoof-and-mouth disease 
(Simpson and Harris 1982: 243-248; Shane 1986: 82).
The 1974-1975 crisis in export beef prices was in 
large part due to the nature of beef import policies of the 
United States. Before 1958, most Costa Rican beef exports
were in the form of live cattle to Peru. Subsequently, 
exports shifted to deboned chilled beef for North American 
markets. Until 1964, Costa Rica and other countries had 
only to receive USDA certification of their packing 
facilities. But in 1964, when beef prices were low and 
there was a glut in the U.S., Congress passed a bill to 
regulate imports {Edelman 1985: 170-171). Between 1964 and 
1979, the U.S. regulated beef imports by means of a 
principle of market sharing. A quota allowed between 6 and 
7 percent of U.S. domestic production levels to be 
imported. The law was cyclical; that is, as U.S. 
production increased, so did imports, producing a 
destabilizing effect on prices, such as in 1974-1975. In 
1979, a counter-cyclical law was established, allowing U.S. 
domestic production and imports to vary inversely. A 
minimum import quota of 625,000 tons was part of the law 
(Simpson and Farris 1982: 243).
After 1954, Costa Rica exported over half its beef, 
and sometimes as much as two-thirds, until 1977 (Morales 
and Villalobos 1985: 332; Parsons 1976: 124). Since 1977, 
less than half of Costa Rica's beef has been exported 
(Table 5-1), due in part to a weaker U.S. Dollar and, 
later, to the implementation of the counter-cyclical law, 
and a general decrease in per-capita U.S. beef consumption 
(Shane 1986: 85; Morales and Villalobos 1985: 331, 339).
The effect of this trend toward less production for export
127
and more for the lower-priced and less dynamic domestic 
market, has been less profit for Hojancha's beef producers 
(El Ganadero 1993a: 32).
TABLE 5-1
COSTA RICAN BEEF PRODUCTION, 1972-1983
Total Production Percentage of Pro-










1982 72,562 .4 40.3
1983 66,547.5 27.6
Source: Morales and Villalobos 1985: 332; El Ganadero 
1993a: 32.
Prices throughout the cattle boom period were 
generally favorable to Guanacastecan beef producers until 
the dip in 1974-1975 (Table 5-2). The main cause was a 
dramatic reduction of beef imports by the EEC (European 
Economic Community), and a resulting glut in global beef 
supplies (Simpson and Farris 1982: 238). This proved fatal 
to Hojancha's smallest producers, those with herds too 
small to ever produce a comfortable profit margin, even 
when prices comfortably exceeded production costs.
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TABLE 5-2
PRICES OF BEEF FOR EXPORT, 1964 -1983
(Colones per kilogram)
Year Price Year Price Year Price
1964 5.55 1971 8.89 1978 18.04
1965 5.84 1972 9.28 1979 24.33
1966 6 .80 1973 13 .28 1980 25 .43
1967 6 . 88 1974 12.16 1981 52.65
1968 7.18 1975 11.20 1982 94.17
1969 8 .09 1976 13 .30 1983 99.85
1970 8 .62 1977 12.77
Source: SEPSA, Unpublished data; Solis 1983: 6-7.
These smallest producers, after years of exhausting 
their soils by expanding grazing lands to the limits, were 
already realizing narrow profit margins. From 1974 to 
1975, export production in Costa Rica dropped nearly 30 
percent (Solis 1983: 23), leaving the smallholders of 
Hojancha to compete with large cattle ranches elsewhere in 
Costa Rica for a tight domestic market. According to the 
locals and to the Instituto de Fomento y Asesoria Municpal 
of the Costa Rican Government (IFAM 1976) , this period 
produced severe unemployment and farm loss in Hojancha.
Not until the late 1970s, when the damage had already been 
done, did prices recover. By then, however, many of 
Hojancha's smaller cattle producing farms had been absorbed 
by larger ones.
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State Policies Toward Beef Production
In spite of the vulnerability of Hojancha's producers 
to global market conditions well beyond their control, they 
have continued to concentrate on raising beef since the 
1960s. In part, this is because the denuded, sloped 
Hojanchan landscape, which has suffered sever erosion in 
many cases from two decades of overgrazing, would not 
profitably support other activities. State policies 
stimulating beef exports also explain this behavior, though 
such policies typically have been directed toward the 
largest cattle ranches of Guanacaste, rather than to small- 
scale cattle producers, typical of Hojancha (Aguilar and 
Solis 1988: 129, 136; Spielman 1972: 36, 38; Edelman 1985: 
169-170).
Credit in particular has favored the largest ranching 
operations, because there is more land which could become 
collateral, and because such credit is used less to 
increase output per hectare and more to acquire additional 
land and expand the area in pasture (Edelman 1985: 174).
In the latter 1960s, credit from the nationalized banking 
system granted to cattle production was nearly equal to 
that of all other agricultural sectors combined. This was 
the case, despite beef's low ranking among export earnings, 
compared with other agricultural activities, and despite 
its meager contribution to the national per-capita protein 
intake (Table 5-3).
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Since 1970, more than half the agricultural credit has 
been for cattle production (Aguilar and Solis 1988: 5-6).
In fact, the amount of credit to this sector in the 1956-77 
period increased from 13.8% to 29.5% of all Costa Rican 
National Banking System credit, a greater increase than for 
any other sector of the Costa Rican economy, including 
industry. Furthermore, credit to cattle ranching has been 
longer in term and lower in interest rate than for other 
sectors of the economy. The state frequently has 
subsidized credit with interest rates below the market rate 
(Place 1985: 290). The beef sector has exhibited a much 
higher rate of unpursued loan defaults, due to the lack of 
political effort to tighten controls over this sector 
(Edelman 1985: 173-176).
TABLE 5-3
BEEF AND LIVE CATTLE AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL COSTA RICAN EXPORTS, SELECTED YEARS 1954-1987
Beef as Percent of 
Year Total Exports_____ Year





















Source: Edelman 1985: 173; IDB 1988: 592.
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The expansion of cattle ranching during the last four 
decades is intimately linked to the nationalization of 
banking that occurred after Costa Rica's 1948 Civil War and 
the ensuing victory of the social democratic Partido 
Liberacion Nacional (PLN), or National Liberation Party.
The state had identified beef as an activity with great 
potential for economic development and for foreign exchange 
earnings. Clearly, by directing a large share of credit 
toward beef production, the state, under the leadership of 
both the PLN and the more conservative Partido Unidad 
Social Cristiano (PUSC), or Social Christian Unity Party, 
has directly fostered land concentration and deforestation 
(Aguilar and Solis 1988: 129; Salas, et.al. 1983: 167).
State involvement in the beef cattle sector goes 
beyond the provision of credit. Research, promotion, the 
building of infrastructure, pricing policies, and quotas of 
different types are among the state actions that have 
influenced Costa Rican cattle production. Between 1966 and 
1970, a period in which Hojancha experienced land 
concentration and degradation from its emphasis on cattle 
production, the state spent $11 million for the promotion 
of cattle production and sales, nearly double the $6 
million spent for all agricultural crops (Spielman 1972:
38). The state's completion of the Interamerican Highway 
between Guanacaste and the Valle Central, as well as the 
improvement of many of Guanacaste's secondary roads and
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oxcart paths to accomodate cattle trucks, are among the 
state's activities directed at stimulating beef production. 
The construction of the large market places (la plaza) by 
the state was part of the strategy (Place 1985: 290).
Since the 1950s, the state has sponsored research for 
improvements in herd quality, feeding, and production 
technologies (Shane 1986: 61-66). Several Hojanchan beef 
producers expressed their belief that their activity is for 
the good of Hojancha and the country, because the state has 
promoted the activity for many years as good for the region 
and the country.
Costa Rican state economic policies associated with 
cattle production exemplify a basic development dilemma.
On one hand, the state believes there is a need to export 
beef to generate foreign exchange earnings. On the other 
hand, the state pursues "cheap beef" policies for boosting 
domestic consumption (Hubbard 1986: 26-27). A two-tiered 
pricing system for beef exists. Beginning in the 1960s, 
beef for domestic consumption has been subject to price 
ceilings imposed by the Consejo Nacional de Produccion 
(CNP), or National Production Council. Quotas imposed by 
the CNP to ensure adequate domestic supplies have affected 
exports, and therefore, foreign exchange earnings, in some 
years. The two-tiered system has prevented smaller 
cattlemen who produce primarily for domestic market, such 
as Hojancha's, from realizing the great profits of large
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export-oriented cattle ranches (Spielman 1972: 51; Morales 
and Villalobos 1985: 333) .
Guanacastecan, including Hojanchan, beef production 
has not been unaffected by the actions of international 
lending institutions and development agencies. State 
policies often reflect, or are even tied directly to, the 
policies of these agencies. The prevailing point of view 
in the 1960s and 1970s of such entities as the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) was 
that beef cattle production, if properly managed, could be 
a sustainable, successful provider of food and revenue to 
Central American countries. Beef production, therefore, 
has constituted an important part of the activities of 
these agencies in Costa Rica. In fact, World Bank and IDB 
loans to Costa Rica for cattle development programs 
exceeded those to any other Central American country for 
the same purpose in the 1960s and 1970s (Brockett 1988:
48) .
The World Bank provides credit to initiate projects in 
the livestock sector, provided the state makes technical 
assistance available. Among the largest of World Bank 
cattle projects in Costa Rica was a $55.6 million loan in 
1977 for ranchers to expand herds by a total of 20,500 
head, producing an additional 1,700 metric tons of meat and 
20,000 metric tons of milk (Shane 1986: 35-36). USAID,
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recognizing the profitability of the export beef industry, 
due to its low labor costs, has enthusiastically provided 
loans and grants to the cattle sector, even as part of 
reforestation and conservation projects {Shane 1986: 45- 
46) .
The IDB typically finances up to half of a livestock 
project's costs, and the borrowing country finances the 
rest. While loans for livestock projects typically 
comprise only about 5 percent of IDB's loan portfolio to 
Latin America, for Costa Rica, the percentage is typically 
much higher. Between 1961 and 1977, for example, more than 
one-third of IDB's loans to Costa Rica were for cattle 
(Edelman 1985: 171-172). Six IDB loans during that period 
collectively provided $18.4 million for animal production 
programs. Since 1978, IDB has referred to small-farm 
cattle production as a potential growth sector and a 
desired destination for IDB funds (Shane 1986: 37-40).
Hojancha's cattle-producing sector has seldom been a 
direct recipient of funding by these international 
agencies. This does not, however, mean that the region is 
unaffected. Chapter Seven includes a description of the 
most recent efforts of Hojanchans to secure development 
funds for reforestation and other small-farm improvements. 
This included a rather substantial loan, in part from IDB 
and in part from the state, that contained funds for 
Hojancha's beef producers. Hojancha must compete with
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other cattle-producing subregions of Guanacaste, especially 
those with large cattle ranches that have directly received 
the aid. In short, Hojancha's cattle production and 
marketing are articulated within the broader national and 
international political economy of cattle production and 
marketing, which is affected by the activities of 
international lending and development institutions.
Cattle producers of Costa Rica, including Hojancha, 
have enhanced their position with respect to the state by 
means of their powerful lobby, the Camara de Ganaderos, or 
Chamber of Cattlemen, organized at the national, provincial 
and cantonal levels. Many of its members have personal 
connections with officials of the National Banking System 
and with other government officials. These have resulted 
at times in subsidized low interest rate loans, liberalized 
export laws (Edelman 1985: 170, 173), relaxed export quotas 
(El Ganadero 1993a: 32), taxbreaks for companies 
manufacturing vaccines, and higher sanitary standards for 
cheaper beef imported from other Central American countries 
(Comunidades 1990: 12).
The cantonal-level chamber of Hojancha establishes 
committees to discuss producers' problems, and applies 
pressure to the provincial-level chamber, and hopefully to 
the national-level chamber in-turn. Often, aid is sought 
for animal health and herd improvement, and changes are 
requested in quotas and prices. Hojancha's chamber also
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buys salt, molasses, or vaccines in bulk quantities to pass 
the savings on to member producers.
The Viability of Beef Production
as a Development Strategy
Place (1985: 292) argues that the Guanacastecan cattle
boom, led by state and international agency initiatives,
has not been an effective strategy to provide economic
security and social well-being to campesinos:
Guanacaste's integration into the international 
economy led to economic reorganization which 
has caused a number of changes in land tenure 
and employment patterns. Some of these changes 
run counter to Costa Rica's best interests in 
the long run, since they appear to be reducing, 
rather than improving, the quality of life for 
a large number of rural people.
The most telling sign of the failure of beef production to
improve livelihoods in Hojancha and elsewhere in Costa Rica
is that, as a rural activity whose expansion has displaced
the production of food crops, cattle grazing absorbs very
little labor. On a per-hectare basis, it generates about
one-seventh the employment of basic grains (Table 5-4).
Thus, land concentration, landlessness and unemployment
have accompanied the expansion of cattle production in
Hojancha and elsewhere in Guanacaste. Indeed, Augelli
(1987: 11-12) identifies the increase in pasture for export
beef production as a major factor in the closing of Costa
Rica's settlement frontier in the 1960s.
The "protein flight" which the Guanacastecan cattle
boom of the 1950s to 1970s represented, has resulted in a
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domestic food crisis. Between 1955 and 1969, during which 
time Costa Rican cattle production increased fairly 
steadily, per-capita beef consumption actually decreased 
from 22.4 kg./person/yr. to 15.4 (Spielman 1972: 50). The 
two-tiered pricing system, yielding more favorable prices 
for beef exports, has caused producers to focus on export 
production at the expense of domestic production. This has 
at times driven domestic beef prices upward, beyond the 
reach of many consumers. For example, in 194 9, the 
wholesale beef price in Costa Rica was one-fourth that in 
the United States,* in 1978, it was three-fourths, resulting 
in the decreased per-capita consumption in Costa Rica. 
Hojanchans frequently complain about their inability to 
afford beef. Indeed, in 1993, it was common to observe 
higher ground beef prices in Hojancha's pulperias and 
butcher shops than in supermarkets in the United States.
TABLE 5-4 
LABOR UTILIZATION FOR VARIOUS 
AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN GUANACASTE
Activity
Jornales (worker-days) 













Source: Place 1985: 291; Ribier, et.al. 1988: 42-47
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Rural communities, such as those of the Nicoya 
Peninsula, have consumed less beef per capita than 
communities of the Valle Central, where slaughtering is 
concentrated {Place 1985: 293). Furthermore, cattle 
production has displaced not only basic grains cropland but 
also forest. Expanded cattle production has created 
scarcities of wood for construction of dwellings, firewood, 
game animals, and other forest resources traditionally 
important to campesinos (Place 1985: 292-293).
Social disparities are a byproduct of Guanacastecan 
cattle production, as the activity has become increasingly 
concentrated. Agricultural Census data reveal that by the 
early 1970s, when the cattle boom had become bust for many 
Hojanchans, forcing a large number to emigrate, the 
smallest half of Guanacaste's farms, those under 20 
hectares, accounted for only six percent of the grazing 
land and 9.5 percent of the cattle. Collectively, the 
largest six percent of the farms, those larger than 200 
hectares, accounted for over 55 percent of the grazing land 
and over half the cattle. Only two decades earlier, less 
than four percent of the farms were larger than 200 
hectares, and they accounted for less than half the grazing 
land and only 39 percent of the cattle (Aguilar and Solis 
1988: 9-11).
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Hojancha's Participation in the Cattle Boom
The polarization in land tenure that resulted from the 
Guanacastecan cattle boom operated on a somewhat smaller 
scale in Hojancha, but to a degree significant enough to 
eliminate many small farms. Hojancha's uniqueness as a 
smallholder stronghold, egalitarian by Guanacastecan 
standards, was threatened. Although no huge cattle estates 
emerged in Hojancha, the subregion became as dependent upon 
beef production as the rest of Guanacaste. Ribier, et.al. 
(1986: 19) argue that few areas of Costa Rica have 
responded as strongly as the central Nicoya Peninsula to 
state policies promoting cattle production since the 1950s. 
The poorer transportation infrastructure of Hojancha 
compared to other small farm regions of Costa Rica, even 
into the early 1980s, made cattle the preferred activity, 
as it did not require the same direct transportation access 
as other agricultural products (Ribier, et.al. 1986: 14).
If necessary, cattle can be driven on foot from remote 
places to places accessible to trucks.
As mentioned later in this chapter, coffee enabled 
many Hojanchan smallholders to persist during and after the 
cattle boom and bust. Many families have had to rely on 
off-farm employment, either in Hojancha or elsewhere, to 
supplement farm income. But even today, cattle grazing 
dominates the canton's land use.
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From 1963 to 1973, pastures in Hojancha increased from 
50 percent of farmland to nearly 80 percent, while basic 
grains decreased from 22 to 10 percent (IFAM 1976: 19;
Mora, et.al. 1986: 80-81). By 1973, only 11 percent of 
Hojancha's farmland was fallow, compared to 24 percent of 
Guanacaste's and 34 percent of Costa Rica's (IFAM 1976:
19). This reflects the intensive grazing which the 
canton's relativly small farm units resorted to, given the 
steadily declining terms of trade of cattle during the 
period.
In an effort to diversify production, Hojanchan cattle 
producers have largely adopted "ganado de doble proposito," 
or dual purpose (beef and milk) cattle with Holstein mixed 
into the breed. When cattle prices fell in absolute or 
relative terms, beginning in the late 1960s, and especially 
in the early 1970s, those small Hojanchan cattle farms that 
survived did so by increasing stocking rates from the more 
typical 1.1 head per hectare, the Guanacastecan average 
(Aguilar and Solis 1985: 5) to 1.5 head per hectare. This 
resulted in increased soil compaction and erosion, not to 
mention long-term effects: water infiltration disturbance 
and the seasonal drying up of the canton's streams (Calvo 
and Vargas 1984: 22, 26; Campos, Rodriguez and Ugalde 1993: 
9). The compaction of the canton's clayey soils made 
cattle grazing the only viable activity. The cycle of 
dependency was intensified.
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The landlessness that resulted from indebted 
Hojanchans losing their farms in the wake of unfavorable 
prices for cattle, created a large available labor force. 
The production of cattle, whose labor requirements are low, 
was insufficient to absorb the landless and the unemployed. 
Wages were driven down. Whereas pe6nes. or laborers, 
before 1960 could often save part of their wages and 
eventually buy a small farm, wages during the cattle period 
were lower relative to the cost of land, making such an 
acquisition next to impossible {Damais, et.al. 1986: 16).
The Political Economy of Basic Grains
The basic grains sector, consisting of maize, beans 
and rice, is economically, socially and politically 
important to Costa Rican agriculture. The majority of 
Costa Rican farm families produce at least a small quantity 
of one or more of these. Smallholders produce two-thirds 
of Costa Rica's maize and beans, utilizing basic 
technologies, while rice is mechanized and produced on 
larger holdings, mostly corporate farms (Morales and 
Villalobos 1985: 57, 75; Soto 1990: 213). Because of state 
policies that too frequently discourage commercial 
production of maize and beans, they are increasingly 
becoming subsistence crops to supplement incomes on the 
smallest of farms, whose owners must work off-farm for 
wages at least part time (Barahona 1980: 59- 61).
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Production and Marketing Characteristics 
Production of basic grains is scattered throughout the
country, and is generally relegated to small parcels
containing the poorest soils of a given locality. The 
heaviest concentrations of beans are the lowlands and lower 
highlands of the Pacific side of the country. This 
includes the Nicoya Peninsula. Because most producers are
smallholders who lack resources to invest in efficient
production, few inputs are utilized. A production method 
involving the broadcasting of seeds, known as "frijol 
tapado," discussed in Chapter Seven, is widely practiced in 
Hojancha and elsewhere in Costa Rica. Few producers, 
including those of Hojancha, have the facilities to 
properly dry and store the harvest. They, therefore, are 
forced to sell shortly after the harvest at low prices 
(Hall 1985 : 178-180) .
Like beans, maize tends to be produced on small land 
parcels of 2 ha. or less with poor quality soils. Maize, 
however, is more widely distributed geographically, from 
the driest regions of Guanacaste to the wettest areas of 
the Caribbean lowlands, and from sea level to 2,000 meters 
elevation. Because maize removes soil nutrients, it is 
frequently produced in rotation with the leguminous beans 
(Hall 1985: 176).
Rice production is geographically more limited than 
maize and beans. Most production occurs in the lowlands of
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the Pacific northwest and central Pacific regions. Half of 
the country's production is carried out on a small number 
of large Guanacastecan estates that were formerly cattle 
ranches. Unlike maize and beans, smallholder highland 
production of rice is limited (Hall 1985: 172-176). In the 
case of Hojancha, for example, few producers of the 
canton's highlands (above 500 meters) produce rice. 
Throughout the Hojancha Plain, however, one can commonly 
see small plantings, generally less than one hectare, on 
relatively flat land parcels.
Because grazing land during the cattle boom period 
engulfed so much cropland, displacing basic grains, Costa 
Rica has had to import significant amounts of these 
essential food crops (Grindle 1986: 88-90). To illustrate, 
in 1974, when beef exports reached $28 million (U.S.), 
basic grains imports were $26 million, erasing whatever 
gains in foreign exchange earnings beef was supposed to 
achieve. Since the cattle boom began, a majority and an 
increasing proportion of Costa Rica's agricultural imports 
have been basic grains, particularly maize and beans. Rice 
production has rebounded, due to price supports enabling 
large farms to intensify production through mechanization 
(Place 1985: 295).
State Policies Toward Basic Grains
The primary relationship between basic grains and 
Costa Rican state development schemes has to do with the
latter's policies of making cheap food available to the 
urban-industrial and agroexport sectors of the economy 
(Grindle 1986: 48-50). By keeping food prices low, wages 
can also be kept low, making Costa Rican manufactured goods 
and agroexports competitive. According to the strategy,
cheap food will enable laborers working in the
manufacturing and agroexport sectors to comprise a market 
for domestically-manufactured goods (Lopez 1990: 355-356; 
Lappe and Collins 1978: 226). The perceived comparative 
disadvantage of basic grains production in the eyes of the
state underlies this strategy. The policy creates, in
effect, disincentives with respect to food crop production, 
while directly and indirectly promoting export cash crop 
production and the expansion of livestock grazing (Grindle 
1986: 52-54-; 93-95). With scarce land and resources 
diverted from production of essential food crops, imports 
of these become necessary, and the country then is 
vulnerable to fluctuations in world grain prices (de Janvry 
1981: 160, 179-180).
The Costa Rican state carries out various taxation, 
pricing, investment, credit and other fiscal policies 
which, in addition to the market place, fundamentally 
influence the geography of basic grain production (Alfaro 
1990: 97-100). Particularly important among state policies 
has been the Programs de Ajuste Estructural (PAE), or 
Structural Adjustment Program, a strategy designed to
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control inflation and reduce the cost of labor for the 
purpose of making the export sector more competitive in the 
world market (Yoder 1991). In its execution of the PAE, 
the state is the mediator of a tension between the 
interests of the producers, desiring higher prices, and the 
interests of labor, desiring lower consumer prices (Soto 
1990: 235).
Costa Rican development policies since the late 1940s 
have exhibited the typical Latin American pattern of 
reliance on exports of primary products to finance imported 
technology and capital goods for urban industrialization 
(del Aguila 1982: 370). Development planning has been 
largely "neo-liberal," emphasizing incentives for 
investment, the proliferation of "maquilas" or "screwdriver 
industries", and the promotion of agroexports, primarily 
coffee, bananas, and beef, to finance industrial growth 
(Gayle 1986: 87-91; IDB 1988: 388). Austerity measures, as 
elaborated within the PAE, are an important part of these 
development schemes.
Such policies are largely dictated by international 
lending institutions and development agencies, such as the 
World Bank, USAID, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Under the PAE, these institutions and their Costa 
Rican policymaking counterparts have called for four 
things: the elimination of price supports for basic grains, 
the convergence of Costa Rican prices of these basic grains
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to international levels, boosting the efficiency of the 
production of basic grains, and the permitting of free 
market importation of basic grains (Fallas 1990: 32).
These agencies impose such programs as preconditions for 
loan packages (del Aguila 1982: 360).
Such agencies and the state, including members of both 
of Costa Rica's main political parties, have maintained 
that the peasant sector is inefficient in food production 
and resistant to modernization (Mora 1990: 185; Aguilar and 
Solis 1988: 9). Soto (1990: 215-216, 222) argues that this 
assessment is unfair, because it overlooks the important 
productive role of campesino producers of basic grains.
Farm units smaller than 5 hectares produced 83 percent of 
Costa Rica's beans and 62 percent of the maize, yet they 
represent only 2.5 percent of total agricultural land.
As Mora (1990: 185, 188-190) argues, the criticisms 
that these producers are inefficient misses a crucial 
point. The simultaneous production and consumption 
patterns of these campesinos justify their conservative 
economic and social behavior. They invest in yield- 
improving techniques only when they are absolutely 
convinced the desired outcome will be realized. Their 
goals are to reduce risk and maintain the family farm unit. 
They lack control over the market, and are not well-endowed 
with resources or technical information; therefore, they 
follow the safest path. Campesino producers of basic
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grains should not be judged by the same standards of 
profitability as the large-scale mechanized agro-capitalist 
sector.
Perhaps the most important and controversial means by 
which policy makers have made an impact on small scale 
producers of basic grains is through pricing policies. At 
the center of these pricing policies is the CNP, which acts 
in accordance with the PAE. The state established the CNP 
in 1943, and strengthened it in 1949, to stabilize basic 
grain prices, in part by offsetting the lower prices at 
harvest time. The intention of this action was to provide 
security for smallholders, who lacked grain storage 
facilities {Seligson 1980: 123; Hazell 1991: 15; Bulmer- 
Thomas 1987: 95, 99; Alfaro 1990: 142). Increasingly, 
however, the neo-liberal goal of the CNP has been the 
reduction of grain prices to meet international market 
price levels.
The CNP has carried out its pricing policy by 
establishing minimum prices to producers. These price 
floors are determined prior to the harvest each year 
(Hazell 1991: 15; Morales and Villalobos 1985: 89). When 
the price floors are higher than international market 
prices, the policy acts as a subsidy. In the 1975-76 crop 
year, for example, the CNP launched an aggressive program 
involving price suppports, credit, and seed improvements, 
to stimulate production of maize and beans. The result was
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a doubling of maize output and a 17% increase in beans over 
the previous year. Production of both crops fell 
dramatically the following year when the price boost was 
not renewed, and since then, maize production has been 
insufficient to meet national demand {Morales and 
Villalobos 1985: 60, 62).
The policy of price supports has come under attack 
from "free marketeers" in the government who believe that 
Costa Rica should import cheaper basic grains from other 
Central American countries with lower labor costs, and 
eliminate price supports (Ribier, et.al. 1986: 11). In 
some years, particularly since 1980, the prices to 
producers of one or more of these crops have been allowed 
to fall below international price levels {Soto 1990: 230- 
231). It is no wonder that Hojanchans have by and large 
chosen not to produce basic grains for market since 1960. 
They complain that for two or more decades, the prices they 
have received for basic grains have not increased as fast 
as inputs, seeds, and other production costs.
The way in which the CNP establishes prices is through 
its role of purchaser and seller of basic grains. In 
addition to price floors to producers, the CNP establishes 
price ceilings to consumers (Hazell 1991: 15). In any 
given year, between 2 and 73 percent of basic grains have 
been purchased from farmers by the CNP, stored in CNP 
silos, and sold through CNP-operated retail outlets
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directly to consumers, or sold to "pulperias" or other 
private grocers. Purchasing facilities are located in 
rural communities throughout the country, such as Mansion,
7 kilometers from Hojancha. A farmer will sell to the CNP 
if that agency's price is favorable compared to that which 
free market "intermediaries" offer, or if the CNP is the 
closest outlet willing to purchase a particular quantity of 
grains (Morales and Villalobos 1985: 69-72). Prices 
established by the CNP heavily influence those offered by 
intermediaries.
In addition to the purchase of basic grains from Costa 
Rican producers and sale to consumers, another task of the 
CNP is the importation and exportation of basic grains, to 
ensure adequate and stable supplies and to stabilize prices 
(Table 5-5). Imports of basic grains are subject to CNP- 
established import quotas based on the agency's estimates 
of Costa Rican need, which in-turn are based on domestic 
production estimates (Spielman 1972: 51). In the 1970s, 
the country imported some 24 percent of Costa Rica's maize 
requirements and 40 percent of its beans, while all of the 
country's rice requirements were met by domestic production 
(Morales and Villalobos 1985: 69, 83-87). Barahona (1980: 
59-61) is critical of the CNP's preference to import basic 
grains from other Central American countries, as part of 
its participation in the Central American Common Market.
He criticizes the strategy of importing cheap grains and
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exporting manufactured food items as detrimental to 
campesinos who have relied for decades on production of 
these crops for market, and who have increasingly been 
unable to absorb growing rural unemployment since 1960.
The state's concerns for pursuing comparative advantage 
clearly have a social cost.
TABLE 5-5
COSTA RICAN IMPORTS OF BASIC GRAINS
AND TOTAL FOOD CROPS, 1957-1969 
(1000's of Tons)
Year Total Food CroD ImDorts Basic Grains Imnorts
1957 51.2 40.01958 50 .2 39.2
1959 59.1 48.3
1960 50 .1 38.8
1961 50.1 42.5
1962 51.6 45.3
1963 54 . 0 47.3
1964 68.3 60 .5





Source: Spielman 1972: 52, from unpublished statistics,
Direccidn General de Estatisticas y Censos.
r
A lesson could be learned from the fact that price
support policies in the 1940s and 1950s created incentives
to produce basic grains, such that Costa Rica was generally 
able to meet its national needs, and in some years was able 
to export maize (Bulmer-Thomas 1987: 164). Furthermore, in 
many of the grain-import seasons since the 1960s, the CNP
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import quotas have been insufficient, and domestic needs 
have not been met (Spielman 1972: 51).
Critics of the CNP and its dual goals of stabilizing 
supplies of basic grains, and therefore producer and 
consumer prices, are incompatible. The agency is faced 
with the difficult task of establishing an acceptable range 
between consumer and producer prices (Hazell 1991: 15) . 
Critics argue that fomenting production means higher prices 
to producers, and therefore price fluctuation and 
instability (Morales and Villalobos 1985: 90). In the past 
two decades, the CNP's strategy with respect to maize and 
beans has usually been to provide conumers with favorable 
prices, to the detriment of smallholders, who produce the 
majority of these. Rice production, on the other hand, has 
enjoyed greater CNP support, to the benefit of the large- 
scale mechanized producers who account for the majority of 
output. Small-scale producers have been much less able 
than large-scale producers to overcome consumer pressures 
on the CNP for lower grain prices (Morales and Villalobos 
1985: 90-92).
The CNP, in carrying out the PAE, has made a direct 
impact on smallholder production of basic grains through 
credit policies and technical assistance. Seligson (1980: 
123) noted that during the 1970s, less than four percent of 
all agricultural credit granted by the state-run banking 
system went to small-scale basic grains producers, many of
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whom were anxious to expand their production. Almost 90 
percent of the agricultural credit that decade went to 
farms over 200 hectares producing for export {Grindle 1986: 
58). Salas (1983: 170-171) estimates that in the previous 
decade, the small producer (i.e., basic grains) sector 
received proportionally twice the amount of credit.
Austerity measures since 1978 have mandated a 
reduction in the availability of subsidized short-term 
credit to smallholder producers of basic grains.
Meanwhile, long-term credit for capital equipment, such as 
mechanization for rice production, has increased as part of 
the strategy (Salas 1983: 171). Technical assistance under 
the PAE, likewise, has favored farms producing coffee and 
other agroexport crops, and only the largest farms 
producing basic grains, particularly rice (Chapman 1983: 
261-263; Alfaro 1990: 100-101). The inputs needed to make 
small farms more competitive, such as fertilizers, 
pesticides, and improved seeds, are out of their financial 
reach (Lipton 1977: 288, 292).
The policies of the Costa Rican government and 
international lending and development agencies toward basic 
grains have played a definite role in the transformation of 
the Hojanchan agricultural landscape since 1960.
Hojancha's longest residents lament the fact that they can 
no longer generate income by producing maize, beans and 
rice for market. The canton's younger residents and recent
arrivals simply do not bother to plant more of these crops 
than their households can consume. Particularly dramatic 
is the decrease in rice production in Hojancha. Because 
the state in the 1960s sponsored Green Revolution 
technologies in irrigated rice production, technologies 
which require substantial capital inputs appropriate only 
for large-scale production (Ribier, et.al. 1988: 10), the 
small scale production of rain-fed rice in Hojancha all but 
disappeared. In fact, even many poor Hojanchan campesinos 
claim it is less costly to purchase rice in pulperias than 
to produce it themselves as a subsistence crop for the 
household. Such families must face the additional burden 
to their already lean budgets, while the few families of 
the Pacific Northwest and Pacific Central lowlands that 
dominate large-scale rice production, processing and 
marketing benefit directly from these past and present 
state actions.
Prior to the mid-1950s, when basic grains represented 
Hojancha's primary income-generating market-oriented 
activity, these crops were grown on the best parcels of the 
canton's farms. Increasingly, however, they were displaced 
by the emerging cattle boom, and by policies of 
disincentive enacted by the state, with the blessing of 
multinational lending institutions. The poorest farm 
families, who rely heavily on production of basic grains 
for subsistence still dedicate the best land on their farms
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(which themselves are largely degraded) to this activity. 
Increasingly, however, basic grains became relegated to the 
canton's most marginal, sloped, eroded lands, as the 
campesinos of Hojancha struggled to generate income from 
cattle, coffee, and later, forest products, which represent 
more reliable sources of income.
The Political Economy of Coffee
Many Hojanchan smallholders who suffered the declining 
terms of trade associated with basic grains and cattle 
since 1960 have turned to coffee production as a means of 
achieving economic stability. Before 1960, many small 
farms located above 500 meters, on the canton's highest 
altiplanos and slopes, produced small amounts of coffee 
primarily for subsistence, and only secondarily for market. 
In the 1960s, events in the world coffee market, in 
combination with deteriorating local economic conditions 
surrounding basic grains and cattle (themselves the results 
of global and regional forces), prompted a turn to coffee 
as a viable alternative campesino activity. The 
establishment early in the decade of a coffee producers' 
cooperative in Hojancha was both a response and catalyst to 
the market-oriented coffee production that emerged.
Like cattle production, coffee production in Hojancha 
experienced a boom, and has survived to the present.
Unlike cattle production, however, which promoted land 
concentration and unemployment as it spread in the canton,
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coffee production has generated significant employment, 
albeit seasonally, and has become a means for even the 
smallest of farms to achieve upward social mobility.
Coffee production is an important factor underlying 
Hojancha's uniqueness as a smallholder stronghold within 
the cattle-dominated province of Guanacaste.
Global Coffee Markets
As a source of foreign exchange for the world's lesser 
developed countries, coffee is second only to oil (Singh, 
et.al. 1977: 33; Lucier 1988: 30). Though produced in and 
exported from several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, the latter realm dominates, accounting for some 
two-thirds of all production. Brazil alone produces 
between one-fourth and one-third of the world's coffee. 
Europe, Japan and The United States consume approximately 
85 percent of the world's coffee (ICCR 1992: 8; Pieterse 
1988: 14, 24). The shipping, marketing, and consumption of 
coffee are dominated by the developed countries of the 
world, far removed from the Third World producers of the 
coffee bean. The relationship would seem to favor the 
developed world, which can obtain coffee from a number of 
competing sources.
The two main coffee types are arabica, an upland 
species which is most common in Latin America, including 
Costa Rica, and robusta, a more widely adaptable lowland 
and/or warm-climate species more common in Africa and
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Southeast Asia. Arabica, which has a milder flavor and 
less caffeine, accounts for approximately 78 percent of the 
world's coffee. Robusta, with its more bitter flavor, 
accounts for approximately 22 percent, and is the preferred 
type by the world's instant coffee industry (Lucier 1988: 
27; Pieterse 1988: 6-7). Typically, coffee trees produce a 
harvestable product within three or four years after 
planting. Normal yields are reached two or three years 
beyond that. Normally, yields decline after the trees are 
fifteen years old, but trees can be productive for thirty 
years or more, if properly managed (Pieterse 1988: 6).
Coffee blending and roasting usually occurs in the 
country in which the coffee is consumed. Europe and the 
EEC, the primary coffee consuming regions of the world, 
utilize combinations of arabicas and robustas, so 
production and pricing trends for each species depend on 
and affect the other's production and pricing. For 
example, North Americans traditionally prefer arabicas, but 
shortages resulting from severe frosts in Brazil in the 
1950s and the 1970s prompted U.S. companies to use more 
robusta in their blends. As coffee production has become 
more dispersed globally in the latter twentieth century, 
the processed coffee industry has simultaneously become 
more concentrated. That is, fewer multinational 
corporations are increasingly controlling more of the 
coffee processing and marketing (Lucier 1988: 37, 56-57).
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Dependency upon coffee production is strongest for the 
smallest coffee farms in a given producing region. 
Unfavorable trends in coffee pricing and production are 
felt more acutely on the smallest farms less able to 
diversify their product base. Likewise, at the national 
level, the smaller coffee-producing countries with fewer 
alternative activities, such as Costa Rica, tend to suffer 
more quickly and deeply the effects of falling prices.
Underlying this dependency is the biological nature of 
the coffee tree. When prices are favorable, farmers 
respond by planting new trees and adding additional inputs 
to existing trees to increase output. When prices fall, 
however, production trends still tend to increase, because 
coffee trees mature in 4-5 years, and produce beans in some 
cases for 30 years. The continued higher output, and the 
stockpiling of coffee that results, undermine prices even 
further (Griffin 1981: 152-154). Thus, price elasticity of 
supply is high when prices are favorable, and low when 
prices fall, especially on smaller farms. Larger farms are 
more responsive to price decreases, because they possess 
the capital to diversify their' activities until the crisis 
passes. The same principle applies to those coffee- 
producing countries, such as Indonesia, that rely much less 
on coffee than on other export crops (Singh, et.al. 1977:
31-32).
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Another nature-related determinant of coffee prices is 
weather. Occasionally, a major frost occurs in Brazil, 
destroying not only the current season's coffee crop, but 
the trees as well. In this case, Brazil's output declines 
not for one year, but for four years, until newly planted 
replacement trees nearly reach maturity. Brazil's 
stockpiles take up part, but not all of the slack. Coffee 
prices rise in the short term, to the benefit of other 
coffee-producing regions of the world (Lucier 1988). The 
favorable prices usually stimulate an expansion of coffee 
tree planting, which eventually results in a glut in world 
stocks, and a fall in prices.
Stockpiling is practiced by coffee-producing countries 
to stabilize supplies and prices. Brazil pursued this 
strategy of artificially restricting exports between 1906 
and 1940, in order to boost prices. Colombia and the 
countries of Central America increased production in 
response to price increases and to make up for the fall in 
Brazilian output. Europe encouraged its coffee-producing 
colonies in Africa to increase production in the period. 
These events produced two long-term results. First, 
Brazil's share of coffee production declined. Second, non- 
Brazilian coffee-producing regions of the tropics, most of 
which had held a peripheral place in global coffee trade, 
became more tightly incorporated into the global economy 
(Pieterse 1988: 15-16, 40-43, 58).
In 1962, consuming and producing countries established 
the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). High prices in 
1950-54, due to effects of the Korean War and a frost in 
Brazil, led simultaneously to an expansion of production in 
the coffee-growing countries and a decrease in consumption. 
Prices plummeted by half in the latter 1950s. The 
Brazilians failed in their unilateral efforts to withhold 
stock, shrink global supplies, and drive up prices.
Likewise, the efforts by a few producing countries, led by
Brazil, to reach a voluntary agreement among all producer 
nations to withhold stocks failed. Finally, with the 
backing of Europe and the United States, and as a result of 
the latter's fears of the spread of Castroism throughout 
the hemisphere, the formal agreement was signed. Each 
producing country would be allocated a production quota 
(Lucier 1988; Singh, et.al. 1977).
The ICA has produced mixed results (Pieterse 1988: 
103-105). In some years, when one or more members exceeded 
their quotas, the agreement broke down and had to be 
renewed after considerable effort. For example, prices 
remained high between 1963 and 1968, but fell after 1968,
due to overproduction linked to the high prices and
noncompliance with the agrement. The renewal of the treaty 
in the latter 1960s included newer, stronger penalties for 
non-compliance. Prices remained stable, by means of stock 
withholdings to adjust to production fluctuations, until a
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severe frost destroyed much of the Brazilian crop in 1975, 
followed by floods in Colombia and political unrest in 
Angola (Lucier 1988: 38-50; Pieterse 1988: 65-70).
Consumer prices increased 3 00 percent and wholesale prices 
increased 400 percent as stockpiles were almost instantly 
swallowed up by anxious consumers anticipating a further 
price increase. By 1980, prices had fallen again, due in 
part to shifts in beverage consumption habits in the United 
States and in part to another round of overproduction in 
the wake of the Brazilian crisis. This led to another 
implementation of the ICA.
The clever title of Lucier's (1988) volume, The 
International Political Economy of Coffee: From Juan Valdez 
to Yank's Diner, is illuminating. The global nature of the 
coffee industry links campesinos in coffee-producing 
countries, multi-national roasting and marketing companies, 
and consumers in the industrial world together. Decisions 
made in one place affect people and decisions in faraway 
places. The coffee producer in Hojancha is affected by the 
consumption habits in Europe and the United States, by 
political decision making in San Jose, by corporate 
decision making among the roasting companies, and even by 
the actions of multinational lending agencies. Because of 
the historical importance of coffee to Costa Rica and its 
economy, and the important place coffee holds in the 
national culture and ideology, state policies, perhaps more
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than those at any other level in the political economy of 
coffee, directly affect Hojancha's coffee producers.
The Costa Rican Coffee Tradition 
It is believed that coffee was first introduced into 
Costa Rica in 1805, and the first commercial production 
reportedly occurred in 1816 (Campos 1983: 11). It began as 
a smallholder crop and has largely remained the domain of 
campesinos, especially relative to other Central American 
countries. Coffee has enabled many Costa Rican 
smallholders to successfully persist (Barahona 1980: 45; 
Gamboa 1977: 124). Confined to the Valle Central until the 
twentieth century, commercial coffee production has 
diffused to all zones of Costa Rica at appropriate 
elevations. Today, more than one-fourth of Costa Rican 
coffee is produced in settlement zones outside the Valle 
Central with favorable transportation access, including the 
Valle General, Coto Brus, and the Nicoya Peninsula (Hall 
1991: 16, 158-161). Most coffee trees are grown under 
planted shade trees, which protect the coffee trees and 
beans from direct sunlight and torrential rains. 
Smallholdings represent half the Costa Rican coffee farms 
and 17 percent of the area cultivated in coffee. Coffee is 
quite well adapted to smallholdings, given the labor 
intensive nature of the crop, and its relatively high per- 
hectare economic yield (Hall 1985: 158-161).
State intervention in the coffee sector commenced with 
the beginnings of coffee cultivation in Costa Rica. The 
government provided land grants to prospective coffee 
growers in order to expand production and generate foreign 
earnings. More recently, the state created the Oficina de 
Cafe in 1948 to give the government some control over 
coffee marketing and production activities, such as 
research. By 1961, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) took 
over the agronomic functions, while the Oficina de Cafe was 
given greater precedence over marketing and credit 
functions (Morales and Villalobos 1985: 214-215; Rowe 1963: 
94-95) . The semi-autonomous agency regulates prices paid 
to producers, the processing functions, domestic supplies, 
and the export of coffee by means of establishing 
production and price quotas, and maintaining stockpiles 
(Campos 1983: 48). In the late 1980s, the Oficina de Cafe 
was changed to the Instituto del Cafe de Costa Rica (ICCR), 
or Costa Rican Coffee Institute.
The marketing of Costa Rican coffee begins with a 
farmer delivering the harvest to ,a local "recibidora,1 or 
collection station belonging to one of many "beneficios," 
or processing plants, located throughout the country. 
Beneficios are privately owned or are owned by producer 
cooperatives. Traditionally, privately owned beneficios 
are investments by larger-scale planter families attempting 
to reproduce their capital in the processing and exporting
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functions. The Oficina sets allowable processing costs as
well as the commission, or profit, for each beneficio. By
registering and authorizing all contracts between 
beneficios and exporters, the Oficina ensures that 
obligations under international coffee agreements are
fulfilled (Campos 1983: 48; Rowe 1963: 95).
The states's Ministry of Economy and Commerce (MEC) 
determines domestic coffee prices, both to consumers and to 
roasting companies. Prices exporters pay to beneficios are 
established by the free market (SEPSA 1986a: 7-8). For 
coffee exported, which represents, on average, 87 percent 
of Costa Rica's coffee production, the producer typically 
receives 55 percent of the wholesale coffee price, the 
beneficio receives 33-36 percent, the exporter 8-10 
percent, and the trader 1 percent (Morales and Villalobos 
1985: 210-211). Coffee, therefore, is attractive to the 
smallholders of Hojancha. The relatively high percentage 
of the wholesale price that goes to producers is 
undoubtedly the result of the strong cooperative movement.
The high coffee prices of the early 1950s, resulting 
from frost in Brazil and global monetary .instability 
related to the Korean War, served to launch a Costa Rican 
coffee boom lasting several decades. Between 1950, when 
disruptions in global coffee supplies began, and 1973, the 
area in coffee planted increased 70 percent, and output 
increased nearly four-fold (Barahona 1980: 45). In the
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1950s alone, production tripled (Singh, et.al. 1977: 28). 
Coffee as a percentage of the value of all Costa Rican 
exports reached a peak of 48 percent in 1955 (Barahona 
1980: 45). Its relative importance subsequently declined 
to below 20 percent by the mid 1980s (IDB 1 9 8 8 :  592-593). 
The 1950s coffee boom instigated technological changes in 
Costa Rican coffee production. The state accelerated its 
research of yield-improving techniques. Farmers began 
planting trees closer together, pruning trees more 
regularly, and investing more capital in fertilizers and 
other inputs (Rowe 1963: 88).
While coffee production in Costa Rica in the 1950s was
characterized by changes in technology, production in the
1960s was characterized more by changes in the social
character of both production and marketing. Cooperatives
dominated the transformation. When world coffee prices
fell sharply, beginning in the latter 1950s, smallholders
were hit the hardest. Rowe (1963: 101) assessed the
conditions of smallholder coffee production then:
The very small farmers are managing to keep going, 
but at a relatively low standard of life,- their 
cash costs are low because they employ little or 
no labour, use no fertiliser, prune inadequately, 
etc., but their yields are also mostly very low. . .
. . .(T)hose with three to five manzanas of coffee
. . .are not on the whole doing well with coffee 
because their yields also are low, but they, like 
the very small farmers, have some subsistence crops.
Rowe noted that the profits and living standards of
largeholders were largely unaffected by the downturn in
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prices. Medium-sized farms, because of their superior 
farming practices to smallholders, only felt modest effects 
of lower coffee prices.
Smallholders in the early 1960s desired to recapture 
the "profit drain" going to beneficios, and to work as a 
group, to purchase inputs in bulk. It is widely held that 
cooperatives have translated to success for many 
smallholders, especially in peripheral coffee zones such as 
the central Nicoyan highlands, who otherwise would not have 
survived (Fuentes 1986: 98; Salas, et.al. 1983: 140).
The cooperative movement first emerged in the 194 0s, 
and was pursued as early as the 1950s by the Partido 
Liberacidn Nacional (PLN) as a social democratic 
institution to break the hold by traditional elites over 
credit to smallholder producers, coffee processing, and 
marketing (Cazanga 1987: 9, 98-99). In the 1950s, the 
State Banking System had created a department of 
cooperatives to direct state resources and provide credit 
to the cooperative sector (Salas, et.al. 1983: 140). This 
has subsequently strengthened. By 1960, for example, the 
coffee sector received more than half the credit which the 
National Banking System provided to agriculture and 
livestock (Salas, et.al. 1983: 156, 167). PLN 
administrations began increasing technical assistance to 
coffee smallholders in the 1960s (Barahona 1980: 45), By 
changing the nature of the smallholder-beneficio
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relationship, the social democratic policies have resulted 
in a partial breakup of the hegemony agrobusiness 
traditionally enjoyed over the Costa Rican coffee industry, 
while still fomenting accumulation on the part of medium- 
and large-scale planters (Cazanga 1987: 10, 103).
In short, Cazanga (1987: 115, 258) argues that the 
cooperative movement has tended to promote smallholder 
persistence. To illustrate its rapid success, the 
cooperative movement accounted for less than 2 percent of 
all Costa Rican coffee production in 1957. Twenty years 
later, 40 percent of Costa Rican coffee production was 
received by cooperatives. Much of the increase was due to 
the establishment of a large number of cooperatives outside 
the Valle Central. These sprang up largely because of 
unfavorable prices of basic grains, the traditional 
economic activity of those subregions.
The Hojanchan Coffee Experience
The coffee cooperative of Hojancha, Coope-Pilangosta, 
R.L., was established in March, 1962 by 23 coffee 
producers, with the direct help of the Department of 
Cooperatives of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (BNCR), 
and FEDECOOP, R.L., the Federation of Coffee Cooperatives. 
Today, the cooperative has some 400 members (El Ganadero 
1993b: 30-31). As a result of the formation of this 
cooperative and its beneficio, Hojancha's coffee producers 
were partially able to overcome their locational
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disadvantage by retaining the beneficio profits, and 
pooling together to market the coffee, obtain credit, and 
purchase inputs. Because of the increases in coffee 
production which these successes promoted in the canton, 
Hojancha was declared a "zona cafetalera," or coffee zone, 
by the state in the 1960s, thereby enhancing Hojanchan 
coffee farmers' access to credit from the BNCR {Guadamuz 
1993). Smallholder coffee-producing families in the 
highland communities of Monte Romo, Huacas, Maravilla, and 
Pita Rayada express their enthusiasm toward Coope- 
Pilangosta and the degree of security it has provided them 
since the early 1960s. Most of these farms are too small 
for cattle to be a viable option, and none can produce a 
livelihood through basic grains.
Prior to the establishment of the cooperative, and 
despite the dramatic global stimulus to coffee production 
in the early 1950s, only small quantities of coffee were 
produced commercially in the canton. The establishment of 
three small beneficios in the 1950s in the Nicoyan 
highlands, two of which were in Hojancha, was linked to the 
higher prices early in the decade. The relative isolation 
of the region, and its poor roads, served to delay the 
increases in output and productivity the region eventually 
would experience, after the establishment of the 
cooperative (Hall 1991: 123, 131, 132, 142, 162; Damais, 
et. al. 1986: 17).
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When coffee prices were again favorable, in the 1960s, 
production expanded in Hojancha's highlands, which by then 
were better served by roads (Damais, et.al. 1986: 17). Due 
to the efforts of the local priest, and his ties to the PLN 
in San Jose, all-weather improvements were made to the 
crude oxcart paths that linked these highland areas with 
the towns of Hojancha, Mansion and Niocya. Small- and 
medium-sized farms increasingly diversified their 
activities and planted small areas of coffee at first, and 
later expanded the total area. As Damais, et.al. (1986:
17) and Ribier, et.al. (1986: 18) point out, for the 
smallest farms of Hojancha's highlands, coffee represented 
then, as now, a way of maximizing economic returns to land, 
and occupying family members to a much greater extent.
Farms larger than these have become petty-capitalist, as 
they hire labor seasonally and generate sufficient capital 
to reinvest in maintaining their coffee trees and even 
boosting their output.
Since the mid-1970s, coffee production in Hojancha has 
fluctuated, largely mirroring national trends. Some coffee, 
producers indicated they initially decided to produce 
coffee, or expand existing coffee parcels, in the mid- 
1970s. This coincides with the major Brazilian frost of
1975 that drove up prices globally, and resulted in a 34- 
percent increase in Costa Rican coffee production between
1976 and 1979 (Campos 1983: 49). Between 1985 and 1988,
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some 200 additional hectares of coffee trees were planted 
in Hojancha and the neighboring canton of Nandayure, the 
result of a joint USAID-FEDECOOP venture (Guadamuz 1993) .
Officials of Coope-Pilangosta lament the sluggish 
Hojanchan output since the late 1980s, due to a combination 
of rust blight and unfavorable world coffee prices. These 
officials are hopeful that an agreement recently reached 
between a progressive European development foundation and 
all eight of Guanacaste's coffee cooperatives, in which the 
former will market the latter's coffee in Europe, will 
result in enhanced profits for Hojancha's coffee producers. 
The efforts that went into establishing this relationship 
exemplify the role of agency in the contemporary process of 
Hojanchan regionalization, and are discussed more fully in 
Chapter Seven.
Conclusions
The relative success which Hojanchans experienced with 
coffee in the 1960s and 1970s, though important, was not 
strong enough to stem the massive emigration from the 
canton following land degradation and the shift to cattle 
production. By the early 1970s, Hojancha had experienced 
the highest rate of emigration in northwestern Costa Rica, 
a region accustomed to emigration because of its cattle- 
dominated economy. According to population census data, 
between 1963 and 1973, Hojancha lost 57 percent of its
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population. Unemployment was high even among those who did 
not emigrate (Campos, Rodriguez and Ugalde 1993: 9).
A study by IFAM, or Institute de Fomento y Asesoria 
Municipal, of 860 rural communities in 56 Costa Rican 
cantones in 1974-1976, revealed that Hojancha and Nandayure 
presented the least opportunities for employment of all 
Costa Rican cantones. At the time of the IFAM study, the 
percentage of Hojanchans employed was below the national 
and Guanacastecan averages. Nearly three out of four paid 
farm workers received less than 400 Colones a month, the 
designated poverty line. This compares to 42 percent of 
all Costa Rican rural workers and 57 percent of 
Guanacastecan rural workers (IFAM 1976: 11-16).
The social deterioration of Hojancha was the outcome 
of a conjuncture of several related, mutually reinforcing 
issues. The increased reliance on cattle production, 
landlessness, environmental degradation, unemployment, 
emigration and the abandonment of commercial production of 
basic grains were linked not only to each other, but to 
international marketing trends of the region's commodities, 
and state responses to the debt crisis. The loss of land 
and the rate of emigration were highest among the numerous 
small farms of Hojancha, less than 20 hectares, below the 
feasible elevation for coffee production. These farms were 
too small to profitably graze cattle (Damais, et.al. 1986: 
17) .
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Hojancha's rather sudden switch to market-oriented 
production of cattle coincided temporally with the demise 
of market-oriented production of basic grains.
International beef markets strengthened, while Costa Rica 
appeared to have a comparative disadvantage at producing 
maize and beans. Thus, both events were largely, but not 
exclusively, market-driven. State intervention in both 
sectors, including pricing policies for basic grains 
(advantageous to urban Costa Ricans, but disadvantageous to 
campesinos), and subsidized credit and infrastructure for 
cattle, played an important role in the shift. Likewise, 
environmental factors proved influential. Continual 
grazing and clearing of land for pasture rendered many of 
Hojancha's soils useless for maize and beans.
The increase in coffee production from the early 1960s 
onward was both market-driven and politically-driven. It 
was a response to favorable global demand and to social 
democratic efforts to improve prices to producers. While 
aggregate income at the cantonal level was raised from 
cattle and coffee, only a minority of Hojanchans were 
affected. Largeholders and highland farm owners benefitted 
disproportionately. Negative social costs were borne by 
the majority of Hojanchans.
The catastrophe of poverty, environmental degradation, 
and emigration, which occurred only 30 years after the 
canton's immigration peak, prompted local residents to take
action. Spearheaded by the local priest, community leaders 
undertook a series of measures to promote development in 
the canton. These measures, discussed in Chapters Six and 
Seven, included among others the formation of Hojancha as a 
separate canton, the lobbying of the state for resources 
for infrastructure and social programs, the formation of 
the Cantonal Agricultural Center of Hojancha (CACH), and 
the successful solicitation of credit and donations for 
improving the coffee sector. Perhaps the most dramatic 
example of human agency in Hojancha, of a transformation 
not only of the canton's landscape and economy but also its 
psyche, was the region's adoption of forestry. It is 
argued in the remaining chapters that forestry, more than 
any other activity, underlies Hojancha's contemporary 
regional restructuring and regional identity.
CHAPTER SIX
THE EMERGENCE OF HOJANCHAN SMALL FARM FORESTRY
IN THE 1980s
In the latter 1970s, Hojanchan community leaders, 
including the president of the municipality, the president 
of the technical high school (coleaio tecnolocrico), and the 
local priest, identified forestry as a desirable 
cornerstone of future Hojanchan development. This was a 
response not only to environmental degradation in the 
canton, but also to state efforts to promote reforestation 
through financial incentives and increasingly favorable 
market conditions for forest products (Villasuso 1978; 
Gallardo 1991). The latter was a result of state 
development strategies emphasizing industrialization, and a 
related construction boom, from the late 1950s onward.
Many of the canton's smallholders, as well as its community 
leaders, increasingly viewed their community as an 
important participant in the country's growing 
reforestation activity from the mid-1970s onward (Ortiz 
Monge 1992). However, as one Hojanchan put it, it has been 
difficult in many cases convincing the community's 
smallholders to plant trees. After all, it was the 
campesino sector that for many decades cut trees down to 
expand farmland and pasture as part of the community's 
twentieth-century settlement process.
This chapter provides descriptions of the forestry- 
related activities of the canton. There exist two distinct
173
174
activities, reforestation and tree seedling production.
Each of the two has its own underlying characteristics with 
respect to markets and state intervention. Of the two, 
reforestation has served to stimulate more international 
interest in Costa Rica. Seedling production, a backward 
linkage to reforestation, has generated attention toward 
Hojancha on the part of Costa Ricans. Seedling production 
in Hojancha was stimulated by the reforestation there. On 
a national scale, however, seedling production remains a 
relatively limited activity, while reforestation has become 
a widespread activity of interest to international 
development and lending agencies.
The forward and backward linkages to reforestation are 
identified in this chapter, as are the main species of 
trees and seedlings utilized in Hojancha. Political and 
economic forces occurring at multiple scales are described, 
including state policies with respect to deforestation and 
reforestation, and market conditions of the products of the 
different production stages: seeds, seedlings, logs, 
timber, pulp, furniture and construction materials. The 
agroecologic characteristics of each species and activity 
are described insofar as they affect producer decision­
making and the human landscape of the study area.
Guanacaste is a leading province in both reforestation 
and seedling production (Gallardo 1991; Ortiz Monge 1992:
32-33). Ironically, the province has also experienced the
highest rate of deforestation in the twentieth century, in 
large part a result of the province's deepened 
participation in global beef markets (SEPSA 1986: 191). 
Within the province, which accounts for one-fourth of the 
country's reforestation and more than half the country's 
seedlings, Hojancha is the canton with the highest 
concentration of forestry-related activities. According to 
a country-wide survey of regional forestry offices of the 
DGF (Direccidn General Forestal), conducted as part of this 
dissertation research, Hojancha now produces nearly half of 
Guanacaste's and nearly one-fourth of the entire country's 
hardwood seedlings. In previous years, these forestry 
activities were more highly concentrated in the region, but 
have subsequently diffused to other regions of the country 
■{Rodriguez 1993). Still, CACH officials estimate that some 
60 percent of the canton's workforce is employed at least 
part time in forestry each year (Comunidades 1990: 11).
The Political Economy of Small Farm Forestry;
State Policies. Finance and Markets 
Since 1960, the Costa Rican government has stepped up 
its efforts to reduce the rate of deforestation in the 
country and promote reforestation. Despite the overtures, 
Costa Rica has one of the highest rates of deforestation in 
all of Latin America, on average 3 percent annually since 
1950. Some two-thirds of the country's original forest 
cover has been cleared (Panayotou and Ashton 1992: 23).
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Each year, the percentage of remaining forest that is cut 
increases {SEPSA 1986: 50). The continued environmental 
degradation has prompted the state to promote reforestation 
through incentives and other financial offerings attractive 
to smallholders and agribusiness alike.
Cattle ranching has contributed more than any other 
activity to deforestation in Costa Rica and elsewhere in 
Central America (Shane 1986: 4). Porras and Villarreal 
(1986: 12-13, 34) argue that although the campesino is 
frequently blamed for deforestation in Costa Rica, it is in 
reality the country's particular model of capital 
accumulation, based on exports of beef and other primary 
products, that is the greater cause. The declining terms 
of trade which these export products have experienced have 
led to expansion of their production at the expense of 
forests. Forestry-related legislation has often 
legitimized the deforestation accompanying such 
"development." The reality of low prices for forest 
products precludes proper forest management, particularly 
in the realm of utilization of felled timber. The low 
level of technology in forest extraction translates to 
destruction above and beyond the desired harvest.
Finally, the lack of a forestry tradition, that is, an 
appreciation for preserving forests on the part of the 
public, is an important factor underlying rapid
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deforestation (Ortiz Monge 1992: 67-69; SEPSA 1986: 50; 
Panayotou and Ashton 1992: 171).
State Policies Toward Forestry
The earliest law related to deforestation came in 
1942. The state mandated that not all trees on a given 
parcel of farmland could be removed, but some had to 
remain. The Jose Figueres Administration in 1950 
established the Department of Lands and Forests within the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MAG). The department's primary 
function was to protect acquifers and other water resources 
of primarily the central highland region of the country, by 
limiting deforestation in areas where it would threaten 
watersheds (Sanchez and Oviedo 1989: 6).
The Joaquin Trejos Administration sought to reinforce 
this type of protection by implementing the Forest Law (Ley 
Forestal) No. 4465 in 1969 (Salas 1983: 169). The law 
allowed for the granting of permits or concessions by the 
state for timber extraction from state lands. Under the 
law, the DGF would be required to approve extraction of 
timber from private land. In effect, the DGF was given 
authority to block deforestation around springs and on 
steep slopes (Porras and Villarreal 1986: 3 8-40). Forest 
Law No. 7174, which took effect in 1990, more explicitly 
defined the role of the DGF in prohibiting the cutting of 
forest on private and state land without official 
permission. THE DGF is supposed to examine a site to
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determine if timber extraction is feasible (Nygren 1993:
77) .
Porras and Villarreal (1986: 38-40) are critical that 
Laws 4465 and 7174 have actually promoted deforestation by 
enabling the DGF to issue large timber concessions and 
extraction permits to corporate interests involved in 
activities such as timber exporting. For example, in 1991, 
nearly 4,000 permits for log cutting were issued by the 
Rafael Calderon Administration. Over half the timber 
authorized for extraction came from state forested lands. 
Less than half came from private farms (Lizano Gonzalez, 
et.al, 1993: 39). In addition to deforestation permitted 
by the state, unauthorized (illegal) deforestation, 
estimated to be more than the authorized amount, occurs 
(SEPSA 1986: 106; Porras and Villarreal 1986: 49). It is 
not known what portion of this cutting meets campesino 
household fuel and construction needs, and what portion 
accompanies commercial activities, such as logging and 
pasture expansion. Campesinos who illegally cut trees 
undoubtedly react to what Nygren (1993: 79-81) identifies 
as the anti-campesino bias of Law 7174. Her ethnographic 
fieldwork uncovered many instances of the DGF forbidding 
campesinos to cut wood for contruction materials, while 
huge logging trucks carried their frequent, full loads 
to sawmills.
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In response to deforestation throughout Latin America, 
various state policies have been implemented to foment the 
creation and expansion of tree plantations. By 1980, some 
6 million ha. of plantations of mostly hardwoods had been 
established. By the year 2000, an estimated 11 million ha. 
will be in existence, accounting for the majority of Latin 
American industrial wood production (Sedjo and Lyon 1990: 
45-46) .
In Costa Rica, about 50,000 ha. of plantations had 
been established by 1990, and the amount of reforestation 
is increasing each year, according to DGF data. The 
activity involves the production of timber species, many of 
them exotic, as cash crops. The original forest is not 
replaced. The area reforested annually is now 
approximately 20 percent the area deforested, compared to 
only ten percent in the early 1980s (Panayotou and Ashton 
1992: 31). The total area in tree plantations in Costa 
Rica is still less than one percent of the total cumulative 
area of forest loss, however. Reforestation tends to be 
concentrated in Guanacaste, a province highly deforested in 
previous decades due to the expansion of cattle production. 
Thirty five percent of Costa Rica's accumulated 
reforestation has occurred there (Ortiz Monge 1992: 32-33, 
93; SEPSA 1986: 50). Two main hardwood types are included 
in the plantations of Guanacaste, and Hojancha in 
particular, including fast-growing hardwoods appropriate
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for pulp, wood chips and firewood, such as melina (Gmelina 
arboreal and slow-growing, high-density hardwoods 
appropriate for high quality wood products, such as teak 
(Tectona qrandis) and pochote (Bombacopsis auinatum). 
Slow-growing, denser hardwoods are much less common in 
plantations throughout Latin America (Panayatou and Ashton 
1992: 171-173).
The recent reforestation boom in Hojancha is for the 
most part the result of the latest versions of fiscal 
incentives offered by the state to foment that activity.
The state has offered incentives that range from tax 
deductions to all out cash payments, though only recently 
have they been directed at small-scale producers (Sanchez 
and Oviedo 1989: 38). Under Law 4465, enacted in 1969, the 
Trejos Administration mandated that at least five percent 
of the land area of every farm greater than five ha. be 
planted in trees. In addition, the law permitted all costs 
of reforestation to be deducted from income taxes (Porras 
and Villarreal 1986: 72-73, 77). A maximum of 100,000 
Colones per ha. could be deducted, spread out over five 
years, beginning with 60 percent the first year, 15 percent 
each of the second and third years, and 5 percent each of 
the fourth and fifth years (Ortiz Monge 1992: 89-91). The 
policy did not favor smallholders, whose tax liabilities 
were less than the costs of reforestation.
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In 1977, the Law of Reforestation was enacted, which 
strengthened reforestation incentives under Law 4465.
Income tax deductions were expanded to include the planting 
of any and all trees (not just reforestation) and the 
associated costs of credit (Porras and Villarreal 1986: 79- 
80). In addition, the law exempted from taxation any 
income from the sale of wood or other forest products 
involved in reforestation, including seedlings (Sanchez and 
Oviedo 1989: 11).
The Rodrigo Carazo Administration (1978-82), which 
established five regional state-run nurseries to produce 
seedlings from reforestation, implemented an incentive 
program to supplement the tax break policies. Incentives 
of 15,000 Colones per ha. were paid directly to 
reforesters. The program was directed toward establishing 
reforestation only in specific areas, particularly in the 
Valle Central, that the administration felt were 
environmentally sensitive, but which would not conflict 
with cattle production. The Nicoya Peninsula, for example, 
was not included. The law also stipulated that the 
National Banking System provide at least 2 percent of all 
its agriculture- and livestock-oriented credit at low 
interest rates to reforesters (Porras and Villarreal 1986: 
82-83). During that administration, 2,266 ha. were 
reforested, 87 percent of which was financed by incentives,
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subsidized credit, and/or tax breaks (S&nchez and Oviedo 
1989: 15-16; Salas, et.al. 1983: 172).
Criticisms of these policies are basically two-fold. 
First, only large-scale producers, such as logging 
companies, could generate enough income and income taxes 
from which to deduct all costs of reforestation. In 
effect, these tax deductions served as tax shelters for 
multinational businesses, many of which engaged in forestry 
explicitly for that purpose. After first receiving tax 
breaks and subsidized credit, several companies 
subsequently sold land parcels, pocketing huge profits.
The state has since revised the law by placing a limit on 
the amount of tax deduction of 25 percent of the tax 
liability, and preventing any one recipient of subsidized 
reforestation credit from receiving more than 1 percent of 
all such credit from the National Banking System (Porras 
and Villarreal 1986: 82-83). Second, many environmentally 
fragile areas outside the Valle Central were bypassed by 
Carazo's incentive program (SSnchez and Oviedo 1989: 15- 
16) .
The Alberto Monge Administration (1982-86) attempted 
to foment reforestation by promoting wood industries, 
creating more state-run nurseries, and expanding the 
incentive program. Believing that the development of 
forward linkages would promote reforestation, the 
administration undertook marketing studies and provided
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technical assistance to the wood industries sector to 
increase efficiency. Incentives were raised first to
50,000 Colones per ha., and later to 70,000 Colones per 
ha., and were directed in part toward previously bypassed 
environmentally sensitive areas outside the Valle Central. 
The incentives were successful, resulting in 7,956 ha. of 
reforestation during Monge's tenure, nearly four times that 
of Carazo's tenure (Sinchez and Oviedo 1989: 18-20). 
According to a census of sawmills, however, the efforts to 
boost forward linkages were disappointing.
In addition to boosting incentives from 70,000 Colones 
per ha. to 90,000, the Oscar Arias Administration (1986-90) 
attempted to increase reforestation by mandating that at 
least 10 percent of all lands redistributed through IDA, 
the Agrarian Reform Institute, be devoted to reforestation. 
The National Assembly provided IDA 25 million Colones of 
the 90 million the agency requested for that purpose. The 
incentive increases proved successful, as reforesters for 
the first time were paid a profit of approximately 20,000 
Colones per ha. above and beyond the planting costs 
(Sanchez and Oviedo 1989: 24-26). According to DGF data, 
nearly 13,000 ha. were reforested in the two-year period
1987-88.
Efforts by the Monge and Arias Administrations to 
solicit financing for reforestation from a number of 
international financial institutions were successful. In
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1985, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) introduced 
a financial project for reforestation, including low 
interest loans for planting and the improvement of wood 
processing. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) instituted a program including low 
interest loans with extensive grace periods for 
reforestation (SEPSA 1986: 104). By 1986, these 
international agencies were involved in the financing of 
1,672 ha. of reforestation. In 1989, USAID and the Dutch 
and Swiss governments converted $36 million (U.S.) of Costa 
Rica's external debt into forestry incentives for small and 
medium farms and research funds. At that time, the DGF, 
formerly part of MAG, became part of MIRENEM, the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Mines (S&nchez and Oviedo 1989:
21, 26-28) .
At present, there are four forms of reforestation 
incentives in Costa Rica: 1.) Article 87 of the Forestry
Law; 2.) CAF, or Certificado Abono Forestal (Forestry 
Payment Certificate); 3.) FDF, or Forestry Development 
Fund; and 4.) "CAF Individual" (Nichols 1993: 6-7; Lobo 
1993; Valverde 1993).
Article 87, which was implemented in 1988, requires 
that reforesters finance their own reforestation, but 
permits the deduction of the reforestation costs from 
income taxes. In addition, Article 87 exempts reforesters 
from property taxes and taxes on the profits generated from
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the sale of the timber. Large companies with sufficient 
capital to finance large parcels of reforestation 
participate in this incentive.
CAF is designed for smallholders, and finances a 
maximum of 5 ha. of reforestation per farm. Incentives 
under CAF amount to 85,000 Colones per ha. for the 
producer, and 15,000 per ha. for the local agricultural 
center (such as CACH in the case of Hojancha) that 
administers the program locally. The payments are 
disbursed over a five-year period, starting with 50 percent 
the first year, 20 percent the second year, 15 percent the 
third year, 10 percent the fourth year, and 5 percent the 
fifth year. IDB provides the Costa Rican state a low- 
interest rate loan for the CAF incentive payments.
FDF is designed for smallholders who reforest up to 5 
ha., but who lack sufficient title to their land. DECAFOR, 
the Campesino Forestry Development branch of DGF, oversees 
the incentives and extension services that accompany the 
program. Under FDF, the producer receives 66,000 Colones 
per ha. and the local agricultural center receives 9,900 
per ha. for administration costs. The funding disbursement 
schedule is the same as that of CAF.
"CAF Individual" is for reforestation of parcels 
greater than 5 ha. The source of this funding is not IDB, 
but the state. Incentives under CAF Individual pay the 
producer 120,000 Colones per ha. under the same
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disbursement schedule as CAF and FDF. Larger-scale 
reforesters who lack sufficient capital to finance their 
own reforestation, and who, therefore, do not qualify for 
Article 87, participate in CAF Individual. Like CAF and 
FDF participants, they pay taxes on profits made on the 
sale of timber.
CAF represents the first time in Costa Rican history 
that the small producer has benefitted directly from state 
forestry policies (Scinchez and Oviedo 1989: 38) . 
Multinational corporate beneficiaries of tax breaks under 
Article 87, such as "Ston Forestal" (a division of Stone 
Container), Scott Paper, "Flor y Fauna" (a Dutch-owned 
company) and others clearly benefit the most from state 
forestry policies. However, the smallholder desiring to 
reforest finally has a rare opportunity to receive state 
subsidies. The CAF program is by far the single most 
important reason that Hojanchan campesinos reforest. Ortiz 
Monge (1992: 131-32) laments the fact that the state will 
not be able to support CAF indefinitely, as evidenced by 
its plans to substitute the program at a later date with 
plain credit and a modest National Fund for Forestry 
Financing.
Global Markets for Forest Products
Incentive payments and other forms of financing are 
not now, nor will not be, the only determinant of the 
successes of reforestation in Hojancha or anywhere else in
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Latin America. The forward economic linkages to 
reforestation, that is, the development of wood products 
industries and markets for forest products, are of great 
importance. Recent and predicted future trends in global 
trade in general, and Costa Rican trade in particular, of 
tropical hardwoods suggest that markets for Hojancha's 
timber products will develop at a slow but steady pace, at 
least in the short term. Barring any major global economic 
recession, the forward linkages to tropical reforestation 
show promise. The backward linkages, however, such as 
seedlings, do not appear as promising, as is discussed 
later in this chapter.
Since World War II, a major shift in the global wood 
trade has developed. No longer are tropical countries 
limited to exporting logs of high quality, decorative, 
furniture-grade wood to the industrialized countries. 
Industrialized countries increasingly import lower grade 
hardwoods and products made from these hardwoods, such as 
panels, lumber and plywood (Takeuchi 1985: 433). Imports 
of tropical hardwoods have levelled off in Japan, Europe 
and North America, but continued growth in imports by China 
and other "newly industrializing" countries (NICs) of Asia 
and the Middle East account for the increasing levels of 
tropical woods in the global wood trade (Panayotou and 
Ashton 1992: 29-30). Another important shift is the 
increased domestic consumption of wood products within
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tropical countries, especially in Latin America, following 
post-War industrialization and construction booms there.
In industrialized countries, substitute products, such as 
plastics, aluminum and plywood and particleboard made of 
temperate-zone softwoods, have contributed to the levelled 
demand for tropical wood products. Today, more than 80 
percent of sawn wood produced in the tropics is consumed 
within the country of origin (Ewing and Chalk 1988: 6-9,
29) .
Latin America produces over 20 percent of the world's 
tropical hardwood. Its 3.4 percent annual production 
growth rate is the highest in the world (Takeuchi 1985:
440). Within Latin America, the sources of wood products 
for both export and domestic use are,increasingly 
plantations of hardwoods and decreasingly natural rain 
forests. This trend is linked to the difficulties of 
efficiently extracting a desired species from the 
heterogeneous forests without damaging neighboring trees 
(Sedjo and Lyon 1990: 28-29). It suggests that market 
prospects for plantation-grown wood in Latin America are 
favorable, and especially for fast-growth species utilized 
in the fast-growing wood panel and paper products sectors 
of global trade.
Tropical countries can produce forest products more 
cheaply than can industrial countries, although much of the 
cost savings is eroded by the costs of shipping bulky wood
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products such great distances (Ewing and Chalk 1988: 1-2). 
For that reason, the U.S. will likely remain the number one 
industrialized importing country of Costa Rican and other 
Latin American exported wood products, especially sawn wood 
and panels. Likewise, the U.S. will continue to import 
most tropical hardwood from Latin America, the closest 
tropical realm. Panayotou and Ashton (1992: 29) speculate 
that by the year 2000, Latin America will have surpassed 
Asia and Africa in production of sawn hardwood, due to the 
great depletion of hardwood stocks in Asia and Africa, and 
the rapid increase in plantation production of fast-growing 
hardwoods in Latin America that are easy to harvest and 
generate a quick economic return.
Much of Latin American plantation hardwood timber 
production is of low grade and used for pulp. Because of 
the depletion of high grade hardwood from natural forests 
throughout the tropics, and the sustained global demand for 
this product type, an increase in the production of sawn 
wood ultimately grown on plantations is a recent feature of 
Latin American timber production that is expected to 
continue (Sedjo and Lyon 1990: 46; FAO 1979: 16).
In sum, global market linkages for sawn hardwood are 
well developed, especially between Latin America and North 
America. Trade barriers are modest for the most part 
(Sedjo and Lyon 1990: 56). Demand for sawn hardwood is 
increasing within the tropics and in "newly
industrializing" countries. These trends suggest a bright 
future for plantation production of tropical hardwoods. 
Somewhat tempering these positive trends, however, are the 
periodic recessions that create slowdowns in demand for 
construction materials in industrialized and developing 
countries (Takeuchi 1985: 441), and the increased usage of 
plastics, softwood-based particle board and other 
substitutes. This latter trend has played a key role in 
the post-1950 slowdown in price increases for tropical 
industrial (sawn) woods. Between 1950 and 1985, prices 
increased on average 0.34 percent annually, only one-third 
the rate they increased between 1900 and 1950 (Sedjo and 
Lyon 1990: 60-64). Much of the increase during the entire 
1950-85 period occurred during the oil crisis of the early 
1970s (Takeuchi 1985: 445). Furthermore, patterns of 
dependency that characterize the marketing of tropical 
hardwood, that is, the concentration of marketing into the 
hands of a few firms of the developed countries (Takeuchi 
1985), will remain, given the bulky nature of the product.
Costa Rica and the World 
Forest Products Economy
Since 1975, Costa Rica has been a net-exporter of 
forest products (BCCR 1993; Villasuso 1978: 164). Between 
1984 and 1992, for example, exports exceeded imports by 
about 4-to-l (Table 6-1). Exports are dominated by 
manufactured wood products, such as veneers, plywood, 
particle board and furniture. Raw materials play a much
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less important role in terms of the value of forest 
products exported. For example, pulp represents only 20 
percent of forest product exports, even though pulp exports 
are nearly twice pulp imports. Logs and rough-cut wood 
together represent only 3.4 percent, a negligible portion 
indeed, of forest product exports. The U.S. and El 
Salvador are the top two recipients of forest product 
exports overall. Interestingly, the vast majority of 
lumber is not exported, but is utilized in domestic 
construction and manufacturing. Of the 11 million cubic 
meters of Costa Rican lumber produced between 1967 and 
1990, 61,000 cubic meters, or 0.6 percent, was exported 
{FAO 1980; FAO 1990).
TABLE 6-1
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF FOREST PRODUCTS, COSTA RICA 
1984-1992, IN DOLLARS
YEAR TOTAL IMPORTS fX Si.000) TOTAL EXPORTS (X Si.000)
1984 872 5, 105
1985 1, 057 4, 0541986 1, 244 6, 336
1987 1, 786 8, 033
1988 1,124 11,689
1989 2, 259 15,351
1990 3, 772 13,855
1991 3,715 11,9191992 6,876 14,102
TOTAL 22,704 90,442
Sources: Banco Central de Costa Rica (BCCR) 1993
Unpublished data; Ortiz Monge 1992 : 78.
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Wood pulp represents 40 percent of the value of 
imported forest products, followed by plywood, lumber, and 
other manufactured construction materials (BCCR 1993) . The 
primary sources of imports are the U.S., Nicaragua, and 
other Central American countries (Ortiz Monge 1992: 98).
Costa Rican Forestry and Forward Linkages
Forestry began to show signs of becoming an important 
commercial activity in Costa Rica beginning in the late 
1950s. As a portion of the value of national agricultural 
production, forestry increased from 2.5 percent in 1957 to 
4 percent in 1978, and it levelled off to 3.8 percent in 
1985 (Ortiz Monge 1992: 4; Villasuso 1978: 157). Though 
seemingly overshadowed by other agricultural and livestock 
activities, forestry is holding an increasingly important 
place in Costa Rica's industrialization and economy.
Between 1957 and 1975, annual timber production increased 
130 percent, from 255,686 to 588,607 cubic meters, and the 
number of sawmills nearly doubled (Porras and Villarreal 
1986: 22-24; 29-30). The contribution of forestry and 
forest products to the gross domestic product increased 
nearly six-fold betwen 1976 and 1987, from 790 million 
Colones to 5,363 million Colones (Ortiz Monge 1992: 71). 
However, in the 1980s, wood products represented only one 
percent of Costa Rican exports (Ortiz Monge 1992: 80), a 
further indication of their domestic importance.
A leading sector of the Costa Rican economy utilizing 
wood products is housing construction, and particularly the 
subsidized housing program begun under the Oscar Arias 
Administration in the late 1980s. In 1991, for example, 
four-fifths of Costa Rican sawn wood was used in housing 
construction. ICE, the Costa Rican Institute of 
Electricity, which provides the country with that energy 
source, is the largest single purchaser of wood, for use in 
hydroelectric plants, geothermal projects and other 
infrastructure. In housing and other forms of 
construction, softer, low-grade woods are preferred, 
because they cost less and can be more easily cut on the 
construction site than higher-grade hardwoods. The 
construction sector consumed some $75 million worth of 
lumber in 1992 (Lizano, et.al. 1993: 53-55,, 62-63).
A growing sector of Costa Rican exports are products 
manufactured from low-grade hardwoods that compete against 
similar products made from softwoods in industrial 
countries. Costa Rica ranks third among all developing 
countries of the world in exports of particleboard, a 
product that increasingly competes directly with plywood in 
world markets. Costa Rica, for example, exported 8,000 
cubic meters in 1982, or 11.1 percent of total Third World 
exports of that product. Costa Rica is the tenth largest 
exporter among developing countries of plywood. In 1982, 
for example, it exported 11,000 cubic meters of plywood
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made of low-grade hardwood, which competes with the U.S. 
and other producers of softwood plywood. Costa Rica is the 
seventh largest exporter among developing countries of 
fiberboard, a substitute for thin plywood or particleboard 
(Bethel and Tsing 1986: 26-34).
A potential growth sector for Costa Rican domestic 
production is paper products. Costa Rica exports more pulp 
than it imports, but it is a net importer of paper products 
manufactured from pulp. For example, the country ranks 
second among developing countries in imports of paper for 
packaging and cardboard (Bethel and Tsing 1986: 16, 46). 
Paper in the Costa Rican case appears to exemplify a global 
trade pattern that dependency theorists criticize: the 
tendency for developing countries to export raw materials ■ 
to industrialized countries, and import back from the 
industrialized countries more expensive goods made from 
those raw materials (Kay 1989). Many of the melina seeds 
and seedlings Hojancha produces are sold to Ston Forestal, 
Scott Paper, and other multinational reforesters that 
export melina pulp produced in Costa Rica's southern 
Pacific former banana zone, to the U.S. for manufacture of 
paper products (Murillo and Valerio 1991: 12).
Another potential growth sector of forest products for 
subregions of Costa Rica developing the appropriate forward 
linkages, is sawn hardwood. The interest in reforestation 
that emerged in Hojancha in the mid-1970s was one outcome
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of the 26 percent growth in sawn wood production, and the 
45 percent increase in commercially felled timber, in Costa 
Rica during the short period between 1967 and 1975 (Porras 
and Villarreal 1986: 31-32). Production of sawn wood has 
subsequently levelled off, but still appears lucrative to 
Hojanchans.
While particleboard and plywood increasingly are 
displacing traditional lumber in construction, no such 
large-scale substitution is occurring in the furniture and 
related industries that demand high quality lumber (Lizano, 
et.al. 1993: 61, 63). Furthermore, teak and other high 
grade hardwood species face increasing demand in the 
industrialized countries, whose own (temperate species) 
hardwood production has levelled off in recent years 
(Bethel and Tsing 1986: 22). Though still a small-scale 
export activity, Costa Rican teak lumber can yield prices 
of $1,3 00 per cubic meter on the world market (Ortiz Monge 
1992: 112, 132) .
In addition to the particleboard factory and the two 
plywood factories identified in a 1987 Costa Rican forest 
industry census, there were 161 sawmills across the country 
(DGF 1988). The number of sawmills has declined somewhat 
from a peak of 204 in 1980. According to a study by 
Lizano, et.al. (1993: 35-36), 145 sawmills remained in 
1990. The particleboard and plywood factories are located 
in the Valle Central, close to the major markets. Because
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sawmills are located close to the supply of logs, nearly 
one-third are in Alajuela, the province in which the San 
Carlos Plains timber region is located.
The decrease in the number of sawmills is not the 
result of a decrease in sawn wood output, but is related to 
a concentration of the activity into fewer hands. The
latter trend is in large part the result of higher costs of
raw materials and the additional need for capital to obtain 
them. The output of sawmills has in fact increased, from
356,000 cubic meters of lumber in 1986 to 410,000 cubic 
meters in 1991 (Lizano, et.al. 1993: 48). This corresponds 
to a more-or-less stable level of consumption of logs by 
sawmills, 741,294 cubic meters in 1986 and 759,292 cubic 
meters in 1991. Increases in output are due in part to 
decreases in waste in the sawing process: in 1986, 52
percent of the log bulk was wasted; in 1991, 46 percent was
wasted (Lizano, et.al. 1993: 45; DGF 1988: 51).
In sum, Hojanchans participating in reforestation now 
and in the future will be affected by trends in 
construction and furniture-making, two industrial sectors 
that make heavy use of sawn wood, and lumber exports, an 
activity that is expected to increase as hardwood supplies 
dwindle elsewhere in the world. The health of these 
sectors, and especially construction, which consumes 80 
percent of Costa Rican sawn wood, is tied directly to the 
state of the national and international economies:
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inflation, credit availability, and demand for housing and 
other buildings (Lizano, et.al. 1993: 53). Already, by the 
late 1980s, nearly 90 percent of industrial felled logs in 
Costa Rica were used to manufacture sawn wood in the 
country's sawmills (DGF 1988: iv). Only about 10 percent 
were used in the manufacture of such products as 
particleboard, match sticks and pulp.
Of particular interest to reforesters of Hojancha and 
elsewhere in Costa Rica is the growing percentage of wood 
cut by sawmills that originates in plantations, as opposed 
to trees felled in heterogeneous old-growth and secondary 
regrowth forests. Whereas in 1990, when tree harvests from 
plantations financed by incentive programs were just 
beginning, only 3 percent of the wood cut in sawmills came 
from plantations. By 1991 and 1992, plantation-grown logs 
represented 9.5 and 13 percent, respectively, of the wood 
cut by Costa Rican sawmills (Lizano, et.al. 1993: 50).
Ortiz Monge (1992: 6) speculates that, given the current 
high deforestation rates and the relatively high amount of 
waste in the sawing process, significant importation of 
wood may become necessary in the not-too-distant future. 
This problem could, of course, be rectified in large part 
by significant increases in plantations of hardwood.
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Reforestation in Hoiancha: Species Selection
Criteria and Ecological Characteristics 
In many ways Hojancha has been a showcase for small- 
scale reforestation in Costa Rica. It was among the first 
localities of the country to embrace small farm forestry, 
even before 1988, when the CAF program commenced.
According to unpublished figures from CACH and DGF, in 
1988, of the 368 Costa Rican small-scale reforesters 
participating in CAF, 92 (25 percent) were located in 
Hojancha. Hojanchans that year accounted for one-third of 
the 921 ha. reforested across the country under CAF.
Eleven years before CAF, Hojanchans began planting trees, 
largely with their own funds or by taking out loans from 
CACH, at low interest rates and backed by IDB and the 
state. During the 11 planting seasons from 1977 to 1987, 
121 Hojanchans reforested 212 ha.
According to the CACH officials who promoted the 
activity, it was not easy at first to convince campesinos 
to invest their funds, or commit to taking out loans, to 
plant trees. CACH sponsored several "charlas," or 
discussions, and workshops to influence public attitudes 
toward reforestation as a viable land use in that hilly, 
largely deforested region. The organization established 
several demonstration plots along heavily travelled roads 
in the northern half of the canton for all to see. A 
community nursery was established in 1977 adjacent to the
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CACH office on the outskirts of the town of Hojancha, where 
tree seedling stocks could be built up and then sold at 
cost to reforesters.
Before the existence of the CAF and FDF incentive 
programs, Hojanchan reforesters had to be convinced not 
only of ecological benefits of the activity, but of the 
economic viability as well. The rapid increases in the 
commercial exploitation of timber, the manufacture of sawn 
wood, and prices of forest products in the early and mid- 
1970s were key events that shaped the attitudes in Hojancha 
toward reforestation. Likewise, apiculture (beekeeping) 
became an activity of interest to several campesinos in the 
study region. It required the manufacture of wooden boxes 
to house the hives, and Hojanchans saw this as a potential 
growing market for wood. Finally, a small but growing 
number of woodshops making furniture in the study area in 
the 1970s, and the construction of houses in general, were 
regarded as potential markets for lumber, and good reasons 
to invest time, land and money to reforestation.
It was not until after the commencement of the CAF and 
FDF programs in 1988 and 1989 that the majority of 
Hojanchan farm operators participated in reforestation 
(Table 6-2). Of the 1,349 ha. reforested between 1977 and 
1993 in the canton, 1,137 ha. or 84 percent, were 
reforested after 1987, under the incentive programs. Of 
these 1,137 ha., 689 ha. (61%) are under CAF, 165 (14%) are
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under FDF, and 283 ha. (25%) are in parcels larger than 5 
ha., financed by CAF Individual. Three-fourths of the 
interviewees of this study who have participated in the 
reforestation indicated the incentive program was a 
necessary condition for their committment to the activity.
TABLE 6-2












































































283 Reforestation Under CAF Individual,
1988-93 (Parcels Larger than 5ha.)
TOTAL 1,348.7 449 689 165
Sources: El Ganadero 1993: 25; CACH (Centro Agricola 
Cantonal de Hojancha) Unpublished data.
Three species, melina (Gmelina arborea), pochote 
(Bombacopsis auinatum), and teak (Tectona arandis)
constitute 9 0 percent of Hojancha's reforestation. 
Approximately 10 percent of the reforestation involves 
small parcels of a large number of local species, including 
Gallinazo (Schizolobium parahvbum), gavilan (Albizia 
auachapele), "ron ron" (Astronomium araveolens), laurel 
(Cordia alliodora), and guanacaste (Enterolobium 
cvclocarpum). Each of the three main species has 
particular physical, ecological, and economic 
characteristics that influence which a reforester selects. 
The decision making process is not complex. As part of the 
incentive programs, CACH (in the case of CAF and FDF) and 
DGF (in the case of CAF Individual) make recommendations 
based on the suitability of one or more species to a given 
parcel of land. Only in those cases where more than one 
species is appropriate for a given parcel does the 
reforester realistically have the option to decide between 
two or more.
Melina (Gmelina arborea) is the most popular 
reforestation species in Hojancha, because of its rapid and 
generally straight growth. Melina typically can be 
harvested 12 to 15 years after planting (Murillo Rojas 
1985: 30). The species is native to Southeast Asia, but 
grows well in regions of Central America with at least a 
short (3-5 month) dry season. Under ideal conditions, it 
can reach a height of 30 meters and a trunk diameter of 100 
cm. (Murillo and Valerio 1991). Melina is tall in
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appearance, with the largest branches in the upper half.
Its leaves fall in November in Hojancha, the beginning of 
the dry season, and grow back in April, the beginning of 
the wet season.
Pochote (Bombacopsis auinatum) is native to 
Guanacaste. It occurs naturally as far south as northern 
South America and as far north as Honduras, where there are 
distinct wet and dry seasons. Pochote is fuller in 
appearance than melina. Under ideal conditions, its trunk 
can reach a diameter of 200 cm., and its overall height can 
reach 30-35 meters {Navarro and Martinez 1989). Many 
Hojanchan reforesters prefer pochote, because they are 
familiar with its appearance and its wood, which is 
frequently used in local construction and artisenry.
Because of its smaller leaves, pochote is not as unsightly 
as melina and teak to many Hojanchans when its leaves are 
gone during the dry season. Pochote's greatest 
disadvantage is its slow rate of growth, 26-30 years to 
maturity (Murillo Rojas 1985: 30).
Teak (Tectona arandis), a species native to Southeast 
Asia and some parts of eastern India, can reach 30 m. in 
height in Central America (Chaves and Fonseca 1991:3) .
Like melina and pochote, it requires a distinct dry season 
of 3-5 months. Hojanchans complain that of the three 
species, teak is the most sensitive to slope and other 
environmental conditions. The worldwide demand for its
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wood, however, makes teak the preferred species for some 
Hojanchan reforesters. Teak typically reaches 30 m. in 
height in Central America (Chaves and Fonseca 1991: 4) and
its trunk exceeds 100 cm in diameter. In Hojancha, its
leaves fall in November and reappear in April. Teak is 
usually harvested after 20-25 years of growth (Murillo 
Roj as 1985 : 30) .
The slope of a given parcel plays an extremely
important role in species selection. Teak is particularly
sensitive to sloped conditions, and experiences major 
problems, such as stunted growth and accelerated soil 
erosion on slopes greater than 20 percent. The erosion on 
slopes occurs because the large leaves curl during heavy 
rains, causing the water to gush onto the soil as if from a 
hose. The roots then become exposed, and growth stunted, 
if not ceased altogether. Teak does not grow well on 
compacted or shallow, poorly-drained soils. It also 
requires high amounts of light, so farmers must take care 
to thin out parcels before the crowns become too developed 
(Valverde 1993; Chaves and Fonseca 1991: 3, 35).
Melina, with medium-sized leaves, exhibits similar but 
less severe behavior on slopes. It is, therefore, not 
appropriate for slopes greater than 35 percent. In 
addition, melina is particularly vulnerable to competition 
with weeds. The producer, therefore, must weed frequently 
(Valverde 1993). Only pochote can be successfully grown on
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slopes of up to 35-45 percent, but only if soils are deep, 
well-drained and not compacted or overly clayey in content 
(Navarro and Martinez 1989: 13).
In addition to slope requirements, each of the three 
species has particular elevation requirements that affect 
reforestation options. CACH officials and reforesters in 
Hojancha have found that teak grows best below 4 00 meters, 
which restricts it from Hojancha's highest farms. Pochote 
can be grown up to 500 meters with a reasonably high rate 
of success, allowing producers in San Rafael and Huacas, 
the lowest areas of the canton's highland coffee zone, to 
select it. Melina can be successfully grown, on relatively 
flat parcels, up to 600 meters, and under some 
circumstances up to 700 meters, enabling all but the study 
area's highest farms, those in the highest zones 
surrounding Monte Romo, to produce it. The ability to grow 
melina at higher elevations than the other two species 
partly explains its popularity. Table 6-3 summarizes the 
slope and elevation conditions under which each of the 
species can be grown in Hojancha.
In those cases where the farm contains the proper 
soil, slope and altitudinal conditions to produce two or 
more species, the reforester makes the selection based on a 
number of economic criteria. Among the more common 
economic species selection criteria offered by Hojanchan 
reforesters in interviews are the market potential for the
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wood, the length of time from planting until harvest, and 
the cost and availability of seedlings. Seedlings vary 
more than any of the other costs of reforestation.
TABLE 6-3
SLOPE AND ELEVATION RESTRICTIONS IN HOJANCHA,
THREE MOST POPULAR REFORESTATION SPECIES
---------------SLOPE... ............
ELEVATION 0-20% 20-35% 35-45%
600-700 M. M*
500-600 M. M M
400-500 M. M P M P P
0-400 M. M P T  M P P
M=Melina P=Pochote T=Teak
*=May exhibit difficulties above 600 M.
Melina offers the advantage of rapid growth, half the 
length of time of pochote. The wood is suitable for 
furniture, fence posts and construction (Murillo and 
Valerio 1991: 4; Carpio Malavassi 1992: 137-138). In Costa 
Rica, however, melina is more widely used in pulp and paper 
production. Ston Forestal, which has been a major 
purchaser of melina seedlings produced in Hojanchan 
nurseries, grows melina in the southern Pacific region. 
According to a company brochure, the operation currently 
occupies over 10,000 ha. of former banana cropland, which 
is rented from hundreds of landowners. Ston grows huge 
stands of melina trees for five years, and plants new 
seedlings immediately after the harvest. The harvested 
melina is then turned into wood chips for export, to be
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used in the manufacture of paper and paper products in 
several countries, particularly the United States.
Melina harvested in Hojancha has not ended up as the 
raw material of paper. Only a small amount of melina has 
matured to harvest age in Hojancha, because the 
reforestation there is still a recently-begun activity.
The CACH sawmill, established in the late 1970s, has 
manufactured small amounts of melina lumber since 1992. On 
average, one 18-wheel flatbed truckload of melina per month 
is transported from the CACH sawmill to an export-oriented 
furniture manufacturing plant in San Jose. These shipments 
represent about three-fourths of the study region's melina 
lumber production. The remainder is used within the study 
area primarily in house construction and secondarily in the 
manufacture of apiculture boxes (Valverde 1993).
Because the melina harvest is so recent in the study 
area, Hojanchans' experiences with its wood is limited. 
Several interviewees expressed their skepticism of the 
market potential of melina as a material for construction 
or furniture making. They are generally aware of its use 
in pulp and paper products, and they regard melina as a low 
grade timber with limited potential for generating the 
income a high grade hardwood with proven lumber qualities 
generates. Even some local furniture makers expressed 
these sentiments.
207
The rapid growth of melina and the low cost of its 
seedlings underlie its popularity in Hojancha. According 
to unpublished CACH data, melina constitutes more than two- 
thirds of the land reforested in Hojancha before 1988, and 
slightly less than half the land reforested since 1988 
(Table 6-4). Of the 88 farm operators interviewed, 54 have 
reforested. Of these 54, 42 have reforested with melina. 
Among the latter, the most common reason given for 
selecting melina is its rapidity of growth, thereby freeing 
up the land more quickly for other future uses. This 
response was not surprising, given the high number of all 
reforesters interviewed who indicated that the incentive 
program was the primary reason for reforesting.
Those Hojanchans who choose to reforest with teak do 
so primarily for one reason: they are confident the 
positive market conditions (i.e., high demand and favorable 
prices for wood) will be maintained in the future. 
Reinforcing this belief is the presence near Puerto 
Carrillo, a village on the canton's short Pacific coast, of 
a 3,000 ha. commercial teak farm, Bosque Puerto Carrillo. 
The German-owned company, which manufactures parquet 
flooring for export, buys teak seedlings each year from 
many of Hojancha's nurseries. Several of the 17 
interviewees who have reforested with teak expressed their 
belief that this company, or perhaps others manufacturing 
similar products from teak, will represent a market for
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their teak timber in the future. Indeed, Carpio Malavassi 
(1992: 137-138) and Chaves and Fonseca (1991: 9-10) 
describe teak as an excellent wood for furniture, flooring, 
decorative panels, and other uses that require an 
attractive and dimensionally stable hardwood.
TABLE 6-4
ESTIMATED TOTAL REFORESTATION IN HOJANCHA, 1988-93 
BY SPECIES AND INCENTIVE PROGRAM 
(In Hectares)
Melina Pochote Teak Other TOTAL
CAF/FDF 444 173 117 120 854
CAF INDIVIDUAL 91 . 54 99 39 283
TOTALS 535 227 216 159 1,137
Source: CACH Unpublished Data (Estimates)
Pochote is a popular wood in housing construction and 
in the making of doors in Hojancha. Because of its 
popularity, many of the canton's reforesters have chosen to 
utilize pochote. Several of the 16 interviewees who have 
planted pochote cited the popularity of the wood in 
carpentry in the region as their primary motive for 
selecting the slow-growing species. It is the desire on 
their part to "play it safe." According to Navarro and 
Martinez (1989: 10, 13), pochote is excellent for carpentry 
because it is both dimensionally stable and does not easily 
splinter when sawn on the construction site. To some of 
these reforesters, it was important to plant a familiar
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native tree species that they have seen and grown up with 
all their lives. A common opinion among reforesters of 
pochote, or other native species, such as guanacaste, 
gavilan, gallinazo, and ronron, is that teak and melina, 
which drop their large leaves each November, are extremely 
unattractive during the long, hot dry season.
The establishment of a plantation of hardwood trees in 
Hojancha involves a fairly distinct seasonal chronology of 
activities. The planting of pochote seedlings is carried 
out in April, and teak and melina are planted in May and 
June, at the onset of the rainy season. This is so because 
the newly planted seedlings require several months of rain, 
and the soil is easier to work with then. Seedlings are 
most typically planted in a 3-by-3-meter spatial pattern 
(that is, planted 3 meters apart in rows that are 3 meters 
apart), and in a minority of cases, in a 2.5-by-2.5-meter 
pattern (Rodriguez 1986). A plantation of 3-by-3 results 
in 1,100 plants per ha.
Fertilization and weeding the first year are extremely 
important for all species reforested in Hojancha. The 
first fertilization ideally should be carried out in May to 
July, within one month after planting. The second 
fertilization is typically done in September of the first 
year. The first weeding is usually necessary by June, some 
two months into the rainy season. Subsequent first-year 
weedings are necessary in August and November, the end of
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the rains. Weedings, which involve the use of both machete 
and herbicides, are done twice a year for the first year in 
the case of melina, twice a year for the first three years 
in the case of teak, and twice a year for the first five 
years in the case of pochote. Subsequent weedings are 
needed at least every other year (Valverde 1993).
In melina plantations, in August or September of the 
first year, the straightest stalk is selected and all 
others are clipped, to produce the straightest trunks 
possible. This operation, called "la poda" or the pruning, 
is carried out the second year instead for teak, and the 
third year for pochote. Subsequent prunings of branches are 
usually carried out the fourth year in the case of melina, 
the fifth year in the case of teak, and the sixth year in 
the case of pochote. The branches that are cut are useful, 
either as firewood, fence posts, and even in non-critical 
carpentry.
In addition to prunings, four or five thinnings, 
spread out evenly throughout the life of the plantation, 
are necessary to prevent the crowding of trees as they 
grow. After all thinnings are complete, 120 trees remain 
for the final harvest. Thinnings produce a product with 
similar or greater uses than branches from the prunings.
For example, Ortiz Monge (1992: 122) found in her research 
of teak plantations planted 3-by-3 meters, that the second 
thinning (the sixth year after planting) can produce about
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155.000 Colones ($1,150) of marketable wood per ha. Three 
times that amount can be generated from the third thinning, 
in year 10. The fourth thinning, carried out in year 15, 
can produce over four times the income of the third 
thinning. A final thinning in year 20 can yield over 8 
million Colones, or $60,000 per ha. Her analysis is based 
on the actual 1992 market price of $450 per cubic meter for 
teak exported to Holland. Her analysis is perhaps a bit 
optimistic, considering that thinnings involve the least 
desireable (i.e., most crooked) trees, which most likely 
would not command the highest market price.
In a similar study, Solano Villaverde (1990: 55) 
determined that a pochote plantation, planted 3-by-3 
meters, can produce an income of 55,500 Colones ($606) per 
ha. from the second pruning (year 15), 207,500 Colones 
($2,265) from the third pruning (year 21), 373,500 Colones 
($4,078) from the third pruning (year 27), and 830,000 
Colones ($9,061) from the final harvest, after year 30.
CACH estimates that melina will produce an average of
90.000 Colones ($670) per hectare per year from the 
thinnings and prunings throughout its 13-year life.
In sum, reforestation is an activity in which many 
Hojanchans, including reforesters and community leaders, 
have a vested interest. The political ramifications of 
this interest are considerable, and are described in 
Chapter 8. The results thus far have been mixed, to the
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delight of some Hojanchans and to the disappointment of 
others.
An indication of the prevalance of a "wait and see" 
mindset is the fact that reforested parcels tend to be 
small: typically 1 to 3 ha. As discussed in Chaper 7, many 
Hojanchan producers de-emphasize reforestation and 
emphasize activities that generate income every year. CACH 
and DGF forestry engineers and extension agents complain 
that too many reforesters have engaged in the activity 
solely for the incentive payments, and fail to maintain the 
plantations adequately. Indeed, one can casually observe 
reforested parcels around the study area with tall weeds 
competing with unhealthy-looking trees for soil nutrients. 
Other problems not uncommon in the study area include the 
planting of trees too close together, and the planting of 
trees on excessive slopes. These latter problems are the 
result of producers attempting to receive the incentive 
payments while at the same time freeing up for other 
purposes the land on which they had agreed to plant trees 
(Mendez Cruz 1993).
There exists some doubt over the sustainability, both 
environmentally and economically, of reforestation in 
Hojancha. Of the prior land uses of the interviewees' 
reforested parcels, pasture was by far the most common (79 
%) followed by land in fallow (charral and tacotal). Much, 
if not most, Hojanchan pasture land has been highly
213
compacted from decades of overgrazing, a condition for 
which melina and teak are not well-suited, and which can 
hamper the growth of pochote. Thus, most interviewees who 
have chosen not to reforest, and even a small number of 
those who have chosen to, claim that erosion has not been 
halted from the reforestation, but in fact has been 
maintained, given that the reforestation involves deciduous 
species that leave the soil exposed part of the year.
Approximately 40 percent of the study area's territory 
contains slopes greater than 30 percent, a condition which 
renders this type of reforestation only partly useful, at 
best, in the reduction of erosion (Calvo Alvarado 1984: 4, 
26). In addition, Hamilton and King {1983: 78, 114-120), 
while acknowledging that deforested land is particularly 
susceptible to nutrient removal from runoff, argue that 
reforestation does not necessarily lead to increased water 
table levels, given increased evapotranspiration. 
Reforestation does, however, reduce sediment loads in 
streams and can reduce erosion, unless the tree harvest is 
carelessly done.
On the positive side, however, the reforestation has 
been at least partly successful in leading to the 
development and expansion of forward and backward linkages. 
Woodworking has increased in the canton, even before any 
significant harvests have been realized from the 
reforestation. The belief in the future of forestry,
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however, has stimulated the activity, which is elaborated 
in the first-ever census of woodshops in the study area, 
completed as part of the fieldwork for this dissertation 
(Table 6-5) .
The collection of melina seeds, which the trees drop 
by the thousands each year, has been an important, but 
declining dry-season activity for campesinos of Hojancha. 
All members of the farm family, including children, can 
participate. Shortly after the reforestation began in the 
study area, it became obvious that shortages of seeds 
existed for nurseries desiring to produce melina seedlings 
for the burgeoning reforestation. Until recently, seedling 
collection represented a reliable and easy source of 
additional farm income. Since 1992, however, the activity 
has fallen off due to fallen prices in the saturated melina 
seed market. Reforestation across Costa Rica has not 
expanded rapidly enough to absorb all the melina seedlings 
that are produced, nor the melina seeds collected.
Most producers with melina plantations in Hojancha no 
longer bother to gather seeds, whereas in the past, nearly 
everyone did. Interestingly, two Hojanchans managed to 
dominate the marketing of melina seeds in 1993, enabling 
them to buy seeds at low prices (250-350 Colones per 
cajuela, where 1 cajuela = 20 liters) from those who 
gathered, and to sell to reforesters at prices upwards of 
1,300 Colones per cajuela. This was possible when
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TABLE 6-5 
1993 CENSUS OF WOODSHOPS 
LA CUENCA DEL RIO NOSARA, HOJANCHA, COSTA RICA
Sales
No. No. hired per year Sawmill
Woodshop Location years employees (Colones) Prods. used
Omar
Ramirez Hojancha 7 3 p.t. 300,000 B H
Taller de 1 f.t.
Fausto Hojancha 12.5 1 p.t. 200,000 B H
Jose
Carmona Hojancha 1 1 f.t. 150,000 A H
Fulvio 1 f.t.,
Sandoval Hojancha 11 2 p.t. 2,500,000 B, C H
Muebleria
Los Los Angel- 2 2 f.t. B H, M
Angeles es 2,750,000
El Alto Huacas 1 0 120,000 A M
Wm. Mendez
Cruz Monte Romo 2 1 p.t. 400,000 A H
KEY:
Products: A = furniture, special orders, > 50% within 
canton
B = furniture, special orders, > 50% outside 
canton 
C = apiculture boxes
Sawmill Used: H =* Hojancha 
M = Mansion
f.t. = full time hired employee(s) 
p.t. = part time hired employee(s)
216
shortages of melina seeds occurred that year, due to the 
lack of interest in gathering. These two Hojanchans also 
hired laborers at 100-120 Colones per cajuela, to gather 
the seeds from their own two plantations, and sold the 
seeds at the higher prices. Under such circumstances, 
seeds can potentially be an important source of capital 
created by many, but enjoyed by few.
A final forward linkage that reforestation has 
developed, and one that has played a significant role in 
"putting Hojancha on the map," is the production of 
seedlings, the topic of the remainder of this chapter.
Tree Seedling Production in Hoiancha:
Technical Considerations 
The production of seedlings as cash crops in Hojancha, 
a spinoff activity of reforestation, has become an 
important capital-generating occupation. During the 
initial years of reforestation in the canton, the CACH 
nursery provided the canton its seedling needs at cost. 
Subsequently, however, producers began establishing their 
own nurseries, and producing surpluses of seedlings beyond 
the canton's own requirements. Over 98 percent of the 
seedlings produced in the study area are sold to Costa 
Rican reforesters of all types outside the region, 
including smallholders, largeholders, and multinational 
businesses. The success of Hojancha's nurseries, then, 
depends less on the state of reforestation within the study
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area, and more on reforestation on a national scale, and 
its associated political economy. By the latter 1980s, 
seedling production had become a dynamic sector of the 
Hojanchan economy, igniting dramatic transformations of 
small farming and class structure in the canton {Table 6- 
6) .
TABLE 6-6 
NURSERIES AND SEEDLING PRODUCTION 
IN HOJANCHA, 1985-93



















Source: El Ganadero 1993b: p. 25
Nurseries typically occupy the flattest, most fertile, 
and best-drained land parcels of a seedling producer's 
farm. In many cases, the producer's own farmland is 
inadequate, and land must be rented elsewhere. The 
planting, maintenance and harvest of seedlings is a highly 
labor-intensive activity. Plowing is necessary each year 
to loosen and aerate the soil. Small parallel drainage 
canals are dug every 10 meters to reduce runoff and the 
washing away of seeds and soil nutrients. The seeds, 
planted approximately 15-by-15 cm. or 20-by-20 cm. apart,
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are placed in holes 3-4 cm. deep. Under conditions of 
slope and or absence of drainage canals, these planting 
techniques would leave them vulnerable to washing away 
(Rodriguez 1986) .
The timing of the planting of seeds is critical. 
Nursery operators obtain most of their seeds from CACH, 
though some obtain melina seeds from Hojanchans who gather 
them in their melina plantations. CACH obtains melina 
seeds locally, and pochote and teak seeds from seed banks 
operated by DGF and CATIE, the Technological Agronomic 
Center of Research and Engineering, at Turrialba. To 
facilitate germination, the soil containing newly planted 
seeds must be moist. For this reason, seeds are planted 
during the rainy season in Hojancha: pochote in May, teak 
in June and Melina in July. This scheduling also enables 
the 10-to-ll-month-old seedlings to be harvested exactly 
when they are needed: at the time of the planting of 
reforestation parcels (Valverde 1993; Rodriguez 1986).
Since the planting of seeds in nurseries occurs during 
Hojancha's rainy season, weeds emerge between the time of 
plowing and the germination of the seeds. To prevent weeds 
from outcompeting the newly-germinated seeds for soil 
nutrients, herbicides are applied within a few days of 
planting. Once seedlings sprout above the soil, they and 
the weeds grow quickly, creating the need for frequent 
weedings with machetes, or with herbicides if inverted
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plastic cups are used to cover the plants. Fertilizers are 
generally applied one and two months after germination 
(Rodriguez 1986), and a third time at the beginning of the 
dry season (Valverde 1993). Twice or three times 
throughout the year, the seedlings need to be pruned. The 
straightest, healthiest shoot is selected, and the 
remainder are cut.
The successful harvest of seedlings requires a careful 
scheduling of activities, including (and especially) making 
arrangements to have sufficient labor available. The labor 
bottleneck that occurs around the seedling harvest is a 
major ingredient of the study area's social geography, and 
is elaborated in Chapter Seven. Each plant is pulled out 
of the gound in its entirety with the use of a long-handled 
spade, and laid in a pile with other plants. Pochote 
seedlings are usually planted in reforestation as entire 
plants. Melina and teak seedlings, however, are planted as 
"pseudoestacas,1 or stick-like plants with all but about 15 
cm. of main stalk and 15 cm. of main root cut away. Once 
the melina and teak seedlings are harvested, they are 
almost immediately prepared as pseudoestacas, whereupon 
they must be planted within 15 days if packed in sawdust in 
wooden boxes or grain sacks, or within 8 days if not packed 
in that way (Valverde 1993). Pochote seedlings that remain 
as whole plants typically need to be planted within 10 
days.
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Seedling production quickly became an important 
smallholder activity in Hojancha, given its low physical 
infrastructure requirements and profitability at all scales 
of production (Gallardo 1991). Also contributing to the 
rapid success of the activity in the canton was the 
commitment to research and extension activities on the part 
of CACH, a condition which has not yet existed in other 
recent frontier smallholder strongholds of Costa Rica 
(Nichols 1993: 7). It was embraced by many Hojanchan 
campesinos with heightened needs for producing viable cash 
crops, a result of the region's increased participation in 
national and international markets, and the associated 
higher prices for land and other goods.
Among the social changes tree seedling production has 
stimulated in Hojancha, perhaps none are as dramatic as 
those in household typology. As a highly labor-intensive 
activity from March to July, seedling production has 
transformed some of Hojancha's small- and medium-sized 
farms into operations relying less on maximizing economic 
returns to family labor (G. Damais, et. al. 1986), and more 
on hiring labor and maximizing returns to capital, a 
strategy normally associated with large farms (Barlett 
1982). A number of laborer families with tiny farms or no 
farms at all have been able to become petty capitalist 
producers of seedlings. They use their own tiny plot of 
land or rent one, and hire several laborers from March to
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July, after which time they resume working as laborers on 
other farms. CACH has made available ample credit, albeit 
at high interest rates for small nurseries.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, seedling production 
appeared to provide the campesinos of Hojancha an avenue 
for upward social mobility. By 1992, however, it became 
clear that this model was unravelling, and the culprit was 
seedling markets.
Seedling Markets and Social Class in Hoiancha
The fact is, we cannot evaluate 
or even describe the workings of 
markets independent of the social 
structure in which they operate 
(Harrington 1990: 218).
Because of the requirement of planting seedlings 
within a few days after harvest, a well-orchestrated 
marketing system is necessary. This is accomplished 
through contracts between the buyers of seedlings
(reforesters) and sellers of seedlings. The sellers can be
the viveristas (nursery operators) themselves, or they can 
be intermediarios (middlemen). There are two types of 
intermediaries. One type are the several cantonal
agricultural centers that buy seedlings from nurseries and
resell them at a higher price, or simply act as an agent 
between nursery and reforester and charge a small 
commission per plant. A second type are the largest 
viveristas that buy seedlings from other nurseries to add 
to their own seedlings, in order to fulfill the contracts
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they establish. In some cases these large viveristas 
simply act as agents between other nurseries and 
reforesters, and charge a commission per plant.
Large-scale viveristas dominate production and the 
marketing system (Table 6-7). Of the operators of 
Hojancha's largest five nurseries, four are intermediaries. 
They successfully establish contracts with independent 
reforesters, national and multinational companies 
manufacturing paper or other wood products, and cantonal 
agricultural centers elsewhere in Costa Rica, primarily in 
Guanacaste and the Valle Central. By carrying out its role 
as an information agency, CACH officials facilitate the 
process of buyers and sellers finding each other.
These largest producers of seedlings possess 
advantages that enable them to establish contracts outside 
the canton and sell their own seedlings first. In all 
cases, these largest viveristas own capital generated from 
decades of cattle production. With this capital, they got 
in on the ground floor of the seedling business and have 
established their reputations as producers of quality 
seedlings. They have easy access to credit when it is 
needed, and can easily invest in the necessary inputs to 
maintain their high quality. As relatives or friends of 
the directors and employees of CACH, these largest 
producers have greater access to market information and 




BY NURSERY SIZE, 1989-94
1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93
Large Nurseries 
No. nurseries 7 5 7 10
Seedlings pro­
duced {1000's) 2,765 3,886 4,090 4,665
% of tot. prod. 66.3% 48.8% 55.1% 60.3%
Medium Nurseries 
No. nurseries 8 21 27 19
Seedlings pro­
duced {1000's) 844 1,166 1,335 913
% of tot. prod. 20.2% 43.0% 38.3% 30.3%
Small Nurseries 
No. nurseries 30 24 20 18
seedlings pro­
duced {1000's) 563 689 382 515
% of tot. prod. 13.5% 8.2% 6.6% 9.4%
TOTAL SEEDLINGS
(1000's) 4,172 5,741 5,807 6,093
Large = 200,000 + seedlings 
Medium = 50,000-199,999 seedlings 












Source: Censos de Viveros, Direccidn General Forestal, 
Mininsterio de Recursos Naturales y Minas
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various buyers of seedlings turn to these larger nurseries 
first, because of prior experience, word-of-mouth, or their 
advertisements that appear on Hojancha's page in the Costa 
Rican telephone directory.
Smaller-scale viveristas generally must rely on the 
larger nurseries to market their seedlings for them. The 
larger viveristas make 2 to 8 Colones per seedling, or a 10 
to 67 percent markup. Unfortunately, markets have become 
saturated and prices have fallen for two species, melina 
and pochote (Table 6-8). The melina crisis was heightened 
by Ston Forestal's decision in 1992 to produce its own 
melina seedlings, a decision which left many dependent 
Hojanchan producers stranded. Many smaller nurseries have 
folded and their melina and pochote seedlings remain in the 
ground, because larger producers had first crack at the 
limited markets. In other cases, small viveristas using
TABLE 6-8
SEEDLING PRICES FOR SELECTED SPECIES, 1988-93

























PRICES ARE IN COLONES PER SEEDLING
Source: CACH, Unpublished Data 1993; Gallardo 1991
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markets. the previous years' prices to guide their 
planting decisions have chosen the "wrong" species two or 
more years in a row. High prices for a given species mean 
over-production and a fall in prices the following year.
In large measure, the problem is one of timing, and a 
lack of coordination between supply and demand. Seeds are 
planted in June and July for harvest as seedlings the 
following March and April. Reforesters usually do not 
apply for incentive payments until after the seeds have 
been planted, so their species preferences are not known in 
time. In those cases where information is available ahead 
of time, the larger nurseries with contracts have greater 
access to it.
Large-scale viveristas are insulated from these market 
effects and have a high rate of persistence as they 
continually reproduce capital. Smaller-scale producers 
have a high overall failure rate (Table 6-9). Adding 
insult to injury, if they lose money from their unfavorable 
market experiences, they are unable to pay off their loans, 
and, therefore, are indebted and unable to obtain another 
loan for the next planting.
Conclusions
The cattle period of the 1960s through 1980s saw the 
beginnings of a differentiated Hojanchan population, with 
an emerging class of capital-accumulators within the 
community. This process of class formation has accelerated
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markedly since the late 1980s because of seedling 
production. Initially it was hoped that the landless or 
land-poor laborers could experience upward social mobility 
by renting a small parcel of land and producing the 
seemingly profitable seedlings. Of 28 present and former 
viveristas interviewed, 3 were wage laborers as recently as 
1990 that now enjoy continued economic success and upward 
social mobility each year. Sadly, however, most small- 
scale viveristas have experienced worsened conditions, 
because of debt obligations tacked on to their marketing 
failures.
TABLE 6-9
RATES OF FAILURE OF HOJANCHA'S NURSERIES,
BY SIZE, 1989-93
% of Large % of Medium % of Small
Nurseries Nurseries NurseriesYear Failina Failina Failina
1989-90 8% 54.5% 50%
1990-91 6.6% 27.3% 66.7%
1991-92 0% 34.5% 90%
1992-93 10% 38.9% 61.1%
Source: Censos de Viveros, Direccion General Forestal, 
Ministerio de Recursos Naturales y Minas.
A remedy to the unfavorable marketing situation of 
small viveristas is not outside the realm of possiblility, 
given Costa Rica's solid social democratic ideology 
(discussed in Chapter Eight), and the widespread popularity
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of producer cooperatives in many sectors of the Costa Rican 
economy. The formation of a cooperative of small- and 
medium-scale viveristas would most likely improve their 
access to markets, just as a cooperative of that type did 
for small-scale coffee producers in Hojancha. Secondly, 
the state could require reforesters receiving incentives to 
apply for the funds (and indicate the species they intend 
to use) before the seed planting season, one year in 
advance of their reforestation. This type of "directed" 
planning could provide a means for coordinating supply and 
demand.
The social consequences of the workings of the 
relatively short-term seedling markets are separate from 
the social impacts of reforestation, a long-term commitment 
by rural producers. The overall health of the seedling 
sector is dependent upon the status of reforestation in 
Costa Rica in the future, but not vice-versa. While 
reforestation is driven less by market considerations than 
by subsidies, seedlings are almost entirely market-driven. 
By heavily promoting reforestation, the state indirectly 
stimulates seedling production. All too often, the 
unintended result is saturation of seedling markets, and 
increased disparities within the community. The pitting of 
Hojanchan against Hojanchan, created by seedling markets, 
is a relatively new feature of the locality's regional 
structurat ion.
It is doubtful the IDB, or other multinational 
financial institutions, will indefinitely continue 
providing low-interest loans to the Costa Rican state 
earmarked for small-farm reforestation incentives. Whether 
or not the Costa Rican state maintains its commitment to 
subsidizing small-farm forestry will depend largely on the 
overall character of forest products industries, such as 
lumber, paper products, pulp, and manufactured goods.
This, in turn, will depend upon Costa Rica's position in 
contemporary global economic restructuring, and more 
specifically, its prospects for developing forward linkages 
to its forest products, and its success in finding new 
export markets for these new industries.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE CONTEMPORARY HOJANCHAN AGRICULTURAL 
LANDSCAPE AND GEOGRAPHY OF LABOR
The Hojancha study region, in the minds of its 
inhabitants and many other Costa Ricans familiar with it, 
functions in multiple ways as a region with a common 
purpose as it strives for upward social mobility. At the 
same time, the study region is internally diverse, in terms 
not only of physical environment, but in land use and 
social stature as well. While forestry is a major 
component of the study area's contemporary regional 
restructuring, it is by no means embraced by everyone. 
Forestry is, therefore, articulated with a variety of other 
agricultural land uses and associated labor activities. 
Furthermore, forestry is accepted or rejected within a 
heterogeneous social context, as the immediate material 
needs of each Hojanchan family may differ. But, while each 
family pursues its own goals, the sense of community is 
largely maintained, as if in a common effort.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe salient 
features of Hojancha's contemporary human geography, 
especially variations in its agricultural landscape and 
employment, both of which are underlying ingredients as 
well as the outcomes of contemporary regional change. Such 
change has involved uneven development, as evidenced in 
housing. Though each of the region's transformations in 
the twentieth century has been significant, each has
229
230
included the maintenance of traditional agricultural 
activities, albeit in modified form. For example, the 
production of basic grains and coffee have been maintained 
in the study region since the 193 0s, but with different 
economic emphases. Coffee has become much more than a 
subsistence crop, and basic grains have lost their 
importance as market-oriented crops. The latest 
transformation, involving the widespread, but not 
universal, adoption of forestry, has brought about yet 
another shift in the community's labor profile. Even those 
families who have little or no direct involvement in 
forestry are affected by it as they face extra-household 
employment decisions.
Variations in Land Use and the Built 
Environment Within the Study Region 
Agricultural livelihood modes in the study region vary 
by farm size as well as by subregion. For example, within 
each of the localities of the study region, families with 
no land or only a tiny parcel make very different 
production decisions, and face more limited choices, than 
farm families with a few hectares of land. Likewise, these 
household types utilize different economic rationale than 
neighboring households with abundant land. Because of 
elevation and topography, most farmer- and laborer- 
household units of the study area's highest localities, 
Monte Romo, Huacas, Pita Riyada and Maravilla, engage in
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different activities throughout the year than those of 
Matambu or the Hojancha Plain (Fig. 7-1). In cases of farm 
fragmentation, it is not uncommon for farm operators to own 
or rent several hectares of land in a different altitudinal 
zone from the home farm, enabling them to diversify 
activities.
I. The Plains of Hoiancha and San Rafael
Cattle grazing is the dominant land use among farms of 
all size categories in the altiplanos in which the town of 
Hojancha and the village of San Rafael are located, both 
uplifted plains below the appropriate elevation for coffee 
production. Secondarily, scattered throughout these 
altiplanos are many small, newly-established tree 
plantations, especially on sloped or degraded -lands, and 
small tree seedling nurseries on the flattest lands. These 
nurseries are found on farms of all sizes, and especially 
small farms whose operators consider the activity an avenue 
for upward mobility. Cattle and seedlings are the primary 
economic activities in these plains. Nearly all small 
farms in these altiplanos, and many of the medium- and 
large-sized farms, also produce basic grains, to meet the 
household's subsistence needs.
A study conducted in the mid-1980s (MAG 1986: 94-95) 
revealed a trend in land tenure in the Hojancha Plain and 
surrounding hills, particularly visible between the mid- 
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Southern Boundary of Study Area 
Elevation >500m
Cattle, Seedlings, Reforestation, Basic Grains 
Coffee, Cattle, Basic Grains, Melina Reforestation 
Coffee, Cattle, Seedlings, Basic Grains, Melina Reforestation 
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Basic Grains, Household Gardens, Seedlings, Reforestation
FIGURE 7-1
GENERALIZED AGRICULTURAL LAND USE, CANTON OF HOJANCHA
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percent while the average farm size increased about 20 
percent. It is clear from the fieldwork for this 
dissertation in 1992-93 that the trend uncovered in the MAG 
study is actually the result of a combination of events.
The obvious one, that smallholders have gone out of 
business and sold out to largeholders, is only one issue.
Countering this concentration of land is the division 
of land by inheritance, which would tend to create the 
opposite effect: smaller and more numerous farms. This 
latter event creates in these low altiplanos farm units too 
small to be profitable. Because coffee is produced 
generally above 500 meters, the only profitable cash crop 
in the Hojancha and San Rafael Plains are tree seedlings, 
and these are produced only on extremely flat land parcels, 
which collectively comprise only a small percentage of 
total farmland. Siblings who inherit part of a farm, 
therefore, tend to sell their portion to neighboring farm 
operators or to one or more siblings who wish to keep the 
original farm intact. Often, the siblings together 
continue to operate the family farm intact, without 
dividing it at all. By pooling resources, they can 
sometimes acquire new parcels and enlarge the original 
family farm, a strategy increasingly viewed as necessary, 
given the declining terms of trade the region's cattle 
producers face.
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Besides the zone's relatively flat land compared to 
other parts of the study region, three additional 
characteristics of the Hojancha Plain make it particularly 
suitable for seedling production. First, the altiplano 
soils are by-and-large the product of the Rio Nosara and 
its tributary streams, and are among the most fertile of 
the study region. This permits high yields to be realized. 
Second, as the site of the town of Hojancha, road access, a 
crucial component of successful seedling production and 
marketing, is the best in the study region. Third, the 
concentration of population in the town of Hojancha and its 
vicinity, translates to a relative abundance of labor, 
alleviating in part the bottlenecks that occur duing 
planting and harvest. While labor is generally mobile 
throughout the study region, farm operators indicate that 
abundant labor close at hand is advantageous.
In part, these characteristics also provide advantages 
to cattle producers of the Hojancha Plain. The relatively 
flat pastures are easier to maintain and permit higher 
stocking rates than the more sloped pastures elsewhere in 
the region. Labor for pasture maintenance is easy to come 
by. Cattle can be transported by truck much more easily on 
the paved and improved earth roads of the Hojancha Plain. 
These conditions, however, are not prerequisites to 
successful cattle production. Farms of the often sloped 
San Rafael Plain continue to emphasize cattle production,
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and are generally able to encounter sufficient labor. The 
improved earth road linking the town of Hojancha with 
Puerto Carrillo facilitates the transportation of cattle to 
and from San Rafael, even during the wet season.
Not all households of the Hojancha Plain are easily 
accessible. Near Libertad, San Gerardo and Cuesta Blanca, 
three loosely defineable "villages" near the town of 
Hojancha, one encounters isolated households along dirt 
roads of the poorest quality, with deep ravines formed by 
hard rains and erosion. Many of these are poor laborer 
households that maintain surprisingly little contact with 
Hojanchan promoters of forestry and subsidized housing. 
These are the peripheral areas of the Hojancha Plain.
The town of Hojancha in many ways takes on the 
character of a small urban area. Several streets arranged 
in a grid pattern about the plaza are lined with houses 
close together. The "plaza" is a shaded park that serves 
as the town's social focal point. A rather large church 
and a recently-constructed cement amphitheatre lie adjacent 
to the plaza. A block away from the park is the large ■ 
community hall where dances and meetings are held. The 
town has two schools.
The majority of the town's houses have cement outer 
walls and are neatly painted, giving the appearance of a 
"middle class" rural community more typical of the Valle 
Central than of outlying frontier regions. Most of the
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remaining houses are of the more typical rural type: 
approximately one meter of the wall is cement at the 
bottom, while the remaining portions of the walls are 
neatly-painted wood. Very few traditional all-wooden 
houses remain in the town of Hojancha. Several isolated 
houses outside of town, occupied by poor laborer families 
in peripheral areas of the Plain of Hojancha, are of the 
traditional wooden type.
Most houses of the town, as well as of the other 
villages of the Hojancha Plain, have small, unorganized 
gardens, primarily in the back yard, consisting mostly of 
fruit trees. Only a minority of the town's households have 
planted vegetable crops, root crops, or grain crops in the 
gardens, like those described by Wagner (1958). Among the 
important fruits are plantains and bananas (Musa sp.), 
lemons (Citrus limetta), oranges (C\. aurantium and C. 
sinensis), avacados (Persea americana), mangoes (Manaitera 
indica), and zapote (Calocarpum mammosum). The interviews 
revealed that the importance to the household of these 
gardens is minimal, compared to Wagner's findings. This is 
a reflection of the greater incorporation of the region's 
farms in the national and global economies, and the 
associated need for the locals to devote a greater portion 
of their time to producing commodities for market, and less 
to kitchen gardens.
237
II. The Highland Coffee Zone
Hojanchans descended from the earliest settlers of the 
region's rugged highlands who maintain the farms today, 
enjoy greater opportunities to diversify production than 
many families occupying lowland Hojanchan farms.
Ironically, these highlands were by-and-large viewed as 
peripheral areas, and among the least desirable for 
settlement, before the opening of local coffee markets in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. The establishment of the 
coffee cooperative in 1962 provided a boost to the 
commercial viability of even the smallest of highland 
coffee farms. One official of the cooperative estimates 
that today, 80 percent of the approximately 300 farms of 
the canton's highland coffee zone produce that crop. Of 
the 41 operators of highland farms interviewed for this 
study, 31 (76 %) produce coffee. Those highlanders who 
choose not to produce coffee tend to fall within two 
categories: medium- and large-sized cattle farms that
strive to maximize returns to family labor; and minifundias 
(the smallest of smallholdings) whose operators lack 
sufficient access to capital, or who choose to devote the 
scarce land to producing basic grains for the household.
Another common activity among highland smallholders, 
and especially in Monte Romo, is small-scale commercial 
production of tomatoes and chilis (Capsicum spp.). These 
households own or rent small parcels along stream
tributaries of the Zapotal River, which provide irrigation 
for dry season production. In most cases, less than one 
hectare is devoted to the highly labor-intensive activity. 
Even a fraction of one hectare of such vegetable production 
can generate a significant supplemental source of income 
for a small farm household. One-fifth of the highlanders 
interviewed produce tomatoes and chilis for market. Nearly 
all of these are small farms. For most, the vegetables 
represent the second most important income-generating 
activity, after coffee. For some, vegetables rank third in 
economic importance, after coffee and cattle. Nearly all 
tomatoes and vegetables produced in the study region are 
sold in the pulperias (general stores) of Hojancha, or at 
the market in the city of Nicoya.
The highland coffee zone is not completely dominated 
by smallholdings, but in fact contains several medium-sized 
and larger farms that emphasize cattle production, in a few 
cases exclusively, in most cases in conjunction with basic 
grains, coffee, vegetables, or reforestation. Thirty of 41 
interviewees with land in the highland coffee zone graze 
cattle. The rugged highlands are not beyond the ability of 
cattle to graze, nor are they beyond the reach of cattle 
trucks, as most of the zone is linked by all-weather road 
to Hojancha. Pasture improvement and other intensification 
efforts are minimally used, except for supplemental feeding 
of sugar cane to the herds during the drier months.
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Because the flatter, more fertile, and more accessible land 
parcels are devoted to coffee, vegetables and basic grains, 
and the more peripheral, more highly sloped and degraded 
lands are devoted to grazing cattle, the latter activity 
appears to be as much a strategy to maximize the use of the 
least desirable lands as it is to maximize returns to 
family labor or capital.
Small plantations of melina and, in the lowest 
portions of the highland zone, pochote, are beginning to 
appear on unused pasture land. The high degree of erosion 
on the zone's slopes has served to convince many of these 
farm operators to devote small portions of grazing land to 
reforestation and to take advantage of incentive payments. 
The reforestation overall is more recent in the highlands 
than in the vicinity of Hojancha. Thus, a pattern of 
diffusion from lowlands to highlands has occurred within 
the study region. Interestingly, several of the 
interviewees with farmland in the highlands remain 
skeptical that reforestation with melina can reverse 
highland erosion and improve the region's water resources, 
and prefer instead to allow natural forest to overtake the 
more sloped, degraded lands.
Compared to the town of Hojancha, houses in the 
communities of Monte Romo, Huacas, Pita Rayada and 
Maravilla are spaced farther apart. The town grid pattern 
of Hojancha is non-existent in these less populated
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villages. Instead, houses are strung along the main roads, 
and in a few cases along paths, less than 250 meters from 
the main road. Each village does have its own school, 
church, and community hall located adjacent to a "plaza, 1 
or soccer field. Some of the houses are constructed of 
cement, but they represent a smaller proportion than in 
Hojancha. Most are of the cement-wood type. A fair number 
of neat, well-maintained all wood houses remain. The 
traditional "rancho" house type, with roof of palm leaf, 
has virtually disappeared from the highlands. As in the 
town of Hojancha, most houses of the highland communities 
have in their yards unorganized gardens and a few fruit 
trees of the same type found in the study region's 
lowlands.
Ill. Matambu
The community of Matambu, situated on a low, dissected 
plain, 300-350 meters in elevation, is the study region's 
most distinct locality. The indigenous community is in a 
state of change, as new cement houses have begun to appear 
on the landscape. Approximately half the houses of Matambu 
now have electricity, an amenity enjoyed by the remainder 
of the study region's towns and villages for some two 
decades now. A small but growing number of the community's 
families own "enduro"-type (dirt, or trail) motorcycles, 
the most popular form of transportation in the Nicoya 
Peninsula today. An improved earth road in fair condition
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permits truck and motorcycle access most of the year. Some 
25 families now have water piped into their homes. A 
school, church, and community hall flank Matambu's plaza- 
soccer field.
In contrast to these signs of modernity are the 
presence of a fair number of traditional rancho houses and 
well-tended gardens. The indigenous people of Matambu rely 
much more heavily than other Hojanchans on the kitchen 
garden. This reflects the desire to maintain a connection 
with traditional folkways. In large part, however, this 
practice is maintained out of necessity. Given that most 
farm units in Matambu are extremely small and off-farm 
employment opportunities are frequently scarce, gardens 
provide the household an important food source.
With a 1990 population of 875, Matambu represents, 
after the town of Hojancha, the study region's second 
largest concentration of people. The community, comprised 
mostly of descendants of the Chorotega, was delared an 
Indigenous Reserve in 1980 (IDA 1990). This event enabled 
the indigenous people of the locality to recover most of 
the land that Cartagos had bought or acquired through 
foreclosure over a period of several decades. The transfer 
of land was carried out through the Agrarian Reform 
Institute (IDA) in 1980. Today, the IDA settlement 
consists of 514 ha., most of which is divided into small 
family farm units of 2-10 hectares. As one indigenous farm
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operator expressed it, most of these family farm units 
occupy parcels with soils so exhausted they hardly produce 
anything at all. In almost all cases, one or more family 
members must work off farm, locally during the wet season, 
and in the Atlantic banana zone during the dry season. 
Market-oriented production is limited; most of these small 
farms produce basic grains, fruits, vegetables, and a few 
head of dual purpose (meat and milk) cattle for household 
consumption.
Slowly, reforestation is finding its way into Matambu. 
Because of the low altitude, producers can choose between 
the three main species and several other (native) species, 
such as gavilan. Nursery production of seedlings exists in 
the community, but is primarily carried out by outsiders, 
such as Cartagos of Hojancha, who rent the flat, relatively 
fertile land from the landowner. This provides the 
landowner a reliable income supplement.
A dominant social and political feature of the 
Indigenous Reserve is a cooperative farm, established in 
1985 by 1G families. The collective was formed with the 
help of IDA and CONAI, the National Commission of 
Indigenous Affairs. The 16 heads of household got together 
and lobbied these organizations for the funds to buy the 
land. Today, the 46 ha. cooperative operates under the 
name ASPINMA (Asociacion de Pequenos Productores Indigena 
de Matambd), the Association of Indigenous Small Producers
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of Matambu. It has 11 remaining member-families who 
democratically delegate the work load and decide investment 
policies. The members elect a president, and meet at least 
monthly to establish committees to oversee each of the 
collective's activities and to discuss the successes or 
shortcomings of each project.
Most of the basic grains and cattle that are produced 
by ASPINMA are used in household consumption, but a small 
surplus of these, and nearly all the tomatoes and chilis 
produced with the help of irrigation, are sold at market. 
Small surpluses of maize, beans and rice produced on 7 ha. 
of basic grains land, are generally sold at the pulperia of 
Matambu. A small number of the cattle produced each year 
bn the 35 ha. of pasture are sold to intermediaries. The 
vegetables, produced on a mere half hectare, are sold at 
the market in Nicoya. The less-than-favorable road access 
to the community somewhat limits this marketing. Each of 
the 11 families must earn income by one or more members 
working off farm. Therefore, the cooperative is not a 
completely self-sufficient unit. In the minds of its 
members, however, it provides a more reliable source of 
income and subsistence than would be the case if the 46 ha. 
were divided up into 11 family farms. At this point in 
time, the members are not planning to reforest any part of 
the farm. They believe that land is scarce, and the
244
immediate needs of their families require that land uses be 
carried out that produce food or income at least annually.
Cattle and Basic Grains:
Contemporary Hoianchan Production Choices 
Despite the dramatic changes brought about by 
reforestation, not only in the lower altiplanos but 
throughout the study region, cattle production remains the 
dominant activity, economically and spatially. Slowly, 
however, other land uses are replacing grazing. Through 
the early 1990s, cattle production diminished slightly from 
the 1970s to the 1980s, driven by lower prices on the 
international market and softer demand for beef in the 
United States. In the 1980s, pasture in the study area was 
less than in the 1970s. According to the 1973 and 1984 
agricultural censuses, pasture accounted for 79% and 74%, 
respectively, of the canton's farmland. Meanwhile, in 
terms of percentage of land area, land in fallow 
("tacotal") and in annual crops, especially coffee, 
increased slightly.
In the 1990s, the gradual decrease in pasture land 
appears to be continuing, in part because of reforestation, 
the vast majority of which is replacing pasture directly.
Of the 3,603 ha. of combined farmland of the 88 farm 
operators interviewed in 1992-93, 2,205 ha. (61%), was in 
pasture. According to unpublished CACH forestry data and 
estimates of total farmland hectarage in the study region,
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between 1984 and 1993, forestry increased from 0.5 percent 
of farmland to approximately 9.6 percent.
While new activities are capturing the attention of 
local producers, cattle raising remains a key strategy. It 
is regarded as the safest of activities, largely immune 
from years of unfavorable weather. Herd sizes can be 
adjusted according to ecological and market conditions.
For example, during the dry season, when grass is scarce, 
herds are deliberately reduced. They are built up again 
the following rainy season. Surprisingly, many 
interviewees indicated that prices are generally favorable 
in November and December, the preferred months to sell off 
a few head of cattle, and there is seldom any glut in the 
market at that time. Prices and markets tend to dry up by 
January, however. Since many farm operators or members of 
their families work off farm, often outside the region, 
during the idle dry months, wages earned between December 
and March are one source of capital used to enlarge herds 
in April and May. The nursery harvests provide early wet- 
season wages, some of which are used to finance herd 
enlargement.
Most smallholders engaged in cattle culture practice 
"ganaderia de cria," or small-scale breeding for calf 
production. This involves the yearly improvement of the 
herd, by retaining female calves, and selling off male 
calves at 7-9 months of age and older, fattened, or
unproductive brood cows. Steers are usually not retained 
beyond nine months on small farms, because stocking rates 
necessarily are decreased for older (heavier) animals that 
consume more forage, and per-hectare output decreases. A 
trend that Damais, et.al. (1986) identified in the 1980s in 
the Nicoya Peninsula, the combining of ganaderla de cria 
and "ganaderia de doble proposito" (dual purpose cattle 
raising) has become almost universal among Hojanchan 
smallholder cattle producers. By improving cow-calf herds, 
by breeding holstein or pardo suizo with brahman, they can 
produce milk for the household and possibly for sale to 
neighbors. According to Damais, et.al. (1986: 18), the 
herd improvement, the intensification of coffee production, 
and the overall trend of de-emphasizing cattle, are three 
small-farm characteristics in-line with small-farm 
strategies of maximizing returns to land.
Medium- and large-sized farms, which embody strategies 
to maximize returns to, respectively, family labor and 
capital, generally exhibit a greater variety of cattle- 
raising activities. Many operations of this size do not 
limit themselves to ganaderia de cria. Market conditions 
vary in the livestock industry, and these farms are better 
able to adjust to, or take advantage of, these changes.
For example, "ganaderia de desarrollo," the retaining 
and/or purchase of 7-9-month-old steers for an additional 
9-12 months of fattening, can at times be quite lucrative.
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and an attractive supplemental activity to ganaderia de 
cria.
Most medium-sized farms, and even a minority of large 
farms, produce basic grains for household consumption, as 
insurance against years in which cattle markets are crisis- 
ridden. Typically, however, such crises are not severe, 
and medium-sized producers remain as confident as 
largeholders in the viability of livestock production. For 
example, three medium-sized highland farm operators 
indicated they recently abandoned coffee altogether, pulled 
out their coffee trees, and expanded their pasturage by 
those few hectares. In their view, crises in coffee 
markets and coffee production complications overshadowed 
whatever difficulties there may be in cattle markets.
A favorable economic yield can be realized by buying 
or retaining yearlings for fattening and later sale. 
Generally, however, this affects only medium- or large­
sized farms that have sufficient grazing land, and that 
operate under a strategy of maximizing returns to scarce 
family labor. Typically, in 1993, a producer could sell a 
calf of 7-8 months old, weighing 150 kg., for 20,000-23,000 
Colones ($143-164). A calf of one year of age, weighing 
appriximately 230 kg., could be sold for 35,000-40,000 
Colones ($250-286). A two-year-old animal, weighing 350- 
370 kg., had a market price of 45,000-49,000 Colones ($321- 
350). The fastest gain in weight and economic yield occurs
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the first year. During that first year, labor requirements 
are moderately higher. Since small farms possess an 
abundance of family labor and scarcity of land, it makes 
sense to concentrate on the production of yearlings.
Larger farms possess more land, and attempt to minimize the 
hiring of labor. Ganaderia de desarrollo is better suited 
to the larger farms.
The majority of Hojanchan cattle producers sell 
cattle, whether aged 7-9 mos., one year, two years, or 
older, to intermediaries, who sell to regional markets, 
such as "la subasta," or auction house. Those who buy 
cattle for fattening generally buy from these same 
middlemen. The intermediaries typically charge a markup of 
7-10%. There are about 10 such intermediaries in the study
region operating on a full-time basis (Vargas Quesada
1993). About half of them own their own panel trucks to
carry the cattle, and half must hire trucks. Because of
stiff competition, some of these intermediaries have begun 
acting as middlemen in tree seedling markets on a part-time 
basis, and sometimes even renting small land parcels and 
producing seedlings as well as marketing them. Only the 
largest of Hojancha's cattle producers bypass 
intermediaries, and trade directly with la subasta.
Basic Grains
Maize, beans and rice are not important as market 
crops to the Hojanchan economy, but this does not diminish
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their importance to the Hojanchan household. When queried 
about which activities contributed most to household 
income, several interviewees included basic grains with 
their response, even if they produced only for household 
consumption and not for market. To these producers, 
whenever a portion of a family's dietary needs is met by 
on-farm basic grains production, less food needs to be 
purchased at the local pulperia. They treat this cost 
savings as income.
Typically, maize and beans are produced in rotation 
with one another. There are several different maize-bean 
production variations utilized in the study region, but two 
systems are dominant. One system involves the production 
of one crop each of maize and beans each year, starting 
with the planting of maize in May, the harvest of maize in 
August, the planting of beans in September on the same 
land, and the harvest of beans in December. The maize can 
be produced in one of two ways: higher use of technology, 
including plow and chemical inputs, or lower use of 
technology, with no plowing and very few chemical inputs, 
if any. The "espeque" or digging stick is used in both 
versions. The lower-technology version requires 55-70 
iornales. or person-days of labor, and produces 700-1,100 
kg. per hectare. The higher technology version requires 
65-85 jornales and produces 1,400-1,800 kg., per hectare 
(Ribier, et.al. 1988: 16-27). Households with limited
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resources opt for the lower technology version, while those 
who can afford plows, the higher labor requirements, and 
inputs choose the higher-yielding version.
The beans can be produced in one of two ways: "frijol 
sembrado," which uses the digging stick and some chemical 
inputs, or "frijol tapado," or the "covered bean" system, a 
lower-technology version that involves fewer inputs.
Frijol sembrado requires 65-85 jornales, and produces 450- 
550 kg., per hectare. While its yields are lower, 275-450 
kg. per ha., the labor requirements of frijol tapado are 
also lower, 35-50 jornales per ha. (Ribier, et.al. 1988: 
42-47). Frijol tapado is better suited to slopes than 
frijol sembrado. Households with limited resources opt for 
frijol tapado.
Frijol tapado is a traditional, low-technology system 
introduced into the region by Cartagos early this century 
(Ribier, et.al. 1988: 40). It involves the planting of 
beans into an unplowed land parcel. All that is required 
is a field full of weeds. Parallel paths approximately one 
meter wide and 3-5 meters apart are chopped by machete to 
provide access into the field. The planter walks the 
length of each path, tossing seeds directly into the weeds. 
Once the seeds are tossed, the rest of the weeds are 
chopped by machete, covering the seeds. The dying weeds 
act as both fertilizer and as a "pseudo-soil" that protects 
the seeds from washing away.
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The other common maize-bean production system 
encountered in the study region involves the production of 
two crops each of maize and beans each year. Typically, 
the land is rotated between the two: land planted in maize 
in May is planted in beans in September, and land planted 
in beans in May is planted in maize in September.
Households that devote time, effort and resources to 
producing two crops of each annually, generally favor the 
higher-technology versions of maize and beans production. 
The one exception to this is that, quite often, the second 
bean crop is frijol tapado.
The farm household must decide how best to utilize its 
family labor and its economic resources in deciding which 
system to adopt. Based on interviews of farm operators, no 
clear generalizations emerge with respect to farm size or 
even location within the study region, with one exception. 
Laborer households with no land of their own, but with 
access to a small borrowed or rented parcel, almost always 
produce only one crop of maize and one of beans each year. 
According to Ribier, et.al. (1988: 63-64), these families 
choose this system so that they can devote as much effort 
as possible to frijol tapado during and after the rainy 
coffee harvest season. Beans are the most valuable basic 
grain crop to such families, and they want to maximize 
yields to the extent possible, given their limited 
resources.
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Rice is a highly labor-intensive crop that generates 
low yields per unit of labor input: one hectare of rice 
production in the region requires 85-100 jornales, and 
yields 700-1400 kg. {Ribier, et.al. 1988: 54-56). Rice is 
usually not grown in rotation with either maize or beans; 
it requires flatter land than the other two crops.
Planting occurs in May, and the harvest in October or 
November. Because of the land requirement and the 
relatively low yield per unit of labor, fewer farm families 
produce rice than either maize or beans.
The Geography of Labor in Hojancha
Some Hojanchan households earn most if not all of 
their livelihood from wage labor, working on farms or in 
nurseries owned by others. These are either minifundistas 
who have access to only a tiny land parcel, or are landless 
altogether. Many other households have one or more members 
who work off-farm, but rely on these wages for less than 
half of the family livelihood. Their off-farm work is part 
of a household strategy matrix that involves both wages and 
various on-farm crop and/or livestock options. For both 
groups, wage-earning opportunities are not uniformly even 
throughout the year, often causing complications in 
planning household activities and finances. Labor 
bottlenecks occur several times throughout the Hojanchan 
year, forcing many smallholders to choose between on-farm 
and off-farm work, and forcing landless peones to choose
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between earning wages and devoting time to growing basic 
grains for their families on someone else's land.
From early December until mid-March, employment 
opportunities in Hojancha are limited. Among those 
available are the few farms producing dry-season tomatoes 
and chilis, cattle farms in need of fence repairs, and a 
few farms that put off land clearing or maintenance jobs 
until after the busy wet season is over. The severity of 
the Hojanchan dry season largely precludes the need for 
weeding or chopping pasture grasses. More timber-cutting 
occurs during the dry season, because of the ease of 
carrying out the work then compared to the wet season.
Most families that produce their own wood for fuel, 
construction, or fence posts cut it during that season, and 
the hiring of labor is sometimes needed. The harvest of 
reforestation plantations, and the cutting of timber for 
woodshops have not yet created abundant employment, as 
neither activity has developed to its expected level.
Of the 88 farm households whose operators were 
interviewed, 50 have at least one member that works off- 
farm each year. These correspond in almost all cases to 
small farms. The exceptions are two medium-sized farms, 
each of which is operated jointly by two or more grown 
siblings (and, therefore, are too small to support multiple 
families), and one large farm whose household head owns and 
operates a woodshop. Of the farm household members working
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off-farm, one-fourth migrate from the region during the dry 
season. In comparison, of 31 members of laborer (non-farm- 
owning) families interviewed, 16 (52%) migrate during the 
dry season from the region. The problems of 
underemployment that community leaders and IFAM (1976) 
identified as contributing to the study region's 
significant emigration in the 1970s, have not yet 
disappeared. As discussed later in this section, however, 
the problems are somewhat less severe today, due to 
forestry.
The most common dry-season destinations of Hojanchan 
seasonal migrant laborers are the Atlantic banana zone and 
the Valle Central. The coffee harvest in the Valle Central 
lasts well into January, and in some cases into February.
In either case, the worker establishes connections 
permitting year-to-year employment. This is especially 
easy in the Valle Central, because of the abundance of 
relatives that have remained in that coffee region. The 
Valle Central destinations of these laborers, including 
Palmares, Atenas, San Ramon and Grecia, often correspond to 
the towns which the families left one, two, or three 
generations earlier to settle in Hojancha.
In contrast to the shortage of work in Hojancha during 
the dry season, labor bottlenecks occur frequently during 
the rainy season. For example, the melina and teak 
seedling harvests, and the planting of pochote seeds in
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nurseries, occur in May, the ideal time for land 
preparation, and planting of seeds, for basic grains. Two- 
thirds of the farm operators interviewed hire labor at some 
time. Of these, half indicated they encounter difficulties 
in hiring labor during such bottleneck periods, and must be 
flexible with such activities as the planting of basic 
grains, the weeding of basic grains parcels, and the 
maintenance of coffee trees. Laborers can often choose 
between two or more jobs during peak labor-demand periods 
in the wet season.
Most agricultural-related jobs in Hojancha operate 
under the "jornal," or workday, payment system. The state- 
established minimum wage, 500 Colones per jornal {working 6 
a.m. to 11 a.m.), is the typical wage for all work in basic 
grains, vegetables, and pastures, and most jobs related to 
nurseries, reforestation, and maintenance and planting of 
coffee trees. The coffee and seedling harvests each have a 
different pay scale. Coffee farmers typically pay 100-120 
Colones per cajuela of fruit picked. A rapid worker can 
earn over 1,000 Colones a day. Nursery operators pay 1-2 
Colones per harvested plant. An experienced worker can 
easily "arrancar" (pull) more than 1,000 plants a day, and 
possibly more than twice that number if the roots are not 
too broadly developed. It is important to note that 
permanent employment of any one person beyond three months 
is rare, because a farm operator by law would be obligated
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to pay 22% of the salary, and the worker 9%, for Social 
Security. Several nursery operators complain that 
officials of the Office of Social Security in Hojancha send 
out inspectors to ensure compliance.
Because of the higher pay, nursery operators tend to 
have few problems encountering willing laborers during the 
busy seedling harvests. Farmers attempting to hire labor 
during that time for chopping pastures, or for the 
preparation of land in anticipation of the maize or bean 
plantings, often must postpone these more flexible 
activities for one or more weeks. Furthermore, many 
laborers indicated they give first priority to their own 
family's basic grains production, because it is worth more 
to the household than the wages earned from working for 
others.
Hojanchan landless laborer-households that rely on 
subsistent production of basic grains for part of their 
livelihood, gain access to land in one of three ways.
First, the family can rent a small parcel of land, using 
part of the wages earned from other activities. The rented 
parcel that is affordable usually is land of poor quality, 
suitable for low-technology maize production from May to 
August, and frijol tapado from September to December.
Second, the family may borrow land from a relative, or 
perhaps a close friend who owes a favor. Likewise, this 
land tends to be of low quality. The third, and the most
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common arrangement is know as "a medias," or the dividing 
up of the responsibilities and the output. This system can 
vary, but a typical version involves the landowner 
providing a small parcel of land, the seeds, fertilizers, 
and other inputs; the peon provides the labor. The harvest 
is divided between them, according to a pre-arranged 
proportion. Usually, the landowner receives one-fourth to 
one-third of the harvest, but can receive as much as half. 
The system bears a striking resemblance to the pre­
capitalist, antiquated "feudal" productive relations which 
much of the Latin American peasantry has faced for nearly 
five centuries (de Janvry 1981).
The coffee harvest, like the seedling harvests, is 
time-specific and cannot be delayed. Unlike seedling 
harvests, the coffee harvest involves nearly all members of 
the family, including small children. Usually, one or more 
members of the households of small highland farms work off- 
farm for wages at some point during the year, especially 
during the coffee harvest. In all cases, interviewees 
falling into this category indicated that they give 
priority to their own farm. Once their own harvest is 
complete, they are free to harvest coffee elsewhere. One 
reason why the frijol tapado system is popular in the study 
region is because most of the work associated with the 
late-season bean crop occurs during the coffee harvest, 
from September to October, and the tapado system of bean
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production requires less labor and, therefore, less 
conflict with the coffee harvest.
Opinions among laborers regarding reforestation are 
mixed. By a two-to-one margin, most laborers interviewed 
feel that nurseries have had a positive impact upon labor 
markets, alleviating underemployment during the wet season. 
Indeed, nearly one-third of laborers interviewed across the 
study region consider nurseries their most important 
employment activity. By a three-to-one margin, however, 
laborers believe that plantations of melina, teak, pochote 
and other hardwoods do not generate sufficient employment, 
and actually generate fewer workdays on average than 
pastures. According to CACH unpublished data, 
reforestation generates about 140 jornales per ha. from 
land preparation to final harvest. For melina, this 
represents an average of 10 jornales per year, compared to 
6 for pastures. For teak and pochote, this represents 
about 5 jornales per ha. per year. The concerns of this 
majority of laborers is not unjustified.
CACH estimates that melina seedling production 
generates about 300 jornales per ha. per year, teak 
seedling production employs 335, and pochote 430. This 
compares with an estimated 155 jornales per ha. per year 
for maintenance and harvest of coffee {IFAM 1976: 22), BB­
SS per ha. per year for maize production, and 35-85 per ha. 
per year for bean production. Given the high labor
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requirements of seedlings and the growing popularity of 
reforestation, forestry has put the study region one step 
closer toward alleviating underemployment during the rainy 
season. Fewer than one-third of laborers interviewed do 
not work in forestry-related activities at some point 
during the year. The dry-season employment problem 
remains, however, and peones continue to rely heavily upon 
subsistence production of basic grains, and, in many cases, 
seasonal migration.
Wages remain low in Hojancha, even during the rainy 
season. This, together with underemployment part of the 
year, make it difficult for a landless family to save 
enough money to buy a farm. Meanwhile, as Damais, et.al. 
(1986: 50) point out, capital continues to flow from 
households of wage-earners with little or no land, to 
larger farms. The region's large farms hire this labor at 
low wages, yet accumulate several times their wage 
expenditures in profits from cattle, seedlings and coffee.
Conclusions
The study region, the heavily-populated northern half 
of the canton of Hojancha, is a small locality of only 130 
square-kilometers, yet it is rich in physical, cultural, 
and social diversity. Throughout the twentieth century, 
circumstances and events emanating as much from outside the 
region {and even the country) as within, have generated 
changes in the livelihood modes of Hojanchans. Each time,
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the social structure emerged more diverse than before. The 
deepening of the relationships between Hojanchans and 
extra-regional markets, first through the production of 
basic grains, then cattle, then coffee, has created through 
time a more highly differentiated class structure.
As a result of forestry within the locality, human 
uses of the land and social structure are now more complex 
than ever. "Middle class" farm owners with modern concrete 
houses, kitchen appliances, and new four-wheel-drive 
vehicles, live in close proximity to landless day laborers 
who have few possessions in addition to their labor power. 
Several layers have emerged between these extremes. It is 
typical, for example, for small-scale market-oriented 
producers of basic grains and coffee to not only hire 
labor, but hire themselves or family members out as labor, 
thus defying traditional definitions of class. This 
"category" of employee-employer household is most common 
with seedling production. Some minifundistas, and even 
some landless laborers, have entered the seedling business 
on a part-time basis, albeit mostly without success, while 
continuing to work for wages between nursery-related labor 
bottleneck periods. At the extremes, the traditional 
social categories of capitalist-employer and proletarian- 
laborer, have become sharpened with growing disparities 
between them. Both cattle and seedling production have
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accelerated the concentration of resources in fewer hands, 
fueling a widening social gap.
Ironically, while basic grains have become almost 
trivial as a market-oriented crop, their importance to the 
poorest of Hojanchan households is as great as ever. 
Laborers and minifundistas who struggle with seasonal 
shortages of work but rely on their own production of maize 
and beans, are at times better off than those indebted 
small-scale nursery operators whose resources are tied up 
in the one activity. No two families, of course, face 
identical socioeconomic conditions. Each must decide which 
activities, on- or off-farm, to engage in, based on family 
need, availability of family labor, availability of off- 
farm work, and physical farm-related conditions: soils, 
slope and size. These are in large part the bases for 
internal diversity within the study region. The "essence" 
of the region is the coexistence of the diverse human 
geography, and the uniformity of regional common interest, 
vis-a-vis other regions. This seeming contradiction is 
reflected in the contemporary Hojanchan politics of place.
CHAPTER EIGHT 
HOJANCHA AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE 
A principal tenet of the approach of critical 
chorology as elaborated in this dissertation is that the 
workings of the global economy, with its inherent social 
structures and spatial systems, are played out differently 
from place to place. Geographers can identify how 
capitalism and its production of uneven development as a 
means of reproducing its social relations, is created and 
played out in specific ways in specific localities 
(Entrikin 1991). Implicit in this idea is a bidirectional 
relationship: specific localities are not simply passive 
recipients of the workings of the global economy and its 
inherent structures, but they react to those structures, 
and even play a role in the shaping of those structures.
As the "Zapatistas" of Chiapas, Mexico have recently 
demonstrated, even the most seemingly powerless of Third 
World localities is able to achieve some degree of 
influence in its social and political relationships with 
"core" localities.
A fundamental purpose for undertaking this study was 
to gain an understanding of how the Hojancha study region 
was restructured in such a way that in a period of roughly 
two decades, it has seen its high rate of emigration 
halted, and has largely acquired the character of an 
emerging middle class small-farm stronghold, in many ways
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more typical of the Valle Central than Guanacaste. In 
short, the locality now operates largely within the "semi­
periphery, " exhibiting some aspects of peripheral areas and 
some aspects of core areas. Internal class relations, as 
introduced in the previous two chapters, have played a role 
in this transformation. So too have global, national, and 
local economic and political forces, local ecological 
changes, and land use choices. All these forces have 
coalesced in different ways, at different times throughout 
the study region's history, each time producing a unique 
place, and each time providing the framework for subsequent 
restructurings.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the nature 
of political relations that exist within the study region, 
and between the study region and San Jose. Through an 
examination of the "politics of place," the chapter 
considers the nature of the empowerment and/or 
disempowerment of the Hojanchan campesino. That is, the 
locality is viewed as the setting for interactions, 
occurring at multiple scales, between elites and 
subordinate groups. An examination of the politics of 
place of the Hojancha study region is key to understanding 
the locality's reversal of fortunes since the 1970s. 
Hojanchans' use of the political arena to mobilize and 
pressure the state for subsidies and development of
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infrastructure is an underlying feature of the politics 
of place.
Agnew (1987) makes the case that political behavior, 
perhaps more than any other social behavior, is not subject 
to the processes of "homogenization" that modernist 
versions of social science cite as the outcome of the 
increasingly interconnected global economy. He (1987: ix) 
begins the preface to the volume Place and Politics by 
comparing two localities of northern Italy, similar to each 
other in size and close by, that have completely different 
political traditions, one Communist and one Christian 
Democratic. The different social relations historically 
characterizing each locality, the different paths of 
development each has experienced, underlie the contemporary 
political differences. He concludes that ". . .political
activity is structured and realized through place-specific 
social processes" (p.ix), and that political life, which is 
geographically rooted, is best viewed in terms of place 
histories (p.6). Indeed, Hojancha's own history underlies 
its atypical political affiliations, as described in this 
chapter, and by connection, its atypical contemporary 
economic base, described at length in Chapters Six and 
Seven.
Though stressing the importance of place-based 
political behaviors, Agnew (1987: ix-x, 44) does not deny 
the existence of national political norms. The mediation
that occurs between state and society is carried out in 
individual localities, and collectively, these 
interdependent sets of places constitute national-level 
political systems. Moreover, the World System transcends 
national boundaries, permitting social relations of 
production and accumulation to be structured by activities 
that occur across boundaries. A focus on national-level 
political life will, therefore, not adequately uncover the 
political relations between individual localities and the 
World System. In the case of Hojancha, connections have 
been established between its community leaders and European 
and North American development institutions of various 
kinds, independently of the Costa Rican state. These 
connections, however, ultimately have enabled Hojancha to 
play a role, albeit not a major one, in shaping Costa Rican 
state policies in the realm of forestry.
Costa Rican Exceptionalism: The National Ideology
When considering regional restructuring and the 
changing human geography of Hojancha, it is appropriate to 
frame these changes within the longstanding ideology of 
"Costa Rican exceptionalism" (Edelman and Kenen 1989). The 
ideology is rooted in a mythic history of agrarian 
egalitarianism, projected teleologically to assume an 
almost unbounded reproduction of the yeoman way of life.
Its contemporary manifestation centers on the country's 
social democratic model, created in the early 1940s and
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maintained in various forms to the present. The 
persistence of many of Hojancha's small family farms is in 
part a result of the workings in the locality of the Costa 
Rican social democratic model. Likewise, the continued 
marginalization of a sizeable minority of Hojanchans is 
linked to the model's tendency to sustain social class 
distinctions within the community.
The campesino has traditionally been regarded in the 
national ideology as the backbone of Costa Rica's 
democratic heritage. Since colonial times the campesino 
family unit of production has dominated agrarian life. For 
more than three centuries, a growing population of 
campesinos could pursue with relative ease an independent 
subsistence-based existence, free from the bonds of neo- 
feudal production regimes so common elsewhere in Spanish 
America. An open frontier for settlement made this 
possible. It is widely believed that these factors, 
stemming from the colonial period, are fundamental to the 
country's egalitarian society.
Spanish colonization began in the sixteenth century. 
Because of the relative absence of exploitable precious 
metals and the comparatively small indigenous population, 
the settlement history of what is now Costa Rica differs 
from Latin America as a whole. The indigenous population, 
including the Chorotega discussed in Chapter Three, 
dwindled soon after the Spaniards' arrival. The fertile
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Valle Central, with its pleasant climate and rich volcanic 
soils, became a preferred settlement zone for subsistence- 
oriented farm families early on. These families cleared 
only as much land at a time as they could reasonably work. 
Their swidden agriculture produced sufficient yields for 
household needs, and only small surpluses for trade or sale 
(Augelli 1987: 3-4).
There is wide debate over the existence of social 
class distinctions in the colonial period between 
descendants of the original conauistadores and non-elites. 
Most of the early immigrants were economically marginalized 
peasants from the Andalucian and Extremaduran regions of 
Spain, attracted by the availability of land to work by 
their own labors (Stone 1975: 107; Stone 1989: 21; Seligson 
1980: 27-28; Gayle 1986: 69). Hall (1985: 61) has 
suggested that many of these were Sephardic Jews. An elite 
class of settlers consisted of the conquistadores, their 
relatives and offspring, and numerous soldiers, government 
officials, and "adventurers" who accompanied them (Hall 
1985: 61). Since land was abundant, few peasants bothered 
to gain legal title to the tracts they cleared. 
Conquistadores, on the other hand, received large land 
grants from the Spanish Crown (Augelli 1987: 4-5). Augelli 
(1987) and Seligson (1980) are among the scholars who 
acknowledge this distinction, but hold that the yeoman 
class of the colonial period was sufficiently independent
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from the elite class, such that an egalitarian yeoman 
society could emerge from their subsistence economy and the 
expanding frontier.
Gudmundson (1986: 25-46) and Hall (1985: 131-136) are 
among the scholars that take a different view of class 
dynamics in pre-independence, pre-coffee Costa Rica. They 
insist that a series of hamlets and villages were more 
important than dispersed households in the Valle Central. 
Social inequality emerged as lands surrounding these 
hamlets became fully occupied and extended beyond the point 
of feasible daily access, forcing many to work as laborers 
or move to the frontier. According to this interpretation, 
distinctions between landed and landless members of the 
yeoman class emerged early on.
Gudmundson (1986) and Samper (1990) argue that rural 
democracy and egalitarianism were more a product of the 
post-independence development of coffee beginning in the 
1820s. The state invested in roads to ports on both 
coasts, and instituted land grant policies to encourage 
coffee-based settlement of frontier areas of the Valle 
Central and beyond (James 1969: 196-197). According to 
Gudmundson (1986: 76-82), coffee smallholdings, rather than 
large estates as in Guatemala and El Salvador, dominated 
the Costa Rican agricultural landscape from the 1840s until 
at least 1900. Labor was scarce and expensive. This gave 
smallholders, which utilized mostly family members as
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labor, the advantage over estates, which were burdened with 
wage costs. (Cardoso 1977: 176-181). It was not until late 
in the nineteenth century, according to Gudmundson, that 
disparities between elites and peasants began to take 
shape. Crowding within the coffee zone, for example, 
forced migrant settlers to areas of lower elevation, where 
they produced agricultural commodities of lesser market 
value than coffee (Booth 1989: 389, 409-410).
Those who argue that the colonial period, rather than 
the post-independence coffee period, was the embodiment of 
rural democracy, assert that the transition to coffee 
culture signalled the demise of rural egalitarianism and 
stability based on isolation, individualism, and self- 
sufficiency. The introduction of agrarian capitalism 
created a social division of labor, rural inequality, and 
an increase in frontier out-migration from the coffee zone. 
Urban elites controlled credit and coffee milling and 
exporting, and were ultimately able to determine the price 
and profit the smallholder received. Debts and 
consolidation of landholdings by rural elites 
proletarianized many peasants and drove others to the 
frontier (Barry 1991b: 3; Booth 1989: 389, 409-410).
Coinciding with the end of the coffee boom was an 
acceleration of frontier settlement beyond the crowded 
Valle Central. Pioneer settlement by the year 1900 had 
expanded to altitudes higher and lower than the feasible
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range of coffee production. Migration to Guanacaste, the 
Valle General and other outlying zones with comparatively 
poor soils was well underway by 1930 (James 1969: 197; 
Bozzoli de Wille 1981; Gudmundson 1986: 5, 132-133).
Whether embracing capitalism or escaping 
proletarianization, high land prices, debt or crowded 
conditions, landless Costa Ricans expanded settlement 
beyond the original coffee core region.
Until recent decades, colonization to such areas as 
the Nicoya highlands was spontaneous and unplanned, 
characterized by isolated farmsteads, disorganized hamlets, 
shifting cultivation, and soil exhaustion resulting from 
wasteful farming practices. Until the final closing of the 
frontier in the early 1960s, when settlement had reached 
all sections of the country and no more unclaimed land 
remained, a perception of the existence of unlimited virgin 
lands at the frontier occupied the mindset of frontier 
settlers (Augelli 1987: 5). Once lands became degraded the 
pioneers left them behind (Parsons 1963: 453), and the 
frontier "safety valve" was no longer available to offer 
independence and relative egalitarianism to campesinos.
The version of Costa Rican history that places the 
country's egalitarian democratic heritage within the 
colonial period is the most common. That version, however, 
does not overlook the fact that post-independence 
smallholders dominated coffee farming to a much greater
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extent than elsewhere in Central America. The ideology of 
Costa Rican exceptionalism, based in part on one or both of 
these interpretations of the country's history, is 
maintained in schools and the mass media by historians, 
business leaders and politicians. It is unquestioningly 
accepted as truth by most Costa Ricans (Booth 1989: 387; 
Biesanz 1982: 47). Empirical evidence, however, suggests 
that aspects of the myth are indeed open to questioning.
For instance, during most of the twentieth century, the 
independent Costa Rican self-employed peasant farmer has 
been in a state of social and economic decline. Today, the 
majority of rural Costa Ricans are landless or land-poor 
laborers, unable to make a living strictly from the family 
landholding (Blachman and Heilman 1986: 157, 164).
The Biesanzes (1982: 70) speculate that the myth of 
egalitarianism serves to ease the guilt of the wealthy 
while easing the anxiety of the poor. The complacency 
generated by the myth may in fact create a barrier to the 
awareness of disparities. In some respects, the 
disparities are made less severe by the presence of the 
welfare state, which has intentionally created a "safety 
net" that serves in part to perpetuate the ideology of 
exceptionalism. This feature of social democracy, the 
basis of the contemporary form of the myth, has played a 
major part in Hojancha's post-1970s regional restructuring.
The social democracy that emerged in Costa Rican 
politics in the 1940s has largely been maintained to the 
present. The proponents of the social democratic welfare 
state uphold it as the basis of the country's continued 
relative stability, an anomaly in the turbulent Central 
America of the twentieth century (Barry 1991a: 87).
Although first implemented by President Rafael Calderdn 
Guardia, a Social Christian, in the 1940s, reforms 
characterizing Costa Rica's social democracy have 
subsequently been more vigorously upheld and expanded under 
various administrations of the Partido Liberaci6n Nacional, 
or National Liberation Party (PLN). In more recent 
decades, the Partido Unidad Social Cristiano, or Social 
Christian Unity Party (PUSC), which traces its origins back 
to Calderon, have made deliberate attempts to eliminate or 
scale back many of the social democratic programs which 
Calderon began and which the PLN has generally tried to 
maintain (Barry 1991b).
While Calderon implemented social security for the ill 
and a strong labor code, it was the PLN's founder, "Don 
Pepe" Figueres, who nationalized the banking system and 
outlawed the army in 1948. Subsequent PLN administrations 
have enacted policies raising wages, increasing social 
security health care coverage, implementing modest land 
reform, subsidizing food crop prices, building 
infrastructure, and providing subsidized housing for the
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poor (Edelman and Kenen 1989: 87-88, 123-125; Rovira 1988). 
Costa Rican social democracy, as elaborated by the PLN, has 
sought by means of a strong bureaucracy, to increase the 
state's involvement in the economy {Garita 1981).
The sociologist Diego Palma (1980) explains that all 
along, the social democratic policies of the PLN have 
involved the "pseudoparticipation" of different groups in 
the process of reform. The existence of a strong 
bureaucracy has in fact co-opted citizen participation by 
making only those concessions necessary, such as enacting 
limited agrarian reform, to pacify the peasantry and other 
segments of society. In metaphorical terms, the state has 
opened a number of escape valves to relieve pressure, as 
the need arises. As this case study illustrates, leading 
citizens of Hojancha have found ways to manipulate these 
escape valve openings.
Hoiancha and the Politics of Place
The area that is now Hojancha was for over half a 
century a frontier settlement destination, one small 
example of the national safety valve that perpetuated the 
hopes of campesinos seeking landowning opportunities and 
escaping economic marginalization in the western end of the 
crowded Valle Central. Since the closing of the Nicoyan 
frontier in the 1950s, new escape valves have been opened 
through the functioning of PLN-style social democracy.
This has been most obvious in four realms: the creation of
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Hojancha's political boundaries; the development of 
infrastructure; housing subsidies; and forestry subsidies. 
As a result, Hojancha is a PLN stronghold.
Politically, the region that is now Hojancha remained 
through the 1950s a peripheral portion of the canton of 
Nicoya, whose seat, the city of Nicoya, is located in the 
peninsula's lowlands, a zone more accessible to areas of 
commerce. The first all-weather roads constructed into the 
Nicoya Peninsula linked the town of Nicoya with more 
heavily populated settlements of Guanacaste. The Nicoya- 
Liberia road was the first on the peninsula to be paved. 
Hojancha's priest, Padre Luis Vara, himself an ardent 
social democrat, recognized in the early 1960s that the 
hilly Hojancha sub-region of Nicoya canton was constantly 
overlooked in matters of infrastructure and other 
development. Because of its relatively poor access, 
Hojancha faced greater difficulties than lowland Nicoyan 
settlements in trade.
With help from his PLN connections in the National 
Assembly, Padre Vara succeeded in establishing Hojancha as 
a "distrito" (district) within the canton of Nicoya in 1966 
(Comunidades 1990; 4). As a district, Hojancha would then 
have more visibility to work at the cantonal, provincial, 
and national levels to lobby for assistance. In the 1960s, 
during the administration of PLN President Francisco Orlich 
(1962-66), Hojancha received donations for development,
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including a tractor for road improvements (Vara 1993).
Also in that decade, in response to the priest's lobbying 
efforts, the federal government built a school in Hojancha 
and implemented a program through the Agrarian Reform 
Institute (IDA) to provide land titles to those Hojanchans 
lacking them (Vara 1993).
Padre Vara and other community leaders recognized 
early in that decade the need to develop marketing 
opportunities for Hojanchan agricultural products.
Figueres and subsequent PLN leaders have been strongly 
committed to coffee cooperatives as a means of pooling 
small-scale producers, and empowering them in product and 
credit markets. Such markets typically have favored the 
traditional agro-export oligarchy (Cazanga 1987). In 1962, 
Luis Vara, with the help of allies within the Orlich 
Administration and in the Department of Cooperatives of the 
National Bank of Costa Rica (BNCR), successfully mobilized 
23 coffee producers to form a coffee cooperative, Coope- 
Pilangosta, R.L. (El Ganadero 1993). As a result of the 
formation of this cooperative and its processing facility, 
or beneficio. Hojancha's coffee producers have been largely 
able to overcome their locational disadvantages in the 
marketing of the bean and in obtaining credit.
Between 1970 and 1974, when Don Pepe Figueres was 
president for his last time, another wave of activities 
occurred in Hojanchan development. In 1971, Padre Vara,
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through his PLN connections, succeeded, in getting Hojancha 
established as a separate canton. This enabled Hojancha to 
become completely independent from Nicoya, and to lobby the 
state more directly. The following year, electrification 
arrived in the canton (Comunidades 1990: 4). During the 
PLN presidency of Daniel Oduber (1974-78), the technical 
high school and the modern health clinic were constructed 
in Hojancha, and a water system was installed to serve the 
homes of the town of Hojancha. Again, Luis Vara and his 
PLN connections made these developments possible.
In general, there are three avenues which Hojanchans 
have pursued, in order to lobby for assistance from the 
state. Most commonly, they approach the local "diputado," 
or Representative from the National Assembly. In some 
cases, depending on the assistance sought, it is more 
pragmatic to make contact directly with the appropriate 
government ministry. Finally, under certain circumstances, 
the President of the Republic is lobbied directly. Luis 
Vara has made effective use of all three options.
Typically, the community decides through consensus 
what projects or aims it will pursue through government 
channels. Hojanchan community leaders participate in a 
Consejo Desarrollo Regional, or Regional Development 
Council, a consultative, as opposed to executive, committee 
that operates at two levels. Operating at one level is the 
committee of the "Chorotega Region," one of Costa Rica's
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six planning regions, including the Province of Guanacaste 
and part of neighboring Alajuela Province. At the second 
level is the committee of the canton of Hojancha.
The regional-level committee consists of 
representatives from each of the 11 cantones of the 
Chorotega Region, who collectively decide which large-scale 
(regional) problems or projects need to be addressed. Once 
decisions are made, typically the Ministry of Planning in 
San Jose is approached. The canton-level committee 
consists of representatives of each productive sector, 
service sector, and organization in Hojancha, who decide 
which projects specific to the canton should be pursued.
One or more members of the council usually approach the 
local diputado with requests for assistance. The 
appropriate ministry in San Jos£ is contacted directly in 
some cases, such as when the local diputado is not of the 
PLN, and/or if none of Guanacaste's five diputados, elected 
under a proportional representation system, is from 
Hojancha. The priest and nearly all other community 
leaders of Hojancha are members of the PLN. For this 
reason, PUSC diputados tend to be much less responsive 
(Garcia 1993; Lopez 1993; Marin 1993; Rodriguez 1993; 
Vazquez 1993, et.al.). So too, are non-Hojanchan diputados 
(Marin 1993). Frequently, since Hojancha's formation as a 
canton and even before, Padre Vara has bypassed this 
process, and approached diputados, ministries, and even
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Presidents directly. Again, success depends largely on 
whether these officials are members of the PLN {Marin 1993; 
Garcia 1993).
Luis Vara has been described by a variety of 
Hojanchans as having a clear vision: development for 
Hojancha and an improved standard of living for its people. 
To achieve these ends, he created what can best be 
described as a political machine, consisting of like-minded 
PLN ideologues in Hojancha. Not unexpectedly, a rift 
developed in the mid-1980s, which remains to date. 
Disagreements between Vara and former allies emerged over 
his leadership style and the role of forestry in Hojancha's 
development, an activity that would come to define 
contemporary Hojanchan regional identity.
Given the poverty, emigration, and environmental 
degradation of the 1960s and 1970s, Padre Vara recognized 
the need for the canton to form its own agricultural center 
for raising funds to finance reforestation and research for 
improving the community's coffee and basic grains crops.
In the mid-1970s, the state, as a result of a joint study 
of the country's rural communities between IFAM (The 
Municipal Advisory and Promotion Institute) and AITEC, the 
U.S.-based Accidn Internacional TScnica, pronounced 
Hojancha one of two communities with the least economic 
opportunites in all of Costa Rica (IFAM 1976). As a 
result, in 1978, Vara's political machine and the
279
municipality government of Hojancha successfully lobbied 
the Oduber Administration to establish CACH. A cantonal 
agricultural center was preferable to a cooperative, 
because under Costa Rican law, it could directly receive 
more state aid (Rodriguez 1993).
The Oduber Administration sent several agronomists and 
other technicians to assist in the establishment of CACH. 
The municipality's government and Luis Vara were 
influential in receiving a land grant for the CACH building 
and its first tree seedling nursery. AITEC donated funds 
for salaries and transportation expenses for four years, 
after which time CACH was supposed to be self-sufficient.
A portion of the interest on loans to campesinos goes to 
CACH's operating expenses. In 1981, an agreement with the 
Inter-American Foundation (IAF) provided $235,000 (U.S.) 
for establishing reforestation in the canton (Rodriguez 
1993). The funds financed vehicles for CACH, the hiring of 
technical personnel, and subsidies for reforestation 
demonstration plots. Luis Vara is widely credited with 
"planting the seeds" for the idea of development in the 
community, and establishing Hojancha's image as a well- 
organized place with hard-working, motivated people.
By the mid-1980s, the rift had emerged within the 
priest's political machine. On one side were Vara and some 
of his closest followers who wanted to de-emphasize 
forestry somewhat, and instead emphasize a more integrated,
multi-activity rural development that included forestry and 
other activities. On the other side were several members 
of his political machine and the municipality government 
who favored a stronger emphasis on forestry. To strengthen 
his hand, Vara lobbied President Alberto Monge directly to 
have his hand-picked candidate for diputado, Angel Marin, 
the president of Hojancha's technical high school, placed 
in a favorable position on the ballot for the 1986 
election. In the Costa Rican National Assembly's system of 
proportional representation, voters vote for a slate of 
candidates, whose chances of winning are determined by the 
number of votes for their party, as well as their ranking 
on the ballot. Because of Vara's lobbying efforts, Angel 
Marin was placed in the third ballot position, and PLN 
gained three of Guanacaste's five seats.
Despite Vara's success, the pro-forestry forces in 
Hojancha eventually won. CACH officials and the 
municipality President successfully lobbied for state aid 
for forestry. Padre Vara astonished the community when he 
arranged to have himself installed as the high school 
president, replacing Angel Marin, and then attempted to 
have the high school become the official receiver and 
distributor of the CAP and FDP funds earmarked for forestry 
development in Hojancha. He was unsuccessful in this 
effort to control the forestry funds; CACH officially 
receives the funds (Marin 1993}.
CACH, working independently of the priest, has in many 
ways successfuly transformed the economic landscape of 
Hojancha. The organization continues to lobby the state, 
as well as international development agencies such as the 
IDB, for subsidized credit and grants for the continuation 
of the reforestation (Valverde 1993). As discussed in 
Chapter Six, the forestry has benefitted some, but not all 
of Hojancha's campesinos. Tree seedling markets, for 
example, are structured in such a way that a few nursery 
owners, typically relatives and friends of CACH employees, 
dominate the information flow regarding market demand and 
prices for each seedling species. Consequently, the 
remaining nursery operators rely on these few nursery 
owners to market their seedlings for them. A process of 
social class formation arises out of seedling marketing, as 
some nursery operators abandon that activity while others 
prosper at their expense.
In the minds of many Hojanchans, employees of CACH and 
the coffee cooperative, and these employees' relatives, 
have monopolized the development process in recent years to 
their own personal benefit. In addition to several nursery 
operators who expressed these sentiments, a small number of 
producers interviewed that are skeptical of reforestation, 
regard the leaders of the CACH-cooperative alliance as 
elites and untrustworthy. One campesino of the canton's 
highlands expressed her belief that CACH officials
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orchestrate land use planning for their own benefit: it 
promotes reforestation all over the canton, convincing 
smallholders to tie up valuable land in trees, in order to 
improve the water resources downstream, where the CACH 
officials live, with little or no benefit to highlanders. 
Other Hojanchans have criticized CACH as being out of touch 
with the community, and staffed by several "outsiders" 
(non-Hojanchans) who do not know the people and their 
problems personally.
There is talk of "The Group of Fifteen," which 
includes current and former directors of CACH and Coope- 
Pilangosta, as well as several elected municipality 
officials, who together control decision making with 
respect to the spending of revenues and the lobbying of the 
state through the cantonal committee of the Regional 
Development Council. The Group of Fifteen, whether or not 
it is in fact a dictatorial committee as some Hojanchans 
suggest, represents the opposition to Luis Vara. Until the 
early 1980s, the group had been allied with Vara.
The rift between former allies was most visible during 
the events leading up to the 1993 PLN "pre-eleccion," or 
primary election. In July, the same time that the party 
held its nationwide primary for presidential candidates, it 
held a non-binding nationwide primary for candidates for 
diputado. PLN officials in San Jose decide which 
candidates will appear on the ballot in the official
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election against the PUSC, and in what order, based in part 
on the vote outcome in local areas during the pre-election. 
Each candidate for diputado runs on a slate with a PLN 
presidential candidate. Hojancha's two candidates for 
diputado were Oscar Campos, Director of Coope-Pilangosta 
and member of the Group of Fifteen, and Felix Vazquez, the 
priest's hand-picked candidate and Director of La 
Asociacidn sin Fronteras, the priest's housing subsidy 
organization. Interestingly, both Campos and Vazquez ran 
on slates with the front-running presidential candidate, 
Jose Maria Figueres, son of the late President Don Pepe 
Figueres.
The often dirty campaign included open criticisms 
launched by Vazquez and his campaign workers of Campos, the 
Group of Fifteen, and their "elitism." Campos, who has a 
strong following in the community, did not feel the need to 
counter with negative campaign tactics, though many of his 
followers openly criticized the priest as a "dictator" 
surrounded by "incompetent people." Such conversations 
about the campaign could frequently be heard in the town of 
Hojancha and surrounding villages of the canton. Bumper 
stickers and campaign signs bearing the candidates' names 
along with Figueres's, were everywhere in the study region. 
When registered "liberacionistas" (PLN voters) went to the 
polls, Campos won with approximately 85 percent of the 
vote. Apparently, though many Hojanchans are distrustful
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of the Group of Fifteen and their rapidly increasing 
standard of living, they are even more distrustful of Padre 
Vara's waning political machine, and especially his closest 
associates.
In 1989, Luis Vara established a campesino development 
organization to rival the CACH-cooperative alliance. 
CEMPRODECA, the Center for Campesino Development and 
Promotion, is a non-profit, non-governmental organization 
(NGO) that seeks donations and low-interest loans from a 
variety of sources, including the Costa Rican government, 
the IDB, and Catholic Relief Agencies. Its office is 
located within the church complex. CEMPRODECA attempts to 
offer low-interest loans to small-scale producers wishing 
to diversify household production into cash-earning 
activities, such as vegetables, fruit trees, crafts, and 
small pulperias. The organization has been criticized for 
duplicating the efforts of CACH. Because it is not a 
"centro agricola cantonal" (cantonal agricultural center) 
like CACH, CEMPRODECA cannot as easily receive grants or 
donations directly from the state, but must rely more on 
philanthropic organizations.
The claim by some allies of the priest that Coope- 
Pilangosta and its director, Oscar Campos, are concerned 
only for the rich, is exaggerated. It is true the 
cooperative does exhibit some aspects of a capitalist 
enterprise. For example, not all the profits from the sale
of coffee go to producers; some end up as salaries and 
perks for cooperative employees. On the other hand, Campos 
has successfully negotiated an agreement with the Max 
Havelaar Organization, a European social democratic 
philanthropic organization that markets the products of 
Third World smallholders in Europe. Because of the efforts 
of Campos, Max Havelaar will begin purchasing coffee from 
Coope-Pilangosta and six other coffee cooperatives of 
northwestern Costa Rica at prices higher than the global 
(New York spot) market price. Part of the extra profits 
will be paid to producers, and part will be donated by the 
Havelaar organization to reforestation and technical 
assistance projects in northwestern Costa Rica (Campos 
1993; El Ganadero 1993b; 31) .
An examination of the agricultural-related loans 
granted by Hojancha's four major lending organizations 
offers an indication of the relative influence of each 
organization, and the relative strength of each productive 
sector (Table 8-1). In 1992, for example, CEMPRODECA 
accounted for about 10 percent of total loans dedicated to 
agricultural activities and related microbusinesses. These 
loans were granted to small-scale producers. CACH and the 
National Bank of Costa Rica (BNCR) accounted for 38 and 39 
percent, respectively. The bank's agricultural loans are 
overwhelmingly granted to medium-and large-scale cattle 
producers in the study area. CACH loans are granted for a
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TABLE 8-1
AGRICULTURE-RELATED LOANS IN HOJANCHA, 1992 



























Source: Unpublished data, BNCR, CACH, CEMPRODECA, Coope- 
Pilangosta, R.L., 1993.
variety of uses, primarily nursery-establishment, medium- 
and large-scale cattle production, and microbusinesses such 
as woodworking shops. The risk-reduction policies of both 
CACH and BNCR are strict, yielding smallholders a 
disproportionately small share of the loans. The claims by 
CEMPRODECA and others that CACH loans are granted 
disproportionately to relatives and political associates of 
the organization's employees are not entirely unfounded. 
Several such associates and relatives have received large 
loans for such things as nurseries, cattle production, and 
even a store off the town square. Not all smallholders are 
forced to rely exclusively on CEMPRODECA for credit. In 
some cases, small nursery operators have received CACH
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loans for that purpose. Coope-Pilangosta offers credit to 
most coffee smallholders that request it.
The canton's recent examples of raised living 
standards are not limited to those families prospering from 
coffee production or forestry. A vigorous housing subsidy 
program, initiated by the PLN administration of Oscar 
Arias, was implemented in 1986 in Hojancha under the 
leadership of Luis Vara. Since its establishment, more 
than 1,600 subsidized cement houses have been constructed 
in the Nicoya Peninsula, all of which have been 
administered out of Vara's Hojancha office, La Asociacion 
Cristiana sin Fronteras, directed by Felix Vazquez (Table 
8-2). Of the 1,200 houses in the entire canton of 
Hojancha, 439 (37 percent) are concrete houses subsidized 
under this program (Vazquez 1993). Two-thirds of the 
peninsula's subsidized houses were funded under the PLN 
administration of Oscar Arias, and one-third under the PUSC 
administration of Rafael Calderon, indicating the PLN's 
stronger committment to the welfare state. Calderon's 
administration changed some bylaws to make the client pay 
more of the legal, administrative and engineering costs 
(Vazquez 1993). A count of the houses in the town of 
Hojancha reveals that 57 percent are totally concrete, many 
of which are subsidized, while 36 percent are of the older, 
but still modern, concrete-wood type described in Chapter
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Seven. The town has the appearance of a middle-class 
community, especially in terms of housing.
TABLE 8-2 
HOUSING SUBSIDIES ADMINISTERED BY 
HOJANCHA'S HOUSING OFFICE, 1987-93
















♦Subsidies approved under PLN (Arias) Administration
Number approved under Arias (PLN)=1,076 (269 per year) 
Number approved under Calderon (PUSC)=548 (183 per year)
Source: Unpublished statistics, La Asociacion Cristiana sin 
Fronteras, 1993.
Because of Hojanchans' successes at lobbying for 
development funding, housing subsidies, and other aid from 
PLN administrations, it is no wonder that the canton 
consistently supports the PLN at the poles. According to 
the President of Hojancha's Chamber of Cattlemen, the PLN 
also favors the small farm sector of Costa Rican society. 
Party officials tend to promote such legislation as 
protectionism, to guard against cheaper imported beef and 
food grains from other Central American countries with 
lower wages (Vargas Quesada 1993).
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As a result of PLN policies regarding smallholders and 
housing, Hojancha, a smallholder stronghold, has been the 
most "liberacionista" of all Costa Rica's 81 cantones, in 
all six presidential elections since its establishment as a 
canton (Table 8-3). Even in years when PLN has lost the 
national election, a majority of Hojanchans voted PLN.
Such strong PLN support is not the case in the other ten
TABLE 8-3 
HOJANCHAN VERSUS GUANACASTECAN AND 


































Sources: Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones de la Republica de 
Costa Rica; Valverde 1994.
cantones of Guanacaste Province (Tribunal Supremo de 
Elecciones 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990; Valverde 1994) . 
According to Rolando Araya, nephew of PLN President Alberto 
Monge (1982-86) and himself a pre-candidate for the PLN 
presidential nomination in 1993, the remarkably strong
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support for the PLN in Hojancha, and the strong assistance 
to Hojancha by PLN administrations, are no accident: the 
two phenomena are mutually reinforcing components of the 
politics of place characterizing Hojancha.
Conclusions: Local Agency and the Construction
Of Hoianchan Regional Identity
Marx, the student of Hegel, knew 
perfectly well that the means are 
themselves the end in the process 
of becoming. (Harrington 1990: 38).
Small farm forestry and favorable coffee prices alone 
are not responsible for shaping Hojancha's contemporary 
regional identity. Other examples of human agency abound. 
As Harrington suggested, a group of people, in the process 
of transforming their material conditions, develop a sense 
of comradery, a knowledge of how to work together. As the 
Hojancha case study exemplifies, this idea has regional 
relevance. Through its efforts to reverse poverty, the 
region developed the capacity to alter the social, 
political and economic structures that condition(ed) its 
participation in the national economy and the World System. 
The effect is cumulative, characterized by a momentum that 
is tied to Hojanchans' perceptions of (their) place.
One owner of a "soda," or family-style diner, in 
Hojancha remarked that the region's uniqueness is a matter 
of scale: the community is small enough that it is possible 
to organize. In his view, anyone, not just the wealthy, 
can be part of an organization in Hojancha. At the same
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time, the community is large enough to constitute a 
sufficiently visible force, not to be ignored outside the 
canton. The diversity of concerns, problems and viewpoints 
in the community, propagates the formation of groups and 
associations.
One organization that has spun off from the formation 
of CACH is a women's cooperative, La Asociacion de Mujeres 
de Hojancha. Founded in 1991, the cooperative of 11 women 
manufactures clothing for sale in Nicoya, and through a 
wholesaler in San Jose. Donations by CACH, Coope- 
Pilangosta, U.S.AID, The Peace Corps and a Canadian agency, 
Youth Challenge International, enabled the women to 
purchase a small lot in town and contract to have a small 
building constructed that doubles as a retail outlet and 
meeting space. Most of the sewing work is done 
individually in the home. In the early stages, the women 
democratically decided which activity the group would 
engage in. It was decided that the greatest collective 
skill, and the greatest product demand, were clothing.
They elected to receive an hourly wage of 150 Colones 
($1.08) from the profits, with the remainder reinvested 
back into the business to buy materials and to pay off the 
property. The women generally agree they have benefitted 
from the experience of group action. One problem they 
face, however, is competition from maquiladoras. foreign- 
owned factories that produce clothing in much greater
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quantities and at lower costs, due to economies of scale, 
lower wages, and capital intensity (K. Lopez 1993).
In 1992, an accountant of CACH formed the "comite de 
cultura, 1 a committee to lobby the Ministry of Culture to 
construct a "casa de cultura" in Hojancha. She established 
the necessary connections to convince the ministry to visit 
Hojancha, and evaluate the community for its feasibility to 
receive and support a community cultural center. Because 
of the ministry's positive impressions of Hojancha, its 
sense of community, and its ability to organize, the canton 
was selected to receive one of only three cultural centers 
to be constructed in Costa Rica over the next several 
years. Apparently, never before had a community formed a 
cultural committee so quickly that was successful.
In 1993, a group of women and men that own shops, 
sodas and other related businesses, formed a Chamber of 
Tourism to promote that activity in the study region. The 
idea is to tap into the tourism traffic that passes through 
the canton on the way to and from the beach resort 
community of Puerto Carrillo. Because of the locality's 
nationwide reputation as a progressive smallholder 
stronghold and center of forestry-related activities, the 
chamber plans to promote Hojancha as a destination for 
"agroecotourism," an alternative to the homogeneous beach 
resorts of the country's Pacific coast (Morales Chaves 
1993) .
A region's identity, or "uniqueness" is perhaps best 
elaborated by persons familiar with it but not native to 
it, A small number of non-native Hojanchans were 
interviewed for their impressions. Nearly all commented 
that Hojanchan campesinos are different in many ways from 
those of the rest of Guanacaste, not only for their strong 
sense of municipal organization, but because of their 
"drive" to "get ahead" economically. Outsiders frequently 
complain that Hojancha is heavily populated by 
"choriceros," a term which roughly translates to "wheeler- 
dealers." Because so many of them are part-time 
intermediarios for a number of different products and 
services, as a means of supplementing farm income, they are 
considered to have a mindset of constant profit-seeking. 
Indeed, this researcher was approached on more than one 
occasion by eager Hojanchans offering their services as 
middlemen if he would import used cars from the United 
States.
In short, Hojancha's contemporary regional 
restructuring and regional identity are, in the minds of 
many Costa Ricans, synonomous with upward social mobility. 
The latter, in-turn, is strongly linked to the social 
democratic maneuverings of various PLN administrations of 
the past three decades in San Jose, and PLN-idealogue 
community leaders in Hojancha. The PLN's attention to 
Hojancha and its needs has served to legitimize, in the
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eyes of most Hojanchans, the state and its overall 
promotion of export-oriented capital accumulation.
A close inspection of "Hojanchan excptionalism," 
however, reveals that the benefits of Hojancha's social 
democratic development efforts are not shared equally. For 
the bulk of the region's farm families, the creation and 
operation of CACH, Coope-Pilangosta, and CEMPRODECA are 
only partially empowering. The input of most local 
Hojanchans is minimized. These organizations are run by 
bureaucrats, local elites who have the final word on the 
granting of credit and subsidies. These organizations 
clearly have provided greater opportunities for upward 
social mobility to their directors, employees and relatives 
than to their constituents as a whole.
Many members of the community in fact remain left 
behind. Forestry, subsidized housing, and higher coffee 
prices have not yet translated to the development of, for 
example, Matambu. If smallholder products continue to 
suffer declining terms of trade, and if wages and 
employment opportunities do not increase significantly, 
Hojanchan regional identity in the future will likely 
include such words as "poverty," "disparity," and perhaps 
even "despair," as in the past.
CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It is suggested in this dissertation that a complete, 
or "holistic" description of a locality or small region 
should include, but not be limited to, those features 
associated with traditional, descriptive regional 
geography: physical environment, land uses, cultural 
traditions, demographics, and the like. Given the 
increasingly interdependent nature of the contemporary 
global economy, the studies of regions, to be truly 
insightful, should address the nature of the connections 
between the region in question and the always-shifting 
World System. At the same time, the World System is best 
viewed as being "played out" in a multitude of localities, 
each of which permits the observer a "peek" at the system's 
inner workings. Critical chorology, as elaborated in this 
work, is an expansion of traditional regional geography 
that places a strong emphasis on these extra-locality 
connections, as well as the intra-regional forces that 
shape these connections.
The approach of critical chorology, therefore, is 
basically an enhanced version of the new regional geography 
intended to be employed in studies of restructuring of 
localities throughout the Third World. Because family 
farming in its many forms is still the predominant means 
for deploying labor in most localities in the developing
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world, the environment would out of necessity be an 
important component of such studies. This emphasis is 
perhaps the primary way in which critical chorology differs 
from the new regional geography. While political ecology 
considers the political economic bases of environmental 
change, it tends to place litle emphasis on the meaning of 
place and the formation of place around some political 
activity or cause, two essential components of critical 
chorology. Each Third World locality is unique; therefore, 
the issues that are relevant to Hojancha's regional 
restructuring will not necessarily be relevant elsewhere. 
Political behaviors and biographies will also differ.
The Hojancha case study of critical chorology has 
demonstrated that the workings of a political system at 
multiple levels, from local to national, is pertinent to a 
region's construction. Hojancha, the canton, came about as 
a result of such political processes, driven by the 
priest's and other local leaders' efforts to develop 
political connections at the national level. The 
locality's living standards are determined in large part by 
political maneuverings at different levels: housing and 
forestry subsidies from the national government; the 
workings of the social democratic welfare state in matters 
of education, health care and infrastructure; and the 
differential granting of credit by local institutions such
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as CACH, the coffee cooperative, CEMPRODECA, and the local 
branch of the National Bank.
These political maneuverings, by providing many 
Hojanchan campesinos a means of achieving upward social 
mobility, serve to legitimize the existing social system of 
capital accumulation, and its characteristic class 
structure. Those Hojanchans who remain in poverty are 
seemingly pacified by the existence of the social welfare 
safety net, and by the study region's own ideology, based 
on the hopes and possibilities of a better life, an 
ideology furthered by community leaders in their everyday 
discourse.
In Chapter Two, I discussed several ways in which the 
study of regions can make significant contributions to 
contemporary social science. Hojancha as a case study 
serves to illustrate the usefulness of a regional 
perspective on social processes. First, geographically 
uneven development under capitalism is produced at multiple 
scales, and each region or locality has its "place" in that 
development. Hojancha has exhibited uneven'development in 
its recent history. For the first six decades of the 
twentieth century, Hojancha produced modest quantities of 
food crops and cattle for distant markets. Surplus accrued 
to merchants of the Valle Central who controlled the 
marketing. Its remote location and the high transportation 
costs, borne by its producers, served to marginalize the
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region. Poverty increased as the prices Hojanchan 
campesinos received for their farm products failed to keep 
up with increases in costs of production, crop marketing, 
and consumer goods.
A subsequent boom in coffee markets in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s enabled many smallholders of Hojancha's 
highlands to persist, and even prosper. As explained in 
Chapter Seven, the Hojanchan highlands became, along with 
the Valle Central and other coffee regions of Costa Rica, 
one of the few places in Central America where upward 
social mobility was enjoyed by campesinos to more than a 
modest degree. Lowland Hojanchan smallholders, however, 
largely suffered from the effects of increased 
concentration of cattle production in fewer hands at the 
time. Forestry-related activities, particularly seedling 
production, have provided a new basis for persistence or 
even economic improvement for many smallholders, but 
unemployment or even farm loss for others. In short, 
throughout the twentieth century, Hojancha has at various 
times developed, and at other times has suffered economic 
hardship. Still other times, it has exhibited simultaneous 
development and marginalization, or geographically uneven 
development within the locality.
Second, regions are spatial expressions of the global 
division of labor, in which individual regions play 
different roles. In addition to the production of cattle,
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coffee, food crops and forestry products for local, 
national and/or international markets, Hojancha has
provided the coffee and banana regions with laborers. One
or more members of the most marginalized families of the 
study area are forced to migrate seasonally, and in some 
cases more permanently. Those who hire this labor profit 
by doing so, and in this way, Hojancha provides those
regions a source of capital.
Third, the region is the spatial expression of the 
interaction of political processes at different scales. As 
discussed in Chapter Eight, the campesinos and other people 
of that portion of the Nicoya Peninsula's interior 
perceived a common plight. The community, which coincided 
territorially with the watershed of the Nosara river, came 
together in an effort to reverse economic and political 
marginalization and environmental degradation. The 
establishment of this territory first as a district, then 
as a canton, came about because of the common effort that 
its inhabitants identified, and the leadership of Padre 
Luis Vara. These political exercises created the 
foundation and momentum for subsequent political 
maneuverings by Hojancha's community leaders.
Finally, region or locality is a significant component 
of the theory of "structuration" as elaborated by Giddens 
{1984) . The locality is the spatial setting for 
interactions between human initiative {agency) and
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politically-reinforced economic structures. As humans in 
capitalist societies engage in work and/or trade, under 
conditions (i.e., social and economic structures) not of 
their own making, their everyday lives take on "routines" 
that occur and reoccur in space. Their attempts to modify 
the structures, to render their everyday routines more 
palatable, likewise are place-contingent. These connected, 
spatially-intersecting occurrences give rise to specific 
regions, or localities.
In the carrying out of their everyday livelihoods, the 
people of the Hojancha study region interact with each 
other typically even more than with people of neighboring 
cantones who may in fact be closer by. Such patterns have 
developed historically, and form the basis for Hojancha's 
"structuration of campesino persistence." Community and 
business leaders in the town of Hojancha, the study area's 
primary node, have historically interacted on an everyday 
basis with farm and laborer families of surrounding 
villages; to legitimize and solidify their positions of 
influence, these leaders attempt to work on behalf of these 
people in national and international political and economic 
spheres. The priest's political lobbying efforts, the 
establishment of the agreement involving the coffee 
cooperative and the Max Havelaar Foundation, and CACH's 
efforts to gain resources for the study region's forestry, 
serve as examples of this structuration.
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In short, the Hojancha study region is defined in 
large part by interacted sets of routinized social 
practices functioning at different levels: peasants, 
community elites, and national and international power 
brokers. Hojancha's regional identity is reinforced by 
interactions between Hojanchan campesinos and its community 
leaders. Likewise, the continued development of relations 
between Hojanchan community leaders and "outside" political 
and economic forces, such as the state, constructs and 
reinforces the region's identity.
Critical chorology, in its treatment of regions, does 
not consider social, political and economic practices in 
isolation from the physical setting. The Hojancha study 
region is defined as much by human transformations of 
nature as by social interactions. In fact, physical 
landscape changes and social interactions are linked, and 
historically contingent. The regional geography of 
Hojancha has been reconstructed through a series of 
political-ecological conjunctures.
Chapter Three provides a description of the physical 
geography and the pre-Columbian and Spaniard settlement 
histories of the Nicoya Peninsula and Hojancha. Prior to 
the twentieth century, Chorotegans escaping crowded 
haciendas cleared the first agricultural fields out of the 
extensive forests of the low but rugged central Nicoyan 
mountains and the isolated altiplanos of the zone. Chapter
Four describes the settlement patterns and economy of the 
study region in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Settlers escaping crowded conditions in the western end of 
the Valle Central in the twentieth century subsequently 
occupied and expanded these fields. The latter process was 
accelerated by the linkage of the region to national and 
global agricultural products markets, and the development 
of local land markets, early in the century. As the region 
became more dependent on selling food crops, cattle, and 
coffee to Valle Central markets, campesinos produced fewer 
{and purchased more) of their household needs. As a 
result, they became more deeply dependent upon market- 
oriented production. As national food crop markets 
expanded, Hojancha's locational disadvantages became 
apparent. The boom in cattle markets beginning in the 
1950s, enabled Hojanchans with sufficient landholdings to 
escape the poverty accompanying the locational 
disadvantages in food crop markets.
The conjuncture of favorable international beef 
markets and weakened basic grains markets by the late 1950s 
resulted in a concentration of Hojanchan farmland in fewer 
hands. The land-extensive nature of cattle production 
enticed Hojanchan cattle producers to extend grazing onto 
steeply sloped, fallow and forested lands. The capital 
accumulated from the cattle boom financed additional land 
purchases and the expansion of grazing by a few Hojanchan
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cattle-producer families. The resulting land degradation, 
primarily soil erosion and soil exhaustion, rendered much 
of Hojancha's farmland useless for agricultural activities 
other than cattle grazing. Unemployment, driven by the 
land-extensive cattle culture, reinforced the need for 
smallholders to sell land.
Coffee producers in the canton's highlands, meanwhile, 
responded to additional coalescing events. The 
international coffee glut of the latter 1950s, and the 
resulting lower coffee prices, prompted Luis Vara and the 
study area's coffee producers to retain an increased 
portion of the sale price of processed coffee. The 
establishment of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), 
in part helped along by the Kennedy Administration's 
Alliance For Progress program, boosted prices by the early 
1960s. Coffee was viewed then as a favorable land use 
option in Hojancha's highlands. Production expanded 
accordingly, and coffee was an underlying factor in 
Hojancha's regional restructuring in the early 1960s. In 
short, regional reconfiguration by the early 1960s was 
created by a conjunction of social class processes, local 
ecological factors, and national and international market 
conditions with respect to cattle, basic grains and coffee. 
These national and international aspects of political 
economy are the subject of Chapter Five.
By the mid-1970s, a number of conditions had coalesced 
to pave the way for further regional restructuring in 
Hojancha. Declining terms of trade in basic grains had 
forced smallholders to reduce fallow periods in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Declining terms of trade in cattle led to 
further deforestation and extension of grazing onto fragile 
lands. Emigration of landless and unemployed Hojanchans 
occurred at a remarkably high rate, capturing the attention 
of officials in San Jose. Local community leaders, led by 
Luis Vara, succeeded in their efforts to lobby the state 
for the resources to establish the cantonal agricultural 
center, CACH, in 1976. This has led to the establishment, 
within little more than a decade, of a forestry-based 
economy in the study area, despite some reservations by 
Vara and others about emphasizing the activity so strongly. 
The growing interest in reforestation on the part of the 
state, as expressed in a series of subsidies and 
environmental laws enacted since the latter 1960s, played a 
major role in the course of Hojanchan development from 1976 
on.
The development of forestry activities of Hojancha, 
the topic of Chapter Six, is an example of local agency in 
action. In particular, forestry underlies the formation of 
the region around a political cause. Once state subsidies 
for reforestation became cash payments instead of simply 
tax deductions, Hojanchan smallholders were able to take
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advantage of them. Hojancha quickly became a focal point 
of this activity on a national scale, capturing the 
attention of ecologically-based research organizations of 
Costa Rica and a number of countries of Europe, plus Canada 
and The United States. Indeed, four-wheel-drive vehicles 
bearing the emblems of such organizations arrive in 
Hojancha almost daily, transporting researchers and 
students throughout the study region to examine tree 
plantations and seedling nurseries.
The region in 1994 is most likely in the beginning 
stages of another restructuring. While smallholder demands 
on community leaders have been partly responsible for the 
development of forestry in the canton, the economic 
successes that many of them began to enjoy appear to be 
less than sustainable. Many smallholders have been 
successful at devoting small portions of their land to 
seedling nurseries. Likewise, local community leaders with 
a stake in the success of forestry have assisted several 
non-landowning laborers in establishing small nurseries on 
rented land and in marketing their seedlings. But, 
saturation of seedling markets, due to a number of factors, 
has caused economic hardship for many campesino families 
since 1990.
Market saturation is the result of structural factors. 
Hojanchan small-scale viveristas face intense competition 
with larger-scale viveristas in the region, with small- and
large-scale viveristas who recently have established 
nurseries in other regions of Costa Rica, and with the 
major reforesters themselves. The latter include large 
paper and pulp companies that have recently begun to 
produce their own seedlings instead of purchasing them from 
Hojanchan nurseries. Despite incentives, reforestation 
does not occur rapidly enough throughout Costa Rica to 
absorb the country's seedling production each year. 
Meanwhile, Hojancha's largest seedling producers, who 
largely control the flow of market information, and 
consequently control the marketing of nearly all the 
canton's seedling production, are still able to establish 
contracts with reforesters, thus guaranteeing a market for 
their own output. For smallholders to persist, new 
measures must be sought by these agents to cope with the 
changing structures.
The Hojancha case study and its regional 
transformations in the twentieth century illustrate how 
processes occurring in the realm of political economy are 
dependent upon local context. For example, Marxian-related 
analyses on the question of smallholder persistence differ 
from Chayanovian-related analyses, as discussed in Chapter 
Two. Some Hojanchan smallholders prosper, some lose out, 
and some persist at roughly the same standard of living. 
Still others prosper, then lose out, and so forth.
Likewise, the Marxian emphasis on productive relations, or
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internal class dynamics, contrasts with Wallerstein's 
(1976) World System emphasis on exchange relations. In 
truth, both have relevance in the local context, and 
neither is universally applicable. Hojanchan elites often 
prosper at the expense of the misfortunes of their 
neighbors. No malice is intended; it is simply the result 
of Hojancha's unique version of agrarian capitalism. At 
the same time, Hojancha's fortunes are tied to its linkages 
to other regions of the national, and by extension, 
international economies. It is this concept of local 
contextuality that lies at the heart of critical chorology.
Regional Restructuring in the Mid-1990s:
The Demise of "Honanchan Exceptionalism1 ?
The timing of Hojancha's entry into forestry has 
enabled the region in large part to take on the character 
of a place situated within the semi-periphery of the World 
System. By organizing early on to receive and distribute 
funds from the state and international development 
organizations, and to receive attention from ecologically- 
based research organizations, the recent frontier 
settlement zone now wields considerable influence in the 
realm of small farm forestry in northern and northwestern 
Costa Rica. Many communities of Guanacaste, the northern 
plains, and other recent frontier settlement regions that 
now participate in reforestation, rely on Hojancha's 
nurseries for their seedlings. The canton maintains its
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reputation as a leading forestry stronghold in the country: 
officials in San Jos6 of the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Mines, for example, are well acquainted with CACH 
officials and with Hojancha's most prominent viveristas and 
the quality of their product. The current director of 
AGUADEFOR, the Guanacastecan Association of Forestry 
Development, located in the city of Nicoya, is a former 
director of CACH and a native Hojanchan.
The locality's rise to the semi-periphery is not 
limited to forestry-based activities. As explained in 
Chapter Seven, the variable Hojanchan landscape of 
mountains, high plains, and the lower plain of Matambu, is 
matched by equal diversity in land use practices and labor- 
related decision making. For example, Guanacastecan coffee 
producers' recent good fortune, the agreement established 
with the Dutch-based Max Havelaar Foundation that will 
provide the region a higher price for its coffee than the 
standard Costa Rican export price, is the result of efforts 
by a native Hojanchan, the Director of Coope-Pilangosta.
He is simultaneously the director of UNACOOP, a Union of 
eight coffee cooperatives of northwestern Costa Rica that 
are part of the Max Havelaar agreement.
In late 1993, construction began adjacent to the CACH 
office of a honey processing, bottling and marketing 
center. The project, funded by the IDB, will be the 
primary outlet for beekeepers of Guanacaste. It is hoped
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by CACH that an agreement will be reached with the Max 
Havelaar Foundation for marketing the honey in Europe. The 
office that administers housing subsidies for the majority 
of the Nicoya Peninsula is located in Hojancha because of 
the connections between Luis Vara and the PLN 
Administration of Oscar Arias, which started the nationwide 
program in the late 1980s.
Although Hojancha is a regional core for these 
activities, several conditions exist which bring into 
question the region's ability to maintain well into the 
future its place in the semi-periphery. Flaws in seedling 
markets, particularly those related to saturation, and to 
the lack of coordination in the timing of the planting of 
seeds in nurseries and the application for forestry 
incentives, have generated significant risk in seedling 
production as a smallholder persistence strategy.
As discussed in Chapter Two, markets are usually not 
the central focus of political economic approaches to Third 
World rural development studies. Internal class structures 
of peasant communities, peasant household consumption 
behaviors, or household persistence strategies tend to be 
emphasized in these studies. This case study, however, 
illustrates the importance of markets to class formation 
and smallholder persistence. Those Hojanchan viveristas 
who dominate the marketing of the canton's seedlings have 
seen their social positions enhanced. Within a decade, the
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largest seedling producers have been able to hire the most 
labor, and therefore, generate sufficient capital to expand 
production each year. Small-scale seedling producers who 
have experienced considerably less success with seedling 
markets, have suffered economic hardship and even debt. 
Their lack of capital, their inability to expand 
production, and stagnant seedling prices have translated to 
a combination of declining terms of trade, 
proletarianization, and in some cases, landlessness, for 
small-scale viveristas. Large-scale producers, on the 
other hand, are insulated from these effects. Thus, 
Hojancha's contemporary regional restructuring involves 
"locals manipulating locals" as much as it involves 
competition with other regions.
Seedling markets do not represent the only forestry- 
related problem. As officials of CACH, DGF, and CEMPRODECA 
point out, it is unlikely the IDB-backed reforestation 
subsidies will continue. Based on the responses of 
reforesters in Hojancha interviewed as part of this study, 
the incentive payments have been crucial to smallholders' 
decisions to reforest. A majority of Hojanchan reforesters 
indicated they were reluctant to devote one to three 
hectares of land to reforestation, but did so primarily for 
the incentive payments. Several expressed their concern 
that by choosing reforestation, they forfeited the ability
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to raise cattle or food crops on the land, which could have 
provided the household additional food or income each year.
Hoiancha's Likely Future Course
Assuming the IDB-backed subsidies end, which is 
likely, reforestation will be an activity of predominately 
medium-sized and larger farms, whose owners view it as a 
long-term investment. Such farm operators will obviously 
not have the same short-term cash flow requirements as many 
who now participate in the incentive programs. Retired 
farmers whose children leave the community for college or 
urban jobs will find reforestation, which has low labor 
requirements, an attractive supplement to small-scale 
cattle production. Already, a small number of Hojanchans 
with insufficient family labor have pulled their coffee 
trees out of the ground, replacing them with pasture or 
planted hardwood trees.
Eventually, the results of today's reforestation in 
Hojancha will materialize, and the wood will be sold. Most 
likely, demand and prices for the wood of all species 
produced in Hojancha will be favorable. Rain forests will 
become a less important source of hardwoods, and tree 
plantations will prove to be economically feasible for 
those producers with sufficient land and capital. This 
expected success will translate to a sustained interest in 
reforestation, especially among operators of medium and
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large farms. Smallholders will most likely produce edible 
products instead, such as basic grains and cattle.
This likely pattern will be reinforced by the growing 
consciousness of reforestation on the part of Costa Ricans. 
Ecotourism and agroecotourism are, and will continue to be, 
the basis for the increase in foreign visitors to Costa 
Rica. As such, these are economic sectors of great 
interest to the state and multinational lending 
institutions. This will reinforce Hojanchans' efforts to 
promote agroecotourism in the canton through its cantonal 
Chamber of Tourism, which in turn will serve to sustain 
interest in reforestation in the community. Already, 
several Hojanchans banking on such a future have plans for 
opening more restaurants and lodging facilities. CACH may 
very well be successful in obtaining alternative sources of 
financing for reforestation, given the potential of 
agroecotourism. This most likely will not be in the form 
of incentive payments, which smallholders would need for 
participation in the activity. It is worth noting that 
Hojancha already has played an important role in shaping 
the national consciousness with respect to reforestation. 
The community is becoming better known throughout Costa 
Rica. The phenomenon exemplifies local agency affecting 
national structure. CACH and Coope-Pilangosta will most 
likely become deeply involved in the marketing of 
agroecotourism in the canton.
Saturation of seedling markets will serve in the short 
run to reduce the number of new, start-up nurseries as well 
as existing small-scale nurseries. Smallholders and 
laborers who in recent years have looked to seedlings as a 
mechanism for achieving upward social mobility, will mostly 
rely once again on basic grains as a household subsistence 
strategy. Most likely, aspirations for upward mobility 
will be replaced by, quite simply, the desire to persist. 
Bee keeping and honey production may prove to be viable 
alternative cash-generating activities for smallholders. 
This depends upon the ability of CACH to promote forward 
and backward linkages, including marketing honey throughout 
Costa Rica and beyond, and the ability for smallholders to 
gain more of a collective voice in matters of CACH credit 
policies.
If reforestation were to no longer be widely practiced 
in Hojancha, the region would stand to lose much of its 
clout in San Jose. Forestry is, after all, responsible for 
much of the attention the region receives from officials of 
the state and international development organizations with 
regional headquarters in San Jose. Similarly, the current 
social class and political structures of Hojancha are 
maintained largely because they are legitimized in the 
minds of most Hojanchans, by virtue of the successes power 
brokers have brought to the community in the realm of 
forestry. With faltering seedling markets and the
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disappearance of reforestation subsidies, however, the 
current Hojanchan elite will face a new crisis of 
legitimation.
Future Hojanchan regional restructuring, before and 
after the turn of the twenty-first century, will be the 
expression-in-place of a coalescing of forces that involve 
the physical environment, the social structure of the 
community, the Costa Rican domestic economy, the World 
System, and the personalities and biographies of 
Hojanchans. As in the past, Hojanchans' efforts to achieve 
an improved way of life will not be free to operate in 
isolation from global processes. Economic "downsizing" in 
the industrial world, the proliferation of global "free" 
trade agreements, the increasing spatial mobility of 
capital throughout the world, and global austerity measures 
are among the large-scale processes whose unpredictable 
outcomes will surely condition the social context within 
which future Hojanchan regional identity unfolds.
If forestry is to have a future as a smallholder 
persistence activity, the demand for wood products, a 
condition beyond the control of Hojanchan agents, will have 
to improve and be maintained. Rolanda Araya, the former 
Municipal Executive of San Jos£ and former Minister of 
Public Works, and social democratic political philosopher, 
has maintained that contemporary Costa Rican exceptionalism 
cannot be sustained if the country continues to rely on
exporting basic agricultural goods that continually suffer 
declining terms of trade (Araya 1987: 150-157). Similarly, 
Hojancha's relative prosperity, to be maintained, depends 
in large part on the development of forward linkages to its
forestry sector, which itself would be uncomfortably
dependent upon distant political and economic forces beyond 
the direct control of the community. The locality's fate 
rests in part in the hands of its people, and in part in
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APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
USED FOR SELECTING INTERVIEWS
Two conditions make necessary the use of 
representative samples in social scientific fieldwork: the
use of quantification and the impossibility of interviewing 
every member of the study's population (Pelto and Pelto 
1978: 127-140). Because a limited amount of quantification 
is employed in this study, I found it necessary to select a 
sample to represent as closely as possible the overall 
population of agricultural households in the Hojancha study 
area. This was a challenging task. According to Pelto and 
Pelto (1978: 130), "(e)ven in relatively small communities 
it is sometimes difficult to obtain a total enumeration of 
families or households from which to draw a random sample." 
No list exists of all agricultural households in the 
Hojancha study area from which to conveniently draw a 
sample. Likewise, no up-to-date areal photographs exist 
from which to derive a strict random sample.
To obtain a close approximation of a strict random 
sample, a sampling methodology was derived, utilizing 
components of quota sampling and stratified random 
sampling, as elaborated by Pelto and Pelto (1978: 127-140). 
A stratified sample is one that takes into account the 
different subgroups of a research population, such as 
social classes, ethnic groups, and in this case, 
altitudinal subzones and producer categories. Quota
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sampling is a not-strictly random type of stratified 
sample that involves the selection of a sample through the 
use of quotas to match the research population in its 
diversity of subgroups.
Given the diversity of subzones in the study region, 
including highland (coffee-producing) villages, the 
Hojancha Meseta and Matambu, a stratified sampling 
technique was necessary to ensure that each producer 
category (laborer households and small-, medium- and large- 
farm households) were adequately represented in each of the 
subzones. However, the possibility of obtaining a strictly 
random sample, accurately representing these subcategories 
in the same proportions as the overall population, is 
further reduced by the fact that many Hojanchan farm units 
are fragmented, and located in one or more subzones and 
some distance from the household.
The sample included 119 agriculturalists, consisting 
of 88 farm operators and 31 laborers. This represents 
approximately 14 percent of the study area's total 
households, and 18.5 percent of its agricultural 
households, according to a household count conducted in 
1992 by officials of the Social Security Clinic of 
Hojancha. The sample can be broken down by zone and 
producer type as indicated in Table A-l. Officials of CACH 
were consulted regarding the validity of this sample. They
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agreed that this is an accurate breakdown of the 
agricultural population of the study region.
TABLE A-1































Within each village or subzone, households were 
selected along main roads and along secondary side roads in 
proportions roughly equal to the actual proportions for all 
households. Furthermore, to achieve the sample roughly 
duplicating the actual proportions of laborers and small, 
medium and large farms in each subzone (as estimated by 
CACH officials), a quota sampling technique was used toward 
the end of the interviewing process. In the case of 
deficiencies (for example, medium-sized producers in the 
highland subzone,) a search was carried out to round up the 
desired number, so that the sample matched the proportional 
estimates of CACH. This sometimes involved interviewing a
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head of household living in one subzone, but whose farm was 
located in another subzone.
In those situations, such as this study, where complex 
statistical operations are not necessary, a sampling 
technique based on, but not strictly, a random technique 
provides a valid, useful representation (Pelto and Pelto 
1987: 127-140). In the case of this study, general land 
use and labor trends were to be identified, as opposed to 
detailed and complex agronomic or agricultural economic 
statistical analyses.
APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY OF PERTINENT SPANISH TERMS
Beneficio. Coffee processing plant where the beans are 
husked and roasted.
Cajuela. Unit of measure equalling 20 liters.
Campesino. Peasant; small-scale landowner.
Charral. Scrubland; fallow land with weeds, brush and
young tree saplings approaching 2 meters in height.
Comerciante. Middleman, businessman.
Empacador. Beef slaughter and packing house.
Encomienda. A system of land tenure in which the Spanish 
Crown granted explorers or other military leaders 
rights over Indians of an assigned territory in the 
Spanish colonies.
Hacienda. Large estates in Latin America characterized by 
feudal or quasi-feudal social relations in which the 
landowner presides over peons. The latter receive 
minor benefits, such as the use of a small piece of 
land for subsistence crop production, but do not 
ultimately control the surplus produced on the estates 
nor the land on which they work.
Jornal. A unit of measure of labor equal to one worker- 
day; one work day.
Mestizo. Racially-mixed, White and Indian.
Minifundia. Tiny agricultural landholding, usually too
small to sustain a family's livelihood without their 
reliance on wages earned off farm.
Minifundista. Campesino owner/occupier of a minifundia.
Minifundizacifin. Process of division of landholdings 
into minifundias, usually by inheritence, or by 
selling off of part during economic hard times.
Pe6n. Agricultural laborer or tenant on a hacienda; 





Recibidora. Coffee collection station, usually a small 
shack, located in most villages, where coffee 
cooperative or company receives unprocessed coffee 
beans from farmers.
Tacotal. Scrubland; land fallow at least three years, 
with tall weeds, brush and young trees.
Tierras baldios, tierras libras. Unoccupied or unclaimed 
lands available for colonization.
Viverista. Nursery (tree seedling farm) operator.
Vivero. nursery; tree seedling farm.
APPENDIX III 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE STUDY REGION
1. Town of Hojancha
Denuded, sloped landscape near Pita Rayada
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3. Campesino family and their home, Huacas
4. An example of subsidized housing, San Gerardo
Woodshop where furniture is manufactured, Hojancha
6. Recently planted pochote seedlings, Libertad
7. Pe6n (laborer) harvesting pochote seedlings,
San Gerardo
8. Melina, two years old, in need of weeding, Hojancha
9. Teak, two years old, Hojancha
Harvested pochote seedlings, Hojancha
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